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Political Islam and Social Polarization in Turkey

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ABSTRACT

In the last years Turkish society has gone under major transformations. Since the Ottomans acknowledged that their Muslim identity was the main reason of their backwardness, the social compromise was never maintained again. As a result of Ottoman Empire's numerous defeats by the West which it always despised, Ottoman authorities had to make a choice by acknowledging either the issue was Islam itself or the believers. Thus, Ottoman authorities defined that the issue was Islam and accepted that its dominance on the administration should be reduced. This way Ottomans got under an extensive modernization period which extended their life remarkably. Following the fall of Ottoman Empire, young Turkey was founded from its ashes and carried on the westernized reforms. Atatürk also saw the issue with Islam and implemented a series of reforms in the lead of Republican People's Party to eliminate Islam from all spheres of social and political life. However, this was not welcomed by the majority of the society and in the first free elections in 1950; society showed its desire for a change and elected the opposing Democrat Party with an overwhelming majority which followed a moderate policy towards religion. In the following years, as the welfare state declined, Islamist parties were able to gain a remarkable ground in Turkish politics. The most important of those was Welfare Party as it was the first Islamist party that was elected with the majority vote. During its 15 years of existence Welfare Party was the main actor in social polarization. Even though it was a party which was elected by majority, its acts that praised Islamic values were perceived as anti-laic by the governing elite and the party was closed in 1998. However, its social base never gave up their fight. In 2002, this time Justice and Development Party became the address of Islamist circles by receiving the approval of almost half of the population. Since then the party is being the voice of the society which rises against status-quo. However, party's radical acts in the recent years also drew a contra-opposition against itself which blames the party with being dishonest in its acts, having a secret agenda of Islamizing the country and gradually heading for a civil dictatorship by suppressing the opposite voices.

This thesis presents an overview on Islamism, politicization of Islam, Turkish democracy, social polarization starting from the Turkish acceptance of Islam until the present day in the first two parts and argues the effects of political Islam on Turkish society on the basis of social polarization at the last part through using empirical data from primary and secondary sources.

Keywords:

Political Islam, Islamism, Moderate Islam, Islam, Turkey, Muslim, Atatürk, Welfare party, Justice and Development Party, Democrat Party, People's Republican Party, Polarization, Ottoman Empire, Identity, Ideology, Social Uprising, Turban, Gulen Movement, Public Space, Military Coup, Coup d'Etat, Modernism, Postmodernism, Secularism, Laicism, Laic, Green Belt Project, Greater Middle East Project

RESUMO

Nos últimos anos, a sociedade Turca teve as suas maiores transformações. Desde que os Otomanos reconheceram que a sua identidade Muçulmana era a principal razão da sua relutância, o compromisso social nunca mais foi mantido de novo. Como o resultado das numerosas derrotas do Império Otomano pelo Oeste, que sempre foram desprezadas, as autoridades Otomanas tiveram que fazer uma escolha; ou o reconhecimento do próprio Islão, ou os seus crentes. Então, as autoridades Otomanas decidiram que o Islão e o seu domínio na administração deverião ser reduzidos. Esta decisão dos Otomanos conseguiu um longo período de modernização, que alargou consideravelmente a sua existência. Após a queda do Império Otomano, a jovem Turquia foi fundada sobre as suas cinzas e trouxe consigo reformas ocidentalizadas. Atatürk também viu a saída com o Islamismo e implementou uma série de reformas no governo do Partido Republicano do Povo, para eliminar o Islão de todas as esferas da vida social e política. Contudo, isto não foi bem visto pela maioria da sociedade e, nas primeiras eleições livres em 1950, a sociedade mostrou o desejo de uma mudança e elegeu na oposição o Partido Democrático com uma preponderante maioria, que seguiu uma política moderada na religião. Nos anos seguintes, como o estado de bem-estar declinou. Os partidos Islamistas conseguiram ganhar um remarcável terreno na política Turca. O mais importante de todos, foi o Partido do Bem-Estar, que foi o primeiro partido Islamista que foi eleito com maioria de votos. Durante os seus 15 anos de existência, o Partido do Bem-Estar foi o principal protagonista na polarização social. Ainda que fosse um partido eleito com maioria, os seus actos que pregavam os valores Islamicos foram entendidos pela elite do governo como anti-laicos, e o partido foi encerrado em 1998. Contudo, as suas bases sociais nunca deixaram de lutar. Em 2002, nesta altura Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento, tornou-se o lugar dos círculos Islamistas, pois receberam a aprovação de quase metade da população. Desde então o partido está a ser a voz da sociedade cujas origens são contra o status-quo. No entanto, os actos radicais do partido nos últimos anos também delinearam uma contra-oposição contra si próprios com os erros dos seus actos desonestos, tendo uma agenda secreta de Islamização do país e, gradualmente encabeçando uma ditadura civil para supressão das vozes da oposição.

Esta dissertação apresenta uma visão do Islamismo, politização do Islão, democracia Turca, polarização social partindo da aceitação do Islão pelos Turcos desde os presentes dias, nas primeiras duas partes e argumentos dos efeitos da política Islamica na sociedade turca, com base na polarização social, na última parte, através de dados empiricos de fontes primárias e secundárias.

Palavras-chave:

Islão Político, Islamismo, Islão Moderado, Islão, Turquia, Muçulmano, Atatürk, Partido do Bem-estar, Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento, Partido Democrata, Partido Republicano do Povo, Polarização, Império Otomano, Identidade, Ideologia, Manifestação Social, Turbante, Movimento Gulen, Espaço Público, Golpe Militar, Golpe de Estado, Modernismo, Pós-modernismo, Secularismo, Laicismo, Projeto do Cintão Verde, Projeto do Grande Médio Oriente

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ABBREVIATIONS

Acc.	Accessed on
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Homeland Party)
AP	Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
BDP	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
ÇYDD	Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (The Association for Supporting Contemporary Life)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
Ed.	Edition
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
ibid.	ibidem
İP	İşçi Partisi (Workers' Party)
Is.	Issue
loc. cit.	loco citato
MGK	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
MİT	Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization)
MNP	Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
MÜSİAD	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
op. cit.	opere citato
Prof.	Professor
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SME	Small and Medium Size Enterprises
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TDH	Türkiye Değişim Hareketi (Movement for Change in Turkey)
TÜSİAD	Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association)
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vol.	Volume

INTRODUCTION

Development of the western society through the geographical expeditions and industrialization between 15th and 19th centuries gradually led to the nationalist movements. Modernized and socialized communities of the West started to raise their voices against their repressive kings and followingly completed their experience through several revolutions that promoted the indispensability of equality, freedom and people's sovereignty all over the world. Thus, these claims became the most important element of social and political life in the West following the 19th century. These ideas resulted with the decline of the empires based on land and promoted the national consciousness which led to the rise of different national elements and people's claim of their rights from their rulers. The claims gradually caused the empires to decline and the nation states to rise. One of the most affected empires from the nationalist ideology was Ottoman Empire.

As a result of the unstoppable decline of Ottoman Empire which possessed the Caliphate institution as the representative of the Islam world; Ottoman authorities desperately put the intellectuals in charge of finding the reason of their backwardness and a solution in order to come over their frustration about it. This situation divided the intellectuals in two as of the ones that justified the reason of regression by relating it to Islam itself and the ones that justified the reason with the Muslims. This disaccord reflected to the society in time and has taken the shape of a social conflict. The authorities used their preference to the side that considered Islam itself as the problem and decided to implement a series of reforms in order to meliorate the empire. Deciding the nature of reforms was not easy for an empire which had such a diverse society under its command as the reforms should appeal to all segments of the society. Because the reforms aimed to transform and westernize the society step by step in order to find a solution which could be a cure for the regression, Islamist circles which have always strived for reliving the bright times of Islam during the united Islam state period and were expecting to retain the status-quo to this end got disappointed with the decision. Thus, sultan's modernization efforts resulted with disaccord of the society on Islamism and westernism axes. While these ideologies were puny voices under Ottoman Empire rule, they gradually transformed into the voice of millions.

Islam's role issue have been the subject of heated debates and even conflicts since 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization and especially the declaration of republic until the present day Turkey's political, legal, social, cultural spheres. There is no doubt about indisputability of Islam's place as it played a very important role on majority of the former Turkish societies and the society of Turkey at present throughout the history. This stands as a sociological fact.

It is obvious that Islam started to arise as a problem for the governing elite as an outcome of the westernization moves. As a matter of fact it is still an unresolved problem on some circles' perception. There is still not a credible explanation for how Islam which is a basic fact of the Turkish society for hundreds of years became an issue and why this subject triggers polemics and both sides accuse each other when the state affairs, politics, press, universities and intellectuals come across with Islam.

This is a very important question and it is quite difficult to answer. Each segment considered the issue from their own sides and tried to find an answer accordingly but it is clearly seen that the debates are not conducted on a steady basis. The answer of this question is hidden over the analysis of Turkey's westernization experience. The issue has sides which concern both westernists and Islamists and these elements are closely related to the ideological molds of both sides. However, not much attention was attributed to the ideological dimension of the westernization process; not much analyzes were conducted on the social, psychological, philosophical and political extent of the process; most of the times westernization policy was taken as the single source and the situation was tried to be explained through westernist perspective. On the other hand, also Islamists approached the situation solely on the basis of religious faith rather than a wider view that took the social facts of the Turkish society and the Islam world and thus they could not reach beyond presenting reactive responses. But there is a certain thing which is the fact that westernists has always seen Islam as the symbol of primitiveness and backwardness since the 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization and believed that Islam should be kept away from political, legal, social and cultural life in order to modernize Turkey; and the opposite side intensely withstood this mentality. Thus, this situation established the basis of the westernist-Islamist conflict and the debates on the conflict continue by getting more severe each passing day as neither side step back.

Following the failure of Ottoman Empire, founder of modern Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, embarked to modernize the young country according to needs of the globalizing world. He was also thinking that it was Islam itself what caused the decline of the state and implemented the reforms to that end. Islam was completely eliminated from the Turkish social and political life through the carried reforms that envisaged a Turkish nation which was purged from the Islamic values in the public space and modernized. The first steps taken to this end were the abolishment of Caliphate and implementation of the laic set of rules in the constitution. This was also a reasonable act considering that the nationalist ideology was still the dominating ideology in the world.

The mentioned conflict has reflected more or less to each field, caused the political parties to form two opposite blocs; for example it brought first DP, then AP and followingly the political parties which put the Islamist rhetoric to the center of their politics such as MNP, MSP, RP, FP and finally AKP respectively. It also caused the same dual settlement in the education system and the imam-hatip schools which provide religious education were implemented against the laic public schools as a result of the high demand from the society. However, nobody asked why these schools that were implemented as vocational schools at the beginning turned into competitors of the laic public schools as nobody asked why the opposing parties were emerged. Rather than questioning the reasons, these types of transformations were tried to be answered through the allegations such as threatening laicism, swerving from the laic reforms or upraising Shari'a.

However, it should have been thought that it might be the outcome of a sociological fact if Islamist parties rise; structure of the education system changes and religion schools get demanded. In other words, it should have been thought that if the developments were an outcome of the requisition of the people to call Islam out which was eliminated from the social life by the governing elite. Since its foundation, the republican has never handled this situation sociologically and even the academic circles that should handle the subject objectively cannot give up their persistent attitude and continue on approaching on the subject ideologically. In the final analysis, imam-hatip schools and the political parties which showed a positive attitude to the Islamic demands of the society, even if it was abused by some parties, were depoliticized through military interventions and imam-hatip schools were rarefied.

Islamism's milestone has been RP in Turkish history. RP was able to attract a more various partisan audience compared to the previous Islamist parties. It received the support of religious conservative burghers and indigent migrants that lived in the slums of the principal cities as well as freelance business owners, conservative intellectuals and substantial industrialists. In 1994 local elections, RP doubled its votes and it acquired the mayoralties of biggest six cities and the half of the others. Followingly, RP acquired the most seats in 1995 general elections. Its electorates were reflecting a great mass of people who were expecting social and economic reforms until the ones who were striving for the establishment of Shari'a law. Constitutional Court presented a closure case against the party with becoming the focus of anti-laic acts. As laic state system envisages control of the state over religion, the debates transformed into the debates about if an Islamist party should take place in the political system or not. The concerned laics made up disaster scenarios while the supporters of the party strictly opposed the closure and claimed that the case that was presented was undemocratic. However, the result was predictable when the concerns of the political elites were taken into account. Even so, as the party was successful on transforming its party grassroots to a social movement, Islamist parties never got affected by the closure cases.

Global extensity of the Islam based politics was also another determiner of the success of this movement. RP was closed in 1998 and its leader was banished from politics for five years. Only a few days later another Islamist party was formed that was called FP and had the support of the same diverse mass of electorates. Not much later, FP was also closed, but its partisans stayed linked to its invisible movement. This was the period which marked the greatest transformations in Turkish history. As it was revealed in the last days of FP, the party cadre was gradually dividing in two as of the young reformers and old traditionals. Thus, following the closure of FP, this time two parties emerged. Old cadre founded SP, while young cadre founded AKP which is one of the main actors in this study.

Islamist movement strives for bringing people together on a common ideology that has social and political targets. Islamism is only the main genre that all participants embrace. Islamist movement in Turkey embraces people from different ideologies who have contrasting objectives. Organization method of RP has a significant importance on party's success. The cultural values that form the base of this process are not new. What

is new is its power of enacting people. This situation can directly be connected to the urban living conditions, because as a result of the migration new slum neighborhoods arose in a very short time. Inhabitants of these new neighborhoods were the people that came from different backgrounds and faced challenging urban problems upon their arrival. The new solidarity styles which were based on the familiar cultural values have triggered the community feeling in each neighborhood and enabled the community to become a political power. RP's success was based on its influence on these local communities.

Following the RP's closure, two powerful actors arose in Turkey. AKP and Gülen Movement have been the most spoken elements of the political agenda during the last ten years. Practices and the ideology that AKP exhibits since it came into power in 2002 plays an extremely important role over the social changes and causes major transformation on social and political life. AKP represents a political structure which carries the middle class to the center, bring Islamic opposition with the system and invite the system to acknowledge this. In other words, AKP tries to resolve the Islam-state conflict through a different style by opening space for Islam's representation within the democratic system and in the public space. Considering its efforts, AKP makes an example for the rest of the Islam world and therefore tackles to be a leader in the region as a part of the Great Middle East Project.

However, AKP transforms into a reality besides being the subject that marks the last years by settling to the center of many public debates such as education or dressing. The Islamists/religious conservatives are getting mobilized in the lead of AKP. Therefore, it bears more importance than being a political power for its supporters.

Another very important movement which was successful on mobilizing the people is Gülen Movement. The movement reorganizes as a religious civil society and takes place in the public space by transforming into a sociological actor which brings the critics accordingly. The movement emphasizes religion's place in public space and tries to answer the current identity crises. Thus, religion's characteristic that is closed to the public is gradually left and religion's reflection to life gets obvious. This reflection leads to religion's rise as a social phenomenon based on social relations. However, as this civil religion concept evolves; it brings the competition over the political society and ideological grouping in the cadres of civil services in order to assure the future of

the people that make a part of this mobilization. This is the main reason of Gülen Movement's organizations based on tolerance through encouraging the conservative intellectuals to take part in resolution process of the social conflicts. However, an Islamic movement's active presence in the social projects is criticized by the laic circles which are concerned about the movement's so-called secret Islamization agenda.

Religion experiences great transformations in Turkey's modernization projects. However, there are several issues of modernization in this process. One of them is the issues related to the definition of modernization according to the modernist theory which excludes the importance of religion in the social life. Thus, Turkish revolution makes a good example of the steps taken with the concern of practicing the modernist identity through conducting a religion engineering campaign that aimed to modernize religion perception of the society. However, state's efforts completely ignored Islam's and society's demands and strived for building a religion perception that would answer the needs of the political power. The other issue is the arbitrary practices of religion. In the final analysis, even though AKP and Gülen Movement seem to be different from each other, they are actually intertwined together.

All these incidents show that Islam is still seen as an issue and therefore Islam debates focused on religious reactionism still take place continually. Everybody can see that these debates continue under the shadow of the ideological conflicts rather than the scientific researches. In exchange, society gets confused for not being provided with an open-minded perspective.

It is not possible to ignore laic Kemalist regime's intolerance on any kind of act that would raise the Islam's credibility in the public space which could have been perceived as fascistic and antidemocratic by the Islamist/religious conservative circles. It is true that the laic regime's fighting method with the anti-laic focuses and placing that "whomever is not Kemalist is anti-laic" perception is not democratic, however mentioning a same kind of stigmatization against anybody that is concerned about the anti-democratic practices of governments and political parties as pro-coup and atheist is obviously the same mindset with what Islamists claim to suffer. Thus, last events proved that it was the system which is faulty rather than the ideologies as the system is based on forced impose of the official ideology of the current political power. However,

when a party which embraces liberal values does the same thing, both party and the ideology loses its terms and become illegitimate.

Considering the polarization in Turkish social and political life gets more and more dangerous as it endangers the integrity of the society and the state, the sides of the conflict should come together under scientific platforms and search for the ways to provide a social compromise. In this respect, what should be done by those social segments is to accept the reality; strive for assuring Islam's place in social, political and cultural structure of Turkey to be known correctly by everybody and to be accepted by the society through cleaning it from any prejudices and ideological evaluations while leaving the belief dimension of the conflict to the own decisions of the people. In case this is done, the conflict between the Islamist and laic, elite and people will be eliminated and thus an important step will be taken through the resolution of the problem.

The subject of the thesis is political Islam in Turkey and polarization of Turkish society in relation to the prominence of Islamism. In the study Islamism's evolution on Turkish society from its beginning till the present day, Islam's situation at the republican period, Islam's place in globalizing world, perception of Islamism by the laic elites and the state, Turkish political system and contribution of the Islamist parties to the polarization, polarization focuses in the Turkish society, recent political disputes, an overview of social clusters, bases of social polarization and the results of the polarization in Turkish society will be handled, some points of view, opinions, remarks and critics on Islam which is carried out on the press and the public opinion will be reflected. At the last part of the thesis, primary and secondary empirical data will be used.

The main objective of the study is to show that even after that many years of being debated and many years after the foundation of the republic, the Islam debates are still done under ideological prejudices. Therefore, the conflict became a subject that challenges social compromise through causing the society to get polarized more and more each passing day. However, disingenuous nature of the Islamist parties that has played a very instigating role on polarization of the society should also be taken into account besides the strict attitude of the laic state against Islamist circles. Rise of Islamism as a result of series of incidents, emergence of a moderate political Islam

definition during the Cold War period, global decline of nationalist social democrat ideologies, persistent attitude of the Islamist political parties and showing all the opposers as Islam's enemy while not hesitating to reflect this in any condition brought the Turkish society to a dead-end in our day.

In the light of all this information, this thesis aims to provide an understanding of Turkish Islamist perception by providing an overview of Islamist history, arguing the Turkish democratic system and its weaknesses and finally making an analysis of the polarization that long Islamist history caused in Turkey through evaluating the empirical data that was collected.

CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGY

This thesis is the result of a three-year investigation period, initiated in September 2010, as part of the Masters program in History, International Affairs and Cooperation, held at the University of Porto.

Main purpose of this thesis is to provide information on evolution of political Islam in Turkey along with its consequences on the society. In the recent years Turkish society polarized more than any time before. This thesis expects to find answers to why there is a social compromise problem in Turkish society, how political Islam contributes to polarization, what the contributions of political parties to this polarization are and what should be done for reaching social compromise.

Theme of the thesis is “Political Islam and Social Polarization in Turkey”. Political Islam has always been a prominent ideology among Turkish society since 1950’s. However, prominence of Islamism has gradually polarized the society. Polarization of the society is not a new thing; polarization of Turkish society has its roots back in the 19th century. Modernization efforts of Ottoman Empire divided the society in two as ones blamed Islam for their backwardness and ones blamed Muslim society. But, as Ottoman authorities also found blaming Islam completely and importing innovations from the West immediately easier rather than blaming Muslims and get involved in a never-ending sociological project in a pragmatic attitude was a breaking point for Turkish Islam as this attitude became definitive on deciding the official ideology of Republic of Turkey. Second wave of Islamism is the period starting with 1950’s and reaching the present day. However last 10 years of this period is more important than the rest. In 2002 AKP was elected through obtaining majority of the votes with a liberal rhetoric, but this liberal identity was forgotten following the elections and AKP embarked to implement its biased democracy which was basically provided for its own partisans. In this sense, the society was polarized more and more since 2002 and in the recent years this transformed into an uprising.

Main objectives of the thesis are providing a better understanding on cosmopolite demography of Turkey, identifying conflicts of the society in Turkey, providing a better understanding of political Islam, investigating rise of political Islam

and perception of people, providing an overview of Turkish politics, inspecting the effects of globalization on spread of conservative thought, discussing effects of political Islam in Turkish society by taking immigration, education, cultural conflict and women rights variants into consideration.

While some of the specific objectives are providing a better understanding of the cosmopolite demography of Turkey, identifying characteristics of the low culture and high culture, questioning role of politics on the conflict, questioning effects of internal immigration, discussing moderate Islam and arguing if Turkey is forced to be an example for region countries, investigating vernacular networks and their contribution to political Islam.

In this thesis, above-mentioned issues will be the main subjects to be explained. This thesis has four chapters.

First chapter is methodology part where the theme, purposes and methodology will be explained. No data will be used in methodology.

Second chapter provides a historical perspective over Islamism which handles the period since Turkish acceptance of Islam until the present day. Political development theories are used in order to explain the historical perspective. No data will be used in second chapter.

Third chapter provides an overview about political Islam in Turkey during republican period. As it is understood from its title, this chapter covers a history starting with declaration of republic in 1923 and ending with closure case of AKP in 2008. This chapter is quite important as it provides an overview of steps that led to polarization of Turkish society and will be reviewed in six parts providing information about Turkish Islamist parties, Turkish nationalism, effects of globalization, 1980 coup d'état, Turkish democracy culture, AKP period and Gülen Movement. Data from newspaper articles and magazines will be used in this chapter.

Fourth and last chapter constitutes the main idea of this thesis. This chapter will handle research questions as what is social polarization, why there is social polarization, what is the extent of polarization, what is the source of polarization, what are the consequences of polarization. Empiric, qualitative and quantitative data will be used from primary and secondary sources in this chapter. Newspaper articles about the main incidents will be analyzed. Study A that consists of the results of a public poll in Turkey

about polarization, Study B that consists of a survey that was organized by the author about political attitudes and Study C that consists of two interviews that were done with two Turkish females which represents either of the poles.

Now information about empiric data sources will be provided:

Study A

Authored by Bekir Ağır, this report is based on the data and findings of a survey conducted in April 2010. It aims to take a snapshot of polarization. Turkey is going through by elaborating on differing values and viewpoints that various electoral groups and social clusters have with regard to daily political debates and to make sense of this snapshot. Survey report was published as a series in the daily Radikal Newspaper between June 13 and 17, 2010. A total of 6482 interviews were conducted in 41 provinces, 328 districts and 1116 villages of Turkey. Survey report is available at <http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar.php>

Study B

The survey consists of 24 multiple choice questions on various topics related to demographic features of the participants and political Islam. All data collected was processed by www.esurveyspro.com. Even though basic statistical data of the participants was collected and processed, a crosstab report could not be provided as the free account did not allow retrieving such kind of information. Considering the survey was conducted between 13.07.2012 and 02.08.2012, some data may have altered due to the social changes in Turkey during the last one year. The response option of survey was set to anonymous multiple answers in order to protect participant's privacy and provide convenience for those who respond in a multi-user environment. Survey was responded by 160 people that allow us to analyze the Turkish society roughly through a 10 % standard deviation if solely the quantity of participants is taken into consideration.¹ The survey was prepared and run only in Turkish and later translated to English. All questions were designed as mandatory; therefore none of the 24 questions were skipped by participants.

As this report was submitted through social media and emails, the prerequisites to respond were having access to a computer, having internet connection, owning

¹ Türker Baş, *Anket Nasıl Hazırlanır, Nasıl Uygulanır, Nasıl Değerlendirilir (How is a Survey Prepared, Applied and Evaluated)*, Ankara: Seçkin, 2002

account on social media or having email address as well as being literate. Besides, participants who shared their opinion were mainly the group which is dissatisfied with the political environment in Turkey and mainly the people that identify themselves as laic social democrats whose political preference is predominantly CHP. Therefore, this report cannot be considered as 100 % accurate to the reality of Turkish society.

It is believed it is also important to state that before the survey website was discovered, this survey was attempted to be conducted in paper format based on one-on-one meetings. However, approximately only 20 % of the people which were asked a one-on-one meeting accepted to meet. As there was not enough data to use from the meetings that were intended to be done, an online poll was seen as more trustworthy. Therefore, it can be assumed that 80 % of the participants in a small seaside holiday village that consists of 83 housings and approximately 166 individuals (if it is supposed that each house has 2 inhabitants) in northwestern Turkey where the majority of population are holidaymakers from different regions preferred not to share their political opinion with an alien. Moreover, their attitude also may be related to their reluctance for discussing politics during their holiday season.

Majority of the participants in the survey consist of middle aged, urban, democrat, Muslim males between 45 and 59 who are graduated from a public higher education institution on social sciences and work as employees. Almost three quarters of the participants are CHP electorates that are not satisfied with the current AKP government. Majority believe that religion should be under control of the state. A major part of the participants consider that political Islam is a system that politicians implemented in order to orient the society in their interest. More than three fourths of participants think that Islam in politics does not assure freedoms while more than half of the participants do not want to see religious items in public space. A major part of the participants think that Islamism is a threat for Turkey. Majority have never participated in political activities. Almost all participants say that they make friends from different opinions, but in the meanwhile they think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish society. Half of the participants think that media does not assist liberal thought. Majority partially practices their religion, thinks that their freedom is restricted by the society which is not tolerant. A major part of the participants think that social environment is the most important factor in influencing lifestyles.

Full information of the survey is available in the annexes.

Study C

Study C is based on the interviews conducted in Istanbul during July of 2012. No video was taken, only voice recorder was used. Authorization form was signed by both participants. Both participants are females. Participant 1 represents laic circles; participant 2 represents religious conservative circles. Both interviews were done at cafes for comfort of the participants. Subject 1 participated to the research alone while Subject 2 was accompanied with her sister. Overall atmosphere was positive. Subject 1 was much more relaxed while providing answers compared to Subject 2. Off the record, Subject 2 mentioned that she was a member of AKP's youth branch while Subject 1 was not affiliated with nowhere at the moment.

Subject 1

26 years old, lives in Istanbul, master's student, born in Istanbul, attended school in Istanbul, no imam-hatip background, Turkish, and Caucasian.

Subject 2

27 years old, lives in Istanbul, German teacher, attended school in Istanbul, no imam-hatip background, Turkish, and Caucasian.

Full information of the interviews is available in the annexes.

CHAPTER 2

ISLAMISM FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF TURKISH PERCEPTION OF ISLAM

Religion, which is as old as humankind, is an important determiner in construction of a culture according to Durkheim sociology. Turkish believed in variety of religions in different locations since beginning of their history in Central Asia. Yet, changing religions often based on their location played an important role on their social life. Eventually, Islam became one of the most important values of Turkish society. As a matter of fact, there are historical, cultural and actual dimensions that should be studied to understand importance of religion in Turkish history.

All religions which affected Turkish history should be taken into account on the basis of social structure. There are two opinions about Turkish pre-Islamic religious beliefs; one defends that Turkish were Shamans while the opposing supports that Turkish always had a monotheistic belief. However, both of them are far from exhibiting a certainty. Yet, another opinion which defended that Turkish adopted Islam without resistance was refuted by recent researches. According to this false statement, non-Sunni beliefs were claims to disintegrate Turkish society.²

Islamic world strives for returning back to its glamorous days. Therefore, an investigation of Turkish history should be done to understand where the mistake was done. Turkish were the protectors of Islam until their decline against the West. Ottomans realized that something was wrong following their technological, cultural decline and several military defeats and implemented western style alterations; however they never considered Muslim identity as the problem.³ It was 19th century when Ottomans realized that the issue was actually their identity. While some intellectuals saw the fault in Islam itself, some others blamed followers. This was how two ideologies came into question for the first time: Westernism and Islamism. Those ideologies manifested basis for laicism versus Islamism debates. Eventually, modern Turkish republic was founded by ones seeing Islam as the issue. Even though

² Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam (Turks, Turkey and Islam)*, Ed. 10, İstanbul: İletişim, 1999, p. 20

³ *ibid.*, p. 24

westernists were overwhelming ones, aggression never ended between two groups. At the present time, Turkey seems to be uncomfortable with representation of Islam by some fanatic circles and hopes this identity would get weaker through its admission to the EU.⁴ However, because of inadequate education about Islam, debates can only carry on limited to certain aspects.

It is widely accepted that Turkish adopted Islam starting from 900 A.D for its mystic character. Neither Turkish accepted Islam under pressure nor transition process have been without issues. This transition was consequence of a complex social structure. Islam spread among Turkish step by step and eventually it was adopted as state religion by Karakhanids for the first time. Adoption of Islam by Seljuqs, who were successors of Karakhanids, marked a milestone in the Turkish history. According to ancient documents, Islam spread very superficially among nomads, Arabic tradesmen and Sufis; but they had a great impact on conversion of Turkish.⁵

Sunni-Seljuq evolution has been a constituent for Sunni canon law, ulema religiousness and Sufism.⁶ Sufism was used for society's embracement of Islam and it was assumed that Sufism complemented Quran and Shari'a.⁷ As Sufism evolved, range of unknown in religion was broadened and extent of science shrank. This narrowed the area of political science and fostered society not to question.

Seljuqs passed through great transformations after accepting Islam in Transoxiana at 11th century which assured Turkish possession in Middle East and proved their power to claim caliphate for Sunni Muslims. This incident marked state building era of the Western Turkish. Following Karakhanids and Seljuqs, Sunni Islam was also acknowledged as official state religion of Ottomans. Ottoman sultan became the highest representative of Islam through possession of caliphate and thus state and religion were integrated.

There are two aspects that should be considered on Turkish religious perception; Sunni and non-Sunni Islam. In time, Transoxiana became the center of Sunni Islam and accordingly it became official religion of all Turkish states following Karakhanids.⁸ However, nomad communities started to follow flexible heterodox Islam on the

⁴ ibid., p. 20

⁵ ibid., p.p. 30-36

⁶ Anthony Black, *Siyasal İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi: Peygamberden Bugüne, (The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present)*, Ankara: Dost, 2001, p. 191

⁷ ibid, p. 195

⁸ op. cit. Ocak, p. 41

contrary of settled communities as it was more suitable to their lifestyle. Heterodox Islam did not arise systematically as Sunni Islam did; it originated from a mixture of pre-Islamic religions, Islam and social conditions which explains its non-systematic nature. One of the most important features of heterodox Islam was its harmony that integrated many different beliefs. Because of its flexibility, it was even suitable to use for spreading Islam in the West.

Sunnism evolved as equal partner of militarist political power and it integrated with society and sociopolitical system.⁹ In course of this integration, Shari'a was used as a guideline to transform society in an ethical way. It was seen as moral law which was believed that its orders were set by God and were not debatable.¹⁰

Sunni Islam was always dominant in the structure of Turkish states because of its systematical frame. Naturally Islam itself has a political character as being evolved as a political theory during the Abbasid reign. Turkish states pursued this structure as it was seen as a legitimacy source on governmental and international relations and acknowledged domination of Islam in reconciliation with a traditional understanding.¹¹ Sunni Islam's systematical structure and rationality directed Turkish to accept this sect officially. It lived its brightest period during the Ottoman reign, however advance in religion was only limited to needs of the empire. Ottomans remained tolerant to all kinds of beliefs until Safavids converted to Shi'ism officially and became rival of Ottomans. In the following years, Ottoman Empire applied strict policy against non-Sunni beliefs. Nevertheless, non-Sunni popular Islam has always been present unofficially among the people.

Maverdi was the first person to declare that worldly and spiritual powers were different from each other. Also he formed the legal basis of sultan-caliph idea by defending that the spiritual tasks also could be managed by the actual ruler instead of the caliph.¹²

As there was only one caliph, there was also only one sultan who was military and political leader of Islam.¹³ This idea caused extensive effects that were seen in

⁹ op. cit., Black, p. 128

¹⁰ op. cit., Ocak p. 131

¹¹ ibid., p.p. 61-68

¹² op. cit., Black, p. 139

¹³ Bernard Lewis, *Historians in the Middle East*, London: Oxford University, 1962, p. 52

Ottoman sultan's claim of caliphate along with his political and military leadership.¹⁴ In that respect, religion was sunk into politics in Turkish states. Consequently, because religion scholars and sultans were in close relationship; Islam did not experience a conflict between religion and politics like in Europe.

According to Islam, all emperors were subject to Shari'a which clearly was abused by the Ottoman Empire; moreover loyalty to the dynasty was seen equal to loyalty to Islam. Vassal's desire of engaging to their emperor was a typical Ottoman tradition, because it was considered that state would collapse if emperor failed. Therefore, reformists tied their hopes to a reformist sultan which explains how the Turkish revolution established the most laic state in the Islam world.

One of the most important reforms in the Ottoman state was the introduction of laic customary constitution known as Ottoman Constitution of 1876. This way, two sources of law were introduced by integrating laic and Shari'a laws which were both applied by same courts. Multi-ethnic nature of Ottoman Empire has been effective on introduction of new laws as the entire society was subject to them on the contrary of religious laws. There is no other example of introduction and consolidation of laic laws under a code of law by sultan's advice in Islamic world. The law aimed decreasing pressure on society and penalizing crime effectively. Some historians state that Ottoman law was fair and liberal compared to the feudal laws in Europe at the period.¹⁵

Albeit law and Shari'a were integrated to be a unique system, actually law contradicted with Shari'a in many ways. Therefore, Heyd stated that "many religion scholars were against the laic law as a principle".¹⁶ Ottomans made a synthesis of religion and politics at their brightest times; once they started to have failures, this synthesis started to get criticized and tension between religious and laic elements emerged at this point for the first time.¹⁷ Some religious scholars advised that Ottoman state should attach itself to Shari'a in order to gain its former power. Moreover, an anonymous author stated: "who believes that sultan has the right to ban what is permitted and to permit what is banned in religion is faithless, because God is the only

¹⁴ op. cit., Black, p. 145

¹⁵ ibid., p.p. 295-299

¹⁶ Ulrich Heyd, *The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II*, Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. 9, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1973, p. 203

¹⁷ op. cit., Black p.p. 303

determiner”.¹⁸ Reorganization of relation between land owners and Christian community might be the reason of ulema’s unwilling attitude towards laic law as reactions were expected from circles that were benefiting from feudal system.¹⁹ Besides all these, integration of religion and power affected intellectual life in a negative way, because ulema blamed people who expressed independent opinions with infidelity. This was the result of dynasty’s increasing dependency on Sunni orthodoxy as its legitimacy source.

The decline period between 16th and 20th centuries marked start point of Ottoman political thought.²⁰ Switch of international commercial routes to oceans and military defeats dealt another blow to Ottomans. Those defeats caused deep wounds in Ottoman Empire as economic and social integrity depended on conquests.

Islamists strived for declaration of orthodox Sunni Islam; impose of Shari’a to society and they followed a method which aimed to decrease state’s central authority while reformists emphasized their desire for protection of social privileges and classes. These two tendencies constituted the base of current conflict between laics and Islamists.

Ottoman ideology struggled to make a choice between sultan concept that was dominant among different societies and the sultan concept that was caliph of Muslims.²¹ In the 17th century, Ottoman society defended that it was necessary to return back to the basics of Islam to stabilize the empire again. Ulema were put in charge to reintegrate the society in such an atmosphere, but ulema preferred to fight against laic implementations and anything against Shari’a instead. Even an edict was submitted in 1696 dictating public and private affairs to be organized according to Shari’a.²² With the beginning of westernization, modernist and radical Islamist movements triggered great tension between intellectuals in Islamic world.²³ Nevertheless, Islamists could not avoid the change of balance of power in favor of westernists.

¹⁸ op. cit., Heyd, p. 204

¹⁹ op. cit., Black, p. 303

²⁰ ibid., p. 355

²¹ ibid., p. 378

²² op. cit., Heyd, p. 379

²³ op. cit., Black, p. 380

Caliphate was especially important for Sunni Muslims, because it was a title granted to the emperors of Islamic states.²⁴ This title was standing for protection of Islam, proxy to Mohammed and maintenance of worldly actions relevant to Islam among other responsibilities of emperors. It was an institution formed by Abbasid reign to resolve governance depression of Sunni world. At that period, leaders of Islamic world reviewed legitimacy of power to prevent possible anarchic occurrences and eliminated separatist actors. However by the end of Islam state, this title was received by all emperors in Islamic world.²⁵ Legitimacy and confidence issue that arose after 4 Caliphs era turned caliphate to a problematic institution. Foundation of new sects was influent on this conflict as each sect adopted different perceptions; however caliphate was main source to legitimize power.

When Ottoman Empire was founded, caliphate had already lost its meaning a long time ago as all emperors were receiving the title. Position retrieved its importance when Selim 1st brought relics of Mohammed to Istanbul and continued to retain it as a political tool. Nevertheless, disputes continued as Ottomans did not attribute much attention to the position. Caliphate became an international issue when Ottoman Empire undertook protection of all Muslims through 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Government and religious authorities disagreed for the first time at Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reforms and as a result, caliphate was conceptualized as protector of Islam rather than protector of believers.

Caliphate gained a holy chairmanship status similar to papacy except the ability to intervene worldly affairs by the 4th clause of Ottoman Constitution of 1876.²⁶ This marked placement of a distinction between worldly and spiritual affairs which was basically a characteristic of the Western laic system for the first time. In this sense, it would be true to say that Ottoman religious idea was influenced by Western thoughts.

Ottoman caliph was acknowledged by different Muslim communities as all Muslims should be dominated by a leader according to religious regulations. However, Arabs were an exception to this acknowledgement as they believed that caliphate was a right extorted from them. This assumption was enough to create a controversy between two nations.

²⁴ Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu (Islamism's Rise as a Political Ideology)*, İstanbul: Nesil, 2011, p. 181

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 182

²⁶ *ibid.*, p.p. 189-191

Occasionally Muslims outside Ottoman Empire were approaching to the caliph to request help on different subjects, but responsibility of the caliph to assist co-religionists eventually politicized religion by promoting his political power.²⁷ Those requests were legitimizing power and providing prestige for Ottoman Empire in global arena which actually transformed the caliph into a factor of international relations.

Ottoman caliphate was more respected among other Muslim communities overseas because it was seen as a shelter against Western imperial powers. Caliphate became an important subject in foreign diplomacy during Abulhamid 2nd's reign as imperial states were blaming Ottoman Empire with provoking Muslim communities under their sovereignty. Forasmuch, pan-Islamism was serving for this idea under command of caliphate. Even though pan-Islamism was not practiced, there would still be a solidarity dominated by Ottomans; after all, caliphate was a political tool only for vassals while pan-Islamism was a propaganda tool towards entire Islamic world.²⁸

2.2. EVOLUTION OF ISLAMISM

Islamism emerged as an outcome of Islamic issues and problems of the epoch, including fast social change, transformations in traditions and traditional family perception, evolution of media and emergence of new conservative intellectual elite. It arose indifferently from any other ideology and transformation was realized through same way as in the West. In this part, developments which paved the way for Islamism will be handled.

2.2.1. Developments which Paved the Way to Islamism

Islamic world faced Europe originated developments such as the industrial revolution, geographical explorations and globalization after the 18th century. Not only technology but also the social structure, political organizations, life styles and people's understanding of life advanced at this period.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 180

²⁸ Selim Deringil, "2. Abdülhamid'in Dış Politikası" (Abdülhamid 2nd's Foreign Policy), *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to Republic)*, Vol. 2, İstanbul: İletişim, 1985, p. 306

Advance of enlightenment idea forced people to understand that they were main determiners of their lives which formed the path for French Revolution and nationalism. Effect of religion and fatalism in people's lives decreased when advancement idea proved that humanity was thriving. Besides, science replaced spiritualism with positivism as Comte mentioned in his book "The Catechism of Positive Religion" that a religion which depends on positive science could rescue humankind.²⁹

Fast urbanization and industrialism brought new issues of mass psychology. On the contrary, spread of mass communication has emerged an intellectual community that influenced people with nationalist and socialist ideas. Unfortunately Turkish reformers misinterpreted socialist acts in Europe and labeled those ideas harmful which resulted with a defense against western influence.

The 19th century Islamic world was introverted because of its domestic crisis; forasmuch positivism was providing an advantage to the West. Besides, the West studied Islamic world through Orientalism and used it as an advantage against them. As Islamic world never experienced an enlightening or industrialism period, they failed to resist industrialized West and lost their sovereignty one after another. These incidents forced Islamic world to modernize. Advance in press and broadcasting enabled easier information exchange and changes in political organization also attracted Islamic communities as they had the possibility to indicate their discontent.

In this chaos, structure of modernization started to be debated and resulted with an outcome of two main thoughts that were either taking all structure of the West or combining tradition with western elements.

First modernization act in Ottoman Empire was 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization that implemented major changes in social, spiritual and political life. On the other hand, Ottomans needed to follow balance policy towards the West because of Russian threat. This policy forced Ottomans to follow a series of reforms which paved the way to western intervention to internal affairs. Main aim of these reforms was assuring solidarity in empire; however some reforms caused political reactionism and harmed solidarity.³⁰ Media was one of those reforms that caused political reaction by spreading Western ideologies. As democratic thoughts spread and written language got simplified, defending social rights became easier for intellectuals.

²⁹ op. cit., Türköne, p.180

³⁰ ibid, p. 78

Another important reform, 1856 Ottoman Imperial Reform Edict which acknowledged wider rights to non-Muslims, became subject to protests and eventually merged social and spiritual organization at state level. Imposing laic implementations empowered Shari'a as a reaction that affected legislation process and Islam turned to be an opposition tool against modernist circles that were requesting decrease of Islam in political power.³¹

1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization was an important step in process of Ottoman Empire's transformation to a modern state.³² All Ottoman citizens were considered to be equal before law, an impersonal order started with adoption of this edict and 1856 Ottoman Imperial Reform Edict has been a supplementary element by assuring the equality between Muslims and non-Muslims.

This transformation was realized under ideological influence of the West and rise of nationalist ideologies in Western Europe created the need of forming a national unity in Ottoman Empire. In this sense, neo-Ottomanism was suggested. Even though Ottoman Empire's bureaucratic institutions were based on religion, generation of an equal Ottoman society was intended by this ideology.³³

Western imperialism sharpened differences between ethnical and religious groups. Division of labor among religious groups and the conflict it caused precluded rise of a land based ideology. Because Europeans were trading with non-Muslim communities in Ottoman Empire, they were demanding more privileges for them and this resulted with failure of Ottomanism policy on attaching non-Muslims to state. On the contrary, non-Muslims' loyalty started to shift in favor of Europe.

Neo-Ottomanism idea emerged at this period.³⁴ This ideology was reconciling Islamist reaction, which was a reaction against Ottoman Imperial Reform Edict, with modernity. Neo-Ottomans expressed the emotions of a group which was complaining for losing their prestige.³⁵ This way, laic reorganization policies contributed to creation

³¹ loc. cit.

³² Haldun Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslam'ın Temelleri (Identity Politics: Bases of Political Islam in Turkey)*, İstanbul: Metis, 2002, p. 26

³³ Roderic Davison, *Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response*, Edited by W. W. Haddad & W. Ochsenwald, *Nationalism in a Non-National state: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, Columbus: Ohio Uni., 1977

³⁴ op. cit., Gülalp p.p. 27- 28

³⁵ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton: Princeton Uni., 1962, p. 163

of a Muslim collective identity.³⁶ Main element assuring unity in society was Islam according to neo-Ottomans and therefore western values were tried to be expressed through Islamic values. Besides, rational ideas and Islam were tried to get associated by taking philosophical values from the West.

Islam formed ideological perspective of a political project in neo-Ottomanism philosophy.³⁷ However neo-Ottoman thought was aiming to express feelings of Muslim society, it pioneered continuation of reforms and modernization of the state as it was supporting modernization. Even though Abdülhamit 2nd was considered to be a fundamentalist by laic circles, he contributed more to modernization of the state than his antecedents in this context. His Islamist ideology should be considered as a state ideology.

Ottoman Empire started to split at the end of 19th century and neo-Ottomanism lost its significance. Following Russo-Ottoman War in 1877, majority of Christian population was withdrawn from Ottoman territories due to loss of a great part of its European territories. Thereupon, Arabs which were neglected for a long time came into question.

Pan-Islamism is an outcome of this process and Caliphate was started to get used effectively again at this period. It is also possible to see the support to Ottoman Empire given by Muslim communities under colonial rule of Western countries in this period. But, as pan-Islamism was insufficient to represent Ottoman society as a whole, it also failed to form integrity.

Islamic world faced very serious identity issues in the 18th and 19th centuries. Being frontier to Europe, Ottomans were one of the societies that got extremely affected by those changes. As Muslims were forming majority of Ottoman society, they were vulnerable against such kind of transformations and considering Islam was in every sphere of life, acceptance of a modern theory was challenging. This conflict caused a social disorder and secession followed till present day. As a conclusion, an incompatibility became inevitable between modernization process and state ideology in long term.³⁸

³⁶ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, Berkeley: University of California, 1997, p. 207

³⁷ op. cit., Gülalp, p. 29

³⁸ Tamara Sonn, *Secularism and National Stability in Islam*, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9, Ed. 3, 1987, p. 285

2.2.2. Islamism as an Ideology and Politicization of Islam

Different opinions get into relation once different layers of society communicate at a point in history and different opinions are first steps in forming ideologies. When the limits of human mind and acts are questioned, ideology emerges. Ideology is the idea of modern times and an outcome of industrialism. According to Geertz, ideology is a system of symbols or symbolic maps created for people to explain their socio-political environments. Religion also contains the same symbolization system with ideology and both provide a social integration mechanism.

Although Ottoman Empire did not go through same processes as the West, its geographical position and cultural proximity caused it to be influenced by modern thought and create individual ideologies. This process is called acculturation which means transformation of original cultural patterns of different societies through their excessive interaction with each other. Effects of acculturation can be seen in both interacting cultures. When different layers that are isolated from each other get into touch through globalism, two cultures influence each other and they both start to transform.³⁹

Islamism is considered to date back to the beginnings of 2nd Constitutional Era of Ottoman Empire, but modern Islamist idea emerged especially after 1930's as a reaction against aggression of imperialist states. A legitimacy issue arose with the arrival of western ideologies to Islamic societies. People's desire of contributing to decision making process has weakened monarchy which was acknowledged by traditional Islam. The biggest reason of this manifestation was advance of media and rise of intellectual society. Islamism was a socio-political theory that arose at the point where legitimization efforts turned to be unsuccessful.

It referred to reorganization of Muslim society, foundation of modern structures and ideas adequate to needs of the age by Ottoman Empire. However, it became a negative synthesizer at colonized Islamic communities by being identified with anti-imperialism.

Even though Islamism is an outcome of traditional Islamic society's confrontation with ideology, traditional Islam still exists in context of religious values.

³⁹ op. cit., Gülalp, p. 33

Main difference between Islamism and traditional Islam is the change in legitimacy type of religion as a result of acculturation. In Islamist ideology, Islam is acknowledged as a world view like in western ideologies which resulted with its perception according to the needs of modern era and transformation into a more concrete frame.⁴⁰ Traditional Islam adopts traditional values of religion which defends the idea of God and sacred laws that its followers can only practice but not discuss, while in Islamism main elements of Islam can be discussed and even transformed according to the needs of era.⁴¹ There is a God centered explanation in Islam, as Islamism is based on human nature.⁴² Distinctively from traditional Islam, Islamism competes with philosophical thoughts instead of other religions. While it competes, it absorbs useful sides of them, because the acceptance of Islam as a philosophical reference provides a political movement formed in national identity frame to be in touch with other dominant movements. According to Islamists, Islamization of society should be the outcome of a social and political activity.⁴³

Many social scientists still believe that modernism's outcome should be laicism. According to this thought, modernism period decreases effect of religion all around the world; but rise of Islamism proves that this is not accurate.⁴⁴ Even though it is believed that Islam is not suitable for modernization, Turkey makes an exception in the Islamic world by embracing modernism and Islamic elements together.

Though, it should be stated that laicism is not a model particular to Judaism or Christianity, because substantially religion and social life should not be considered as independent from each other. Only the different methods that some societies adopted were effective on decrease of religion in social life. However such kind of a break point was not realized yet. Even though Turkey is the most suitable Muslim country for the Western model, laicism was implemented by force because of the social nonconformity. Thus, it is possible to see also a great social opposition against this system that is still considered to be eliminated by urbanization and industrialization. In the meanwhile

⁴⁰ op. cit., Türköne, p. 30

⁴¹ Reinhard Bendix, *The Age of Ideology*, Edited by David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 296

⁴² Seyyid Hossein Nasr, *Modern Dünyada Geleneksel İslam (Traditional Islam in the Modern World)*, İstanbul: İnsan, 1989, p. 110

⁴³ Olivier Roy, *Siyasal İslam'ın İflası (L'Echec de l'Islam Politique)*, Ed. 3, İstanbul: Metis, 1994, p. 56

⁴⁴ op. cit., Gülalp, p. 24

Turkey still suffers from its anti-laic society. Nevertheless, Ernest Gellner states that “Islam is unique among other religions and Turkey is unique in the Muslim world”.⁴⁵

Islamism’s political interpretation currently represents an ideology that was studied by many Islamist intellectuals. But usage of Islam as an ideology is not something particular to our time, thus Islamist modernists also made such attempts in the 19th century. The most important of those was neo-Ottomans. But Kemalist regime’s oppressive nature, strived for taking Islam under control. Islamism could open a space for itself only after 1950’s when nationalism lost its significance. These efforts resulted with Islamists’ possibility to have a voice in politics increasingly after 1980’s.

2.3. WESTERN NATIONALISM VERSUS ISLAMISM

Ottoman intellectuals found nationalism idea based on race inappropriate for their society. 19th century Ottoman intellectuals tried to form an Ottoman nation that could meet their demands. Once felt this necessity, they discovered Islam nation and started to form an Ottoman nation around homeland idea they have taken from the West. Western nationalism is an idea that was formed as a result of transformation experienced on religious principles following enlightenment which makes it a laic idea as other ideologies. But as Ottoman state never passed through enlightenment, religion was transformed into a nationalist ideology and permuted the space that enlightenment covered up in the West with Islamic idea. Intellectuals applied to Islam brotherhood when they understood that they needed to take approval of the society.

Nationalist idea in Islamist nationalism is an acculturative ideology; however it does not have any discrepancy from western nationalism. Ottomans differ from other Muslim societies with not ascribing other missions to Islam such as jihad.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, it can be said that Islamism evolved under pressure of laicism in Ottoman society.

Islam’s use as a political ideology in 1979 Iran Revolution drew international attention. This was beginning of a period when Islam was started to be identified with

⁴⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni., 1981, p. 186

⁴⁶ op. cit., Türköne, p.p. 282-284

state and politics concepts in today's world.⁴⁷ Another feature of this revolution was start of an "Islamic revival" period.

Another idea emerged at the same time was "defiance to the West". This idea resulted with a quest for "Islamic state" which turned to a totalitarian politic ideology. Under those circumstances Turkey has a significant importance by having the closest relations with the West. Muslimhood in Turkey carries marks of a journey from East to West and has a diverse historical root.

Turkish Muslims have always been vulnerable against cultural influence from either the West or the East for being close to both. Western influences forced Turkey into a westernization process and exposed to major socio-cultural transformations. Identity dispute became more apparent again in republican era by strict laic ideology. Islam was pushed out of public sphere as a result of this. A new type of Muslimhood left to personal conscience that can be called as "Kemalist Muslimhood" emerged at the end of this process and caused a new identity depression.

Result of Islam's withdrawal from public space resulted with introversion of religious understanding and formation of a parochial Islam. Parochial sheiks started to teach religion secretly in this period. But these people who were trying to teach religion had an obvious disinterest towards knowing in what kind of a world they lived in. In 1950, because of DP's soft attitude and migration to cities, urbanization started. However migrants carried out the village Muslimhood to city instead of adapting to urban life. As a result of this, neighborhood culture was transformed into religious communities.

This urbanized community got into touch with other Muslims and criticized traditional Islam understanding. As a result of that, they contradicted with traditional Islamist community. New generation Islamists have seen Islam not only as a religion but also as a political, economic and social model and were labeled as puritanical. This Islamic revival that was disconnected from its past, have entered under command of ideological inclinations. The weakest points of Turkish Muslim intellectuals are lack of historical consciousness and insufficient knowledge of Western civilization.⁴⁸

Challenging tests are waiting for Muslims in Turkey which intend to be westernized. Muslims should be aware that paralyzed ideologies would not serve to

⁴⁷ op. cit., Ocak, p. 130

⁴⁸ ibid., p.p. 137-138

escape from this situation. Turkish Muslimhood became the slave of its past for not facing it yet and seeks consolation in dream of living Islam's golden age. Complex and jealousy against the West turned into hostility as a result of that. Muslims can only put their advantages forward once they overcome their complex.

2.4. THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ISLAM

Theories of political development have a significant importance in terms of evolution of Islamism. In this thesis, evolution of Islamism is being explained in three theories which are modernism, radicalism and postmodernism. First, modernism will be handled.

2.4.1. Modernism

Between Ottoman Reorganization Period and World War I, Muslim intellectuals started to be interested in Europe. In the meanwhile, European states started colonialism and the states that were affected from nationalism started to split from Ottoman Empire.

Modernism in Ottoman Empire started as an outcome of its westernization desire and it was the only Muslim state that made reforms for this purpose at the time. Reforms that were carried out created a synthesis between traditional and modern states. Some intellectuals saw European laic laws and modern technology as the main point to reach success and many reforms were conducted one after another. In this sense, 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization has been the most comprehensive reform movement and Islamic world faced a reform movement which adopted European political thought for the first time. The main purpose of this reform was to show motivation of liberalization to Christian minorities and request assistance from the West for the ongoing rebellion in Egypt. Another reform which was important regarding rights of minorities was 1856 Imperial Reform Edict. This edict assured limitation of Shari'a with individual space by reforms made in legal structure.

These reforms resulted with emergence of an equal Ottoman society and a social system based on citizenship was adopted. However, the group, which objected laicism and defended that state could not exist if religion's importance would decrease, opposed

reforms.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, some other intellectuals did not ignore that Islam was also important for unity, but they defended that main important element is Turkish nation considering that state existed before Islam.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Ottoman officials and sultan defended that reforms were licit as future of the state was in question.

Ottoman Empire pioneered the first great scale movement in Islamic world by integrating West's individualism, constitutional governance and representative democracy principles with Islamist idealism. Islamic political thought and western political thought got into interaction and became systematical starting with neo-Ottomans period.⁵¹ Neo-Ottomans defended that spreading ideas was a basic human right and the only way to strengthen people through education was political newspapers.⁵² Freedom became a main value for this generation.

Islam's diplomatic language and West's diplomatic language were considered as the same by neo-Ottomans. Moreover, neo-Ottomans also used Quran and hadith scripts to support the idea of constitutional democracy. For example, "Difference of opinion is God's favor in my society." hadith of Mohammed and "Then, forgive your people and take their opinion in all affairs." sentence from Al-Imran section of Quran were introduced as arguments that backed up parliamentary system.⁵³ Those incidents caused political values of the past to be questioned. Considering that basic aim of neo-Ottomans was to adopt parliamentary system that was ordered by Islam, they can be considered as first true Islamic modernists. Neo-Ottomans were defending that Shari'a rules also could be altered according to the needs of time⁵⁴ and that God did not plan everything in advance.⁵⁵ However, neo-Ottomans broke away from western style laicism, because their homeland idea was significant to an Islamic multi-ethnic society rather than the ethnic society understanding in Western idea.⁵⁶ But nevertheless they still defended that state and religious affairs should get separated, religion is not the

⁴⁹ op. cit., Mardin, p.p. 199-200

⁵⁰ Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, London: Tauris, 1998, p.p. 169-170

⁵¹ op. cit., Black, p. 406

⁵² op. cit., Lewis, p. 147

⁵³ op. cit., Black, p. 407

⁵⁴ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal: McGill, 1964, p. 213

⁵⁵ op. cit. Mardin, p. 407

⁵⁶ Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Vol 2., Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni., 1977, p. 132

determiner of laws and religion would become corrupted if it interacts with state affairs.⁵⁷

People's struggle in class and nation identities frame throughout modern period resulted with welfare state model in central countries, socialism in semi-periphery countries and progressive state model in periphery countries. This way, class identities were dominated by national identities and national development was seen as the common target.⁵⁸ Nation states strived for legitimatizing national unity for economical benefit and commitment of citizens to the state. Eventually failure of this system accelerated passage to postmodern state concurrently with globalization. National economies lost their domestic integrity with advance of globalization and this caused deterioration of worker class and emergence of an outsourced production system.

2.4.2. Radicalism

In order to integrate society against separatist ideas, Abdülhamid 2nd tried to use caliphate. However, because this strategy failed against non-Muslim communities, Turkism was promoted and Islam lost its importance in politics. Turkism later transformed into a bold nationalism by Kemalist ideology which became official policy of modern Turkish republic.

World War I revealed the perception which considers the West as superior on social and political aspects is incorrect.⁵⁹ Turkish Revolution that took place between 1920 and 1924 was important at least as much as 1917-1921 Russian Revolution even though Western researchers did not show much attention to it. A state that calls itself laic was formed for the first time in Islamic world through this revolution.⁶⁰

Groups such as Young Turks and Committee of Union and Progress, which were against autocracy in Ottoman Empire, emerged in Abdülhamid 2nd term. Those groups forced Abdülhamid 2nd to carry out reforms in order to found a Turkish nation-state. Abdülhamid 2nd and his supporters defended that liberalism can only be based on Islamic values.⁶¹

⁵⁷ op. cit., Berkes, p. 208

⁵⁸ op. cit., Gülalp, p. 122

⁵⁹ op. cit., Black, p. 425

⁶⁰ ibid., p. 430

⁶¹ op. cit., Berkes, p. 369

In any case, a strong link between nationalism and laicism was established in this term. However many intellectuals defended that Islam was also a very important aspect in the formation of Turkish national conscious.

As the result of failure of Ottoman leaders, Ottoman Empire fell and roots of new Turkish nation-state were laid in Atatürk's leadership. Passage of sovereignty unconditionally to Turkish nation brought the end of caliphate institution. However surprisingly Sunni cannon law complies with European revolution doctrine at this point; both sources mention obtainment of sovereignty by force. In this situation Turkish nation took their sovereignty by rebellion.⁶²

Even though Atatürk abolished sultanate by declaring republic, he remained indecisive about abolishing caliphate institution. But when Islamist circles started to push caliph to hinder reforms, this institution was also abolished. Atatürk tried to fill the social gap left from Islam through his implementations, but this failed and created the risk of emergence of two conflicting societies as laic and conservative.⁶³ Nevertheless, Atatürk's aim was not to eliminate Islam as a religion; what he strived for was redefining relation between religion and state in frame of Islam.⁶⁴ Eliminating Islamic values from state governance through reforms brought Turkey closer with Western civilization. Religion was declared as a personal space and was entirely excluded from governmental structure. Moreover, army implemented strict measures on prevention of Islamist parties to participate in politics.

2.4.3. Postmodern Identity Politics and Development Concept

Relation between decrease of class conflict and postmodern life formed distinction cultural identities and new social movements.⁶⁵ Classes lost their significance and left their place to status conflict which became main anxiety of society. Therefore race, gender, ethnicity and religion were the main elements of identity politics. Identity politics is basically a formation beyond classes. In this sense, Islamism should be also considered as an identity politic.

⁶² op. cit., Black, p. 432

⁶³ op. cit., Ocak, p.p. 75-79

⁶⁴ op. cit., Black, p. 433

⁶⁵ op. cit., Güllalp, p. 125

Because Islamism is an ideology which defines itself as anti-Eurocentric, it arose as a criticism of Western civilization in Turkey as well as in the world. It is possible to see the effect of underdevelopment in Turkey. Thus, an impatient revolutionism followed reformist optimism and a submissive atmosphere dominated when it was felt there was no hope for revolution.⁶⁶ Although, there was a possibility to break off from global system through socialism before 1980, this possibility was eliminated in post-1980. Global system theory proved that it was impossible for national units to escape from capitalism on their own.

The ones attributed attention to post development rather than development itself, refused modernism theory and this tendency emerged as Islamism in Turkey.

According to “cadre school” which arose in 1930’s, obtaining national independence from capitalist order and state’s undertaking of development were accepted as conditions of development. Another aspect of this school was its opposition to Islamism.

Western civilization gets criticized because of its ambition for economic growth and resisting to West is taken in a cultural frame in Islamist literature. While industrialism was accepted as the main circumstance of development in Islamism, Islamist literature defends that taking industrialism concept as granted is an indicator of surrendering to the West’s cultural imposition. Islamism accords with postmodernist idea in this sense.

Another point that they accord is about not accepting what is told unconditionally. Postmodernism does not consider wisdom as a trusted source of information the same way as Islamism does. Truth can be relative according to both ideologies. In this sense, both of them accept that what is unknown can only be explained by faith.

Islamist authors emphasize that Islamism is not conservatism or traditionalism. Islamism is a response given to modern issues.⁶⁷ Therefore, modernism and laicism get criticized by Islamists for not actualizing what they promised.

Islamist author İsmet Özel correlates capitalism and consumption with idolatry, because people started to worship money and politics even though they quitted

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 128

⁶⁷ *op. cit.*, Güllalp, 136

worshipping idols.⁶⁸ Besides, he asserts that technology is influenced by Western corporations which determine the trends on technological progress to make profit for a certain group in society.⁶⁹

Islamists also criticize the West for their ambition to seize nature by forgetting that human being is also a part of it. In this context, increasing popularity of Islamism can be explained with crisis of modernism. If Islamism derived from crisis of modernism, the reason of its popularity especially among intellectuals is the critic against modernist values such as industrialism, materialism and laicism.⁷⁰ In this context, Islamism asserts that materiality is not the only purpose in life and social issues would diminish by decrease of consumption through adoption of Islamic lifestyle. Considering this, it can be said that postmodernism was an outcome of periphery's uprising against center.

Islamist critic assumes that humanitarian values are abandoned only in rational societies and defends that standard of value should shift from materialism to virtue. Therefore, it bases excess consumption and environmental pollution on rational society and suggests virtue as antidote of consumption mentality. However, it is also an incorrect assumption to believe that Islamic state promises wealth; this is based on an incorrect hypothesis which suggests that it is possible to reach the objective that was promised by capitalism through Islam.⁷¹

Differently from Marxism and capitalism, Islamism refuses development paradigm completely and isolates itself from elements as the West and capitalism. In fact, Islamist ideology is not against entrepreneurship, profit and market economy; it is only against monopoly capitalism. According to this, real conflict in the market is between liberalism and monopoly. Islamism gives the same struggle against any inequality on economical, social and cultural issues.⁷² In this sense, as in consideration of liberal market the same as with equality and freedom, there is the idea of protecting citizens against suppressive state policies in criticizing modern state to support civil society.

⁶⁸ İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet ve Yabancılaşma (Three Issues, Technic, Civilization and Alienation)*, İstanbul: Çıdam, 1992, p.p. 31-32

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p.p. 43-46

⁷⁰ *op. cit.*, Gülalp, p.p. 140-142

⁷¹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, *Savaş, Barış, İktidar (Warfare, Peace, Power)*, İstanbul: İşaret/Ferhat, 1991, p. 20

⁷² *op. cit.*, Özel, p. 20

According to Islamist author Ali Bulaç, as modern state does not give free space to its citizens, it also ignores different identities through nationalist practices.⁷³ Thus, Bulaç defines nationalism as formation of a nation out of nothing.⁷⁴ According to him, modern nation state is totalitarian as it attempts to create a monotype society by collecting all powers under the same roof.⁷⁵

It is not possible to practice Islam in modern state, because God's willpower materializes through community, not the state.⁷⁶ Therefore, it means Shari'a actually materializes through civil society. Islamists defend that modern state seized civil society by abrogating Shari'a.⁷⁷

⁷³ Ali Bulaç, *Modern Ulus Devlet (Modern Nation State)*, Istanbul: İz, 1995, p. 8

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.p. 54-55

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p.p. 43-48

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p.p. 21-26

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p.p. 278-279

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY DURING THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD

3.1. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKISH POLITICS AND POLITICAL ISLAM

As there are a variety of movements that can correlate with political Islam in the world; political Islam, moderate Islam and Islamism terms often replace each other. Despite their different features, social structures and conditions, Islamism arose as a common value of unsatisfied Muslim societies which were in search of a solution. But it is not clear why the solution was sought in Islam. Even though Islamism may have different forms such as moderate or radical, their common point is their confidence in Islamic morality for being a solution to their issues.

Religion is shaped in a way that generates a cultural code in many aspects of life and concept of being devotional is perceived accordingly.⁷⁸ Therefore, place of being Muslim in Turkish identity code should be analyzed very well. Turkey's recent history exhibits a character that both conflicts and corresponds with modernism. The ideologies including Islamism which existed in Turkish modernism period adopted some aspects of western approach. Westernism constitutes a common axis in Ottoman and Turkish politics. Therefore Islamism means a struggle and effort to have a place in westernization tendency in Turkey.

It is important to study the period which started with DP government in order to understand Islamism in today's Turkey. But to understand emergence of Islamism and its ideological composition, last period of Ottoman Empire should be taken into consideration.

Main motivation of developments in the last period of Ottoman Empire was rescuing the empire. For that reason Islam transformed into a very political form during Abdülhamit 2nd's reign. In this period, government followed an Islamic policy to assure social harmony. It took radicalism under control by using caliphate institution and

⁷⁸ Ayşegül Komsuoğlu & Gül M. Kurtoğlu-Eskişar, *Siyasal İslam'ın Farklı Yüzleri (Different Aspects of Political Islam)*, İstanbul: Profil, 2009, p. 12

reconciled it with Islam perception of elite class. Thus, Ottoman nation was integrated politically and religiously in a certain way. Ottoman period Islamism was a state orientated act unlike republican period.⁷⁹

On the other hand, emergence of Islamism in republican period was an outcome of reactions that were accumulated for a long time against republican revolution and request for revision of republic. This way, Islamism was wrapped into a nationalist form because of its commitment to state while it preserved its conservative attitude.

Islamism handles requests of audiences in an adversary manner because of their emergence as a social movement in republican period while it does not conflict with existence of state.

Political Islam, which Turkey experienced through adoption of multi-party system in 1960, gained acceleration especially after 1991 Gulf War. This period, which political Islam arose as an alternative and powerful socio-political movement, was concluded by September 11 attacks. This period is also important for Turkey as it lead to precise victory of AKP in 2002.

Usually Islamic world is taken as it is a different region that does not fit in any general social norms and concurrency of Islam and modernity is a long ongoing debate. According to classical sociological theory, modernism should proceed together with secularism and culture relying on religion should eventually get vanished in a modernizing society. According to this theory, Islamic world is an exception as importance of religion does not tend to decrease in Muslim societies. Interestingly, Turkey is the only country which is also accepted as an exception to this previous situation. In other words, Turkey is the only modern and secular country of Muslim world which is an “exception within an exception” with Gellner’s expression. However, accuracy of this assumption is debatable. In fact, Turkey is not much different from any other society; studying incidents from historical perspective would be explicable.

There are two important conditions to comprehend political Islam and the situation in Turkey. One of them is effect of globalization. According to the example of Turkey, political Islam is a tool to provide advantage by keeping up with globalization rather than a resistance and means an effort of building a solidarity network devoted to

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p.p. 15-20

it.⁸⁰ Other condition is the parallel course of Islamism with other intellectual global movements. Islamism as a factor of social identity is a philosophical reference point for people that are conservative and a tool that can transform the society. Those two perspectives should be taken into account while studying how Islamism gained such popularity.

Dominant rhetoric of Islamist MSP, which was led by Necmettin Erbakan and founded as an independent political party in 1970, was development and industrialization. Thus, this statement of such kind of a traditional-Islamist party was not consistent. The same way, statements of SP that focused all the debate on turban issue were not reliable.

However, 1990's turned out to be a decade that suddenly arguments of Islamic movement got rendered, main concept of rationalism got questioned and contemporary civilization became a problematic. In such an environment traditional knowledge was exalted instead of modern values and Islamism achieved a political success. Moreover, nation-state idea became outdated by criticism of modernism and movements that were expecting to constitute political unity around different identities gained importance. According to that, Islamism can be considered as a product of globalization.

Following the end of Cold War by fall of USSR, East-West conflict left its place to a definite North-South conflict and absolute claim of Northern countries on the wealth of South became obvious. After all, the excuse "prevention of communism" became history. Thus, USA stated that its intention was to establish a "New World Order" on the date that Gulf War started.⁸¹

Passage of leadership of anti-imperialism to Islamist movements marked the most important result of Gulf War. From then on, fundamentalist Islamism has taken over the place of communism for the western alliance. Despite its loyalty to the West, Turkey's strategic importance increased after Cold War period and Turkey was assigned to leadership role of Islamic world by USA. It was planned that Turkey would build relationships with Middle East rather than the West and be a role model for region countries. Although this project was very welcomed by Turkish-Islam synthesizers; by the beginning of Gulf War; government sensed a "New World Order" was coming and worked to be able to stay in western alliance. For that reason, ruling ANAP eliminated

⁸⁰ op. cit., Gülalp, p. 12

⁸¹ ibid., p. 15

its Islamist staff which pushed those to the opposition and united them under Islamist RP. In this environment, RP grew rapidly.

Through elimination of Soviet Bloc, world economy united under a single market and NATO devoted itself to protect its members' interests from possible threats of the South. However, the order that new system would bring was not certain. Two different theses were suggested about the new system. Fukuyama's thesis was suggesting that the competition between social and political systems came to an end and world would be led through liberal democracy. Other and more realistic one was Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis.⁸² According to that thesis, North and South were different and they would never approximate to each other.

Albeit the political race during Cold War, competition instigated economic development, but economical disparity grew and a social disorder arose in globalism era. The ambiguity in political arena ended by September 11 attacks, USA has taken the global cop role on its own and plan called combat with terrorism became USA's national security strategy. This incident eliminated the slightest possibility of a new Islamist state. In this aimlessness, Islamist circles started to base their argument on liberalism and human rights which led them to political victory.

While Islamism was one of authentic identities, after September 11 it became the weaker pole of bipolar world. Actually it can be said that clash of civilizations does not exist and whole situation consists of legitimating a simple hegemony project by an excuse as terrorism.⁸³

3.1.1. Nationalist Modernization: Kemalism

Islam's position against westernization movements left a great mark on Ottoman Empire's last period. Following Ottoman Empire's failure, modern Republic of Turkey was founded at the end of World War I. This state uncompromisingly followed a positivist westernization policy and aimed for Turkization and modernism. With foundation of republic, religion and Islamism were otherized and were imprisoned to personal space, because republican regime took laicism as primary condition of modernization. Thus, dual policy that was trying to maintain balance between the West

⁸² loc. cit.

⁸³ ibid., p. 23

and Islam in Ottoman period was abandoned.⁸⁴ With the change of regime, state got detached from its Ottoman past but remained Ottoman socially and culturally. Republican regime increasingly augmented its domination over religion in order to consolidate national conscious.

In this context; Islam, which existed in politics and at every aspect of life during the rule of Ottoman Empire, was eliminated by a project which was based on French laicism. This project was named “Kemalism” and formed a cultural identity which replaced Islam with laicism in a sense. Despite that this identity was accepted reluctantly by majority of people who attached importance on Islamic values and defined themselves as conservative while it was adopted by the elite circles such as intellectuals, bureaucrats, soldiers, politicians and great capital groups eagerly.

Main goal of the new identity was creating a secular and Western culture that was refined of Islam which was controlling an important part of life. This identity was also an uprising against the system that took whole society under control and did not acknowledge individualism. Thus, it is widely known that Atatürk himself had a rebel spirit.

State worked stringently until 1950 in order to sell this new identity, which was adopted by elite circles, on people. But 1950 elections showed that people clearly were stuck on their traditional identities. Therefore political system is constituted on the axes westernizing and traditional ideologies. Struggle for obtaining power continues ever since between two ideologies.

Today, Turkey exhibits an aspect as it could not complete its evolution and stuck between the West and traditional east while society dissolves in basis of laics and Islamists. In this sense, laics represent intellectuals who support getting westernized without Islam and governing elite at the center while Islamists represent conservative society which forms majority of the Turkish population that desire to modernize with Islam. This disunity in Turkey, where formation of a classless society was aimed, remains as greatest handicap in modernization path.⁸⁵

Reform movements that started in Ottoman period lay underneath the conflict which Turkey experiences today. Ottoman leaders realized that only hope to rescue Ottoman Empire from falling down was to conduct western style reforms and they

⁸⁴ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 17

⁸⁵ op. cit., Ocak, p.p. 114-115

brought improvements to comply with this. But this suggestion divided society into two as westernists that aimed to copy the West and Islamists who were thinking that returning back to basics of Islam would resolve the situation. These fiery debates were carried to the republic with fall of Ottoman Empire. Turkey selected an identity according to desire of westernists in republican period and this situation disappointed Islamists. Cadre that carried on national struggle by using Islamist ideology until 1924 adopted a new radical westernist ideology and closed era of one thousand years which was driven by Islam. This implies that Republic of Turkey clearly adopted a regime that Islam did not have an active role. However, Kemalism could not avoid transforming to enlightenment despotism.

This transformation is the most important milestone in Turkish history after Turkish adoption of Islam.⁸⁶ Turkish state irreversibly adopted western identity with foundation of republic and radical alterations in the system were made. This was something that was never seen before in history. As part of this transformation these alterations were implemented;

- Sultanate was abolished in 1922,
- Republic was declared in 1923,
- Caliphate was abolished in 1924,
- Madrasahs were closed to comply with Code on Unification of Education and all education institutions were transferred to Ministry of National Education in 1924,
- Islam was officially taken under state control by foundation of Presidency of Religious Affairs in 1924,
- Sufism was pushed underground by closure of dervish lodges in 1925,
- The article “Official religion of Turkish state is Islam.” was eliminated from the constitution in 1928,
- Resources that served for Islamic foundations were blocked by transfer of foundations under state control in 1936.⁸⁷

A great part of reforms were done between 1922 and 1925. As a result of these reforms, Islam was limited to private life and gained a more conscientious aspect. Islam’s individualization resulted with its withdrawal also from politicians’ lives.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 117

⁸⁷ *op. cit.*, Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 17

Besides, state did not settle with this and made efforts to transform perception of religion into a Western Muslimhood by interfering to its confidential and cultural areas; it tried to form a reformed and civilized Muslimhood project which fit into westernized Turkey. In this context, state embarked upon forming religion up to its will by ordering projects to professors at Faculty of Theology of Istanbul University to shape mosques in a way that look alike with western churches, investigations on implementing azan in Turkish and organizing Quran recitals in Turkish.⁸⁹

As a result of all these reforms, conflict which existed since Ottoman period between laic nationalist state, laic elite and Muslim majority reached to a hate extent. Society lost its trust upon state and leaned to conservative parties that had an Islamic rhetoric. That's the main reason for DP's accedence to power. Following DP's election, usage of Islam for political interests became one of the most debated topics. But even though Kemalist elite lost its place in power, it has always kept state under strict control through army which caused a negative effect on democratization.

On the other hand, Islam's repression to underground by the closure of dervish lodges caused arbitrary practices on Islamic education. This legislation caused Islamist circles to realize that how much they were lagging behind. Main reason of this lagging was their perception of the Western civilization only with its imperialistic side. However, even though they realized their backwardness, they started to yearn for good old times of Islamic state rather than improving themselves. As the matter of this fact, new communities and tariqahs emerged and a puritanical community Muslimhood was adopted.

Another result was ignition of radical Islam by radical laicism. These movements took their power from Kemalism's oppressive environment. Ethnocentric separatist movements and fears for possible Islamist movements were also based on this environment. One of the most desperate results of this action have been transformation of Islam, which produced its own political, cultural, social, legal, artistic and economic institutions and values that built a high urban culture during imperial period, to a popular Islam perception which demonstrated superstitious features and lacked a refined

⁸⁸ op. cit., Ocak, p. 119

⁸⁹ ibid., p. 120

manner through Islam's deprival of its supporting institutions with declaration of republic which eventually caused rustication of Islam in time.⁹⁰

Turkish identity and nationalist idea started to develop against separatist acts of Arabs and Balkan nations. Turkish nationalism also emerged as a reaction to decline of Ottoman Empire against imperialism like other ideologies. This new ideology replaced Turkish and Muslim elements with non-Muslim elements. Nationalist idea started with Young Turks movement and kept on during Independence War. As a result of this ideology, a new Muslim middle class emerged.

Kemalism identifies Turkish nationalism as an ideology based on land. In its official definition, Turkey stands for geographical land and Turkish people stands for people living on this land.⁹¹ This definition is significantly different from a classical definition of nationalism and moreover it shows similarity with previous Ottomanism concept. Both of them are outcomes of an effort to unify different ethnical elements. The most important difference of Kemalism versus Ottomanism is the exclusion of non-Muslims.

Even though emergence of nation-state is a result of 19th century Ottoman modernization; Kemalism realized establishment of Republic of Turkey as a radical disengagement from Ottoman Empire. In this context, state was reestablished by taking its power from Turkish nation. Kemalist ideology is anti-imperialist and western. The reason that it was disengaged from its Ottoman past was Ottoman Empire's failure as a puppet to imperialism. Therefore this disengagement is an anti-imperialist act according to Kemalism.

Islam was quitted to be used as a political tool after Kemalist revolution. Kemalist administration perceived Islam as a threat and placed it under control of laic state. Following Sheikh Said rebellion against integrity of state, reforms accelerated, any separatist factor was eliminated and Turkey transformed into a unified nation which strived for reaching level of Western civilization.

According to Kemalist idea, crucial element of modernization was westernization and Islam was desired to be taken under control of the state because it was involving contradistinction against some values of modernism.⁹²

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 125

⁹¹ *ibid.*, p.p. 31-33

⁹² *loc. cit.*

Main target of both Islamism and Kemalism has always been to reach the level of Western civilization. Besides, all those ideologies contain a Turkish centralism. According to this thought, Turkish states and Islam always had same values as the West and it was important to readopt what belonged to Turkish.

The extreme thesis in Kemalist historiography helped legitimating westernization by attributions made to pre-Islamic Turkish elements. This situation is actually a common characteristic of third world countries. Thus, western and non-western elements conflict with capitalism's globalist tendencies which show themselves in existence of both globalist and relativist elements together in Western culture. It is expected to westernize from non-Western countries while they are considered that they do not have necessary qualification to be Western. This creates confusion in third world countries and they usually tend to protect their self-respect and authenticity claims while getting westernized. The same situation is also in question for Turkey. Turkey has obliterated its Ottoman and Islam past, completely entered into global civilization but defended that this civilization was not enforcement.⁹³ But Turkey's westernization could not reach a complete success due to unequal evolution of capitalism worldwide. This situation caused emergence of critical movements and a new type of Islamism has risen among those.

3.1.2. Islamic Opposition to Kemalist Modernism

Even though Islamist opposition shares same modernist assumptions with Kemalism, the method it follows became an alternative to secular nationalism. Differing from Kemalist laicism's rhetoric that defends suppression of Islam, Islamist modernists assumed that Muslim communities can also get modernized.

Islamist modernists assume that acceptance of modern values would not spoil authenticity as elements of Western civilization originate from Muslim world. Islamist MSP's and its then leader Necmettin Erbakan's opinions confirm that.

Also MSP refused to see modernism and westernization as the same like other modernist Islamists. Even though Turkish nation lost its connection to Islam, they continued to consider Turkish society as Muslim which resulted with Islam's inclusion

⁹³ *ibid.*, p.p. 33-35

to the ideology that legitimized political power after settlement of the regime. Extreme nationalist rhetoric was also refused at that period. Therefore, an uncertainty emerged.

Radical Islamist movement that was formed in 1980's questioned modernism itself altogether. That started arguments on what kind of an attitude should be adopted towards modernism in Turkish political life and authenticity arose as an alternative against western modernity in the aftermath of this period.

Reason of RP's success was its possibility to merge two concepts of Islam, which are the concept that suggests an alternative to Kemalism and the concept that refuses modernism and hence Kemalism, in the same movement. The factor that brought these two movements together was their opposition against Kemalism. This opposition took its power from Kemalism's decline in an environment that globalization rose and nation-state lost its significance.⁹⁴

Kemalism's decline is a result of globalization. Marxism and nationalism have universalized the experience of Europe, but western protective ideologies lost their validity due to globalization. Therefore, also Kemalism lost its validity as it was accepting Western civilization as a universal model. But, Islamism on the other hand refused Western ideologies as they were ignoring authentic identity and projected itself as local, authentic and anti-imperialist. In this sense while modernist Islamism in 19th and 20th centuries was aiming to unite western modernity and Islamist authenticity in the same frame, current critical Islamism refuses supremacy of Western civilization.

However it is also a fact that putting an authentic identity claiming to be different from the West causes regeneration of Western orientalism. It does not matter which ideology is adopted, ideology of the weak is always obliged to progress in the frame that the strong set.⁹⁵

Masses, which live in rural areas or in slums of cities, manifest their political and social demands with an Islamic identity in today's Turkey take their power from this rustic popular Islam.⁹⁶ These circles bring popular Islam out as an opposing identity against the ruling elite.

Popular Islam ideology, which was produced by periphery against laic understanding, was used by the right wing political parties which were in expectation of

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, p.p. 36-37

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 40

⁹⁶ *op. cit.*, Ocak, p. 125

political power and this way religion was made an instrument of politics by making concessions from laicism in Turkey. Besides, by access of 2nd or 3rd generations that migrated from rural and settled in cities into leadership positions in education, politics, and bureaucracy; Islam that was eliminated by reforms again gained ground in public space. This is the situation that laic circles characterize as political reaction. Majority that was not heard since the single-party period demand their rights now. Their struggle with laic circles is for not losing benefits they gained since now; if this struggle would be conducted in a democratic frame, its contribution in democratization process of Turkey is inevitable.

Even though this opponent society is not as qualified as Ottoman period, it started to reproduce popular Islamic culture at the present day. Popular Islam which demonstrated a rustic feature for a long time, entered in a re-scientification process by the rising education levels of Islamist circles.

At the present day, there is still a society that wants to keep Islam out of scope in modernization programs intended for the future of Turkey; mistake of Kemalist elite lies herein. Even though Kemalism became successful in the period it emerged, it could not keep this success and lost its sustainability in changing global conditions. Kemalism rightfully kept Islam responsible of what devastated Ottoman Empire became; founded the republic which adopted positive values by terminating Islam's political, social and cultural existence and declared itself as the official ideology. However its precluding attitude against Islam's conservative manner, transformed into an ideological struggle that necessitates reconciliation of both sides. At the end of this struggle it will be possible to see a Turkey that absorbed democratic values.

3.1.3. Place of Islamist Parties in Turkish Politics

Islam's revival is one of the most important events occupying world agenda recently. Especially 1979 Iran Revolution is the most important incident that symbolizes this revival. This incident also accelerated researches made by the West in order to understand about its effects to themselves.

Revolution has also attracted attention to Turkey and conceived different results according to attribute of the societies which it was discussed. While this incident turned

to an anti-reactive Islamophobia in laic society, it conducted to various initiatives to redevelop Islam and expose their identity in conservative society.

Starting with establishment of republic, Islamic idea has stayed under strict control of the state until 1950. That's why; conservative society endeavored to live their religion in secret. As a result of pressure of the new regime, this disappointment turned into indignation. Conservative society tried to preserve traditional structure rather than improving popular Islam under this pressure. Today's conservative intellectuals are mostly individuals who took Islamic education in the country side as a result of traditions being more untouched there.

Kemalism's strict policy over religion reduced following admittance of political opposition to the parliament in 1940's. Following this period, Islamism and nationalism integrated and became an official policy.

Giving Islam the place it deserved in political regime came into question in 1947. CHP took steps that could be considered as appeasements to its policy such as supplying exchange for pilgrims, implementation of religion lessons in primary level, introduction of imam-hatip schools and opening a faculty of theology in Ankara University.⁹⁷

As it was stated several times in the study, transition to multi-party period in Turkey has a significant importance as it enabled desperate circles to raise their voice for the first time. In this part of the study, a closer look will be taken into implementations of different parties in the Turkish history between 1950's until the present day.

3.1.3.1. DP and AP Period

1950 elections brought DP, which was using Islamic rhetoric, to the power. Besides DP, many conservative organizations were formed at that period. Thus, people started to show their discontent against imposed reforms by Islam. DP followed a strategy to satisfy both laic and conservative circles and did not refuse laicism even though it embraced a different laicism perception. Not following such kind of a policy has been a disadvantage for CHP.

⁹⁷ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 19

DP did not adopt Islamism as an ideology but it anticipated to construct an identity integrated with Islam instead of imposed laicism during single-party period. Islamists did not get satisfied with DP's steps in this matter, but these steps that DP took, lead to transformation to an era that left a mark in Turkish politic history by extending Islam's mobility. Islamic circles formed their social base through some organizations thanks to flexible policies of DP. In this sense, Islamic circles had the possibility to guide their youth through imam-hatip schools, state dormitories and study rooms. This situation shows importance of civil society in politics. ÇYDD, which is considered to be pioneer in this topic and aims to raise laic persons, only started its practices in 1990. This situation proves how early Islamist circles acted to organize.

Traditional values remained warm because no other ideology emerged that changed cultural values of the society during republican period. Desired transformation was imposed through reforms and education system following foundation of republic. Different circles in society showed different reactions to those innovations and circles that could not keep up with evolving society developed a conservative worldview.⁹⁸ Economic and social problems have a great role in this opinion.

Economic, social and political issues that anti-Islamist Marxist intellectuals brought up in agenda have shown that moral based Islam is insufficient in those issues. Therewith conservative intellectuals started to develop themselves and discuss those issues. The most important of those was the political dimension of Islam. Eventually as a result of giving a high importance on this subject, Islamist intellectuals neglected other aspects of Islam; perceived and influenced society to perceive Islam as only a political regime. This generates an obstacle on evolution of an healthy Islamic thought.

Along with that, Islamic idea still could not evade from a defensive psychology towards laic society in Turkey and that is why it could not prompt its creative side yet.⁹⁹ The most important reason of that is inexistence of a settled freedom of opinion and a quality Islamic idea breakthrough where Ottoman Empire's central militarist structure was influent. Attempts to evolve Islamic idea have been obstructed by traditional conservative society. Same kind of obstruction also keeps going in modern Turkey.

Today, Kemalism which is formed of five basic principles is accepted. Laicism, which is one of those values, means surrounding daily practices by state and ignorance

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 21

⁹⁹ *op. cit.*, Ocak, p. 105

of regional differences in Kemalist ideology. However, while French laicism has an anti-religious nature, Anglo-American style secularism aims to protect religions from state and approves organization of social relations based on religion to encourage social solidarity.

According to Yavuz and Esposito, laicism and nationalism project played a great role in Islam attain an opponent language and ideological dimension. On the other hand, Islamic revival was an internal dialectic of Kemalist ideology. Avoiding differences have always been a principle of Kemalist state.

The thought lying under this system was imposing the idea that state knew what the best was for its people and CHP would protect Islam from foreign effect.¹⁰⁰ However, with transition to multi-party period in Turkey state policy against religion was moderated. As a part of this transition, religion lessons entered in curriculum of public schools, azan that was sung in Turkish until then started to be sung in Arabic, limitations on theological education in public schools and worshipping were removed, construction of new mosques was approved. However, DP opposed to political Islam and any objection against state's laic nature.

DP supported the change on 163rd clause of penal code. Previous form of the code was proposing a penalty for acts which were aiming to change social, economic, political and judicial system based on religious principles and beliefs. Objective of this code was to maintain state control on religion and to prevent any kind of Islamic movement to loosen this control. DP approved the change as "punishment of any group or subject that uses religion for political or personal benefit" in 1953. As a result of this change, state's control over religion increased and religion based protests became subject to suppression by the state.¹⁰¹

DP was closed by 1960 military coup and AP was opened followingly. AP also tried to maintain a synthesis between laicism and conservatism as its pioneer DP and followed an anti-leftist policy that aimed to integrate nationalism with religion. Policies that were followed during Cold War period strengthened conservative nationalist ideology. Islamist intellectual Necmettin Erbakan wanted to enter the parliament from AP quota, but his request was rejected by Süleyman Demirel which postponed his

¹⁰⁰ Helen Rose Ebaugh, *Gülen Hareketi: İnanç Tabanlı Bir Sivil Toplumsal Hareketin Sosyolojik Analizi (The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam)*, Istanbul: Mega, 2010, p.p. 37-39

¹⁰¹ loc. cit.

admittance to the parliament to 1969. He was considered as a person defining Islam's role in Turkish politics.

Necmettin Erbakan hoped to change and benefit from election system by gathering all religious movements and communities under his leadership.¹⁰² His attempt resulted with his prohibition from politics for 5 years according to the 163rd clause of penal code. He always mentioned that he was against the format of laicism in Turkey, defended that current system was governing with arbitrary practices on Islam and suggested that laicism should assure religious freedom and alterations should be done on constitution to that end.

In 1965 elections Süleyman Demirel, who was a sympathetic name for conservative society, was elected as a prime-minister from AP.

3.1.3.2. MNP and MSP Period

Islam got politicized especially in some certain periods after 1970's. This situation was grounded both on political developments in the Middle East and reactions that laicism caused.¹⁰³ Thus, because laicism prevented Islamist circles to join mainstream party organizations and express their opinions there, these circles had to establish parties that eventually politicized Islam's representation.

Thus, political Islamist movement which had to perform politics under the roof of central right parties such as DP in 1950's and AP in 1960's as an outcome of strict laic system of Turkish state was able to establish its own political party, MNP, in 1970 as a result of changing global conditions, decline of nation-state idea and weakening of Turkish state's central authority. Quest of forming a new party started as an outcome of the competition between industry magnates and SMEs in 1968. Following rejection of his application for presidency to Union of Chambers by AP, Necmettin Erbakan established MNP as a reaction.¹⁰⁴ SMEs had possibility to get organized as a result of this process. Party was stating these opinions in its declaration of establishment:

“Our glorious nation! Today is the day that missile is launched to settle our great nation which was walking through the most supreme orbit of human history with its faithful and adherent identity to God which upheld the right and ignored the evil, back to its supreme

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p. 40

¹⁰³ *op. cit.*, Ocak, p. 122

¹⁰⁴ *op. cit.*, Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 22

trajectory, which various efforts to derail it preponderated, after a long period. MNP is this powerful missile that is launched to lead our nation to light after troublous and dismal days, and settle it to its bright historical trajectory.”¹⁰⁵

These opinions which formed the party program, constituted main ideology of successor parties which were established or implemented to be established by Necmettin Erbakan and his companions under the roof of a movement called National Opinion. This backlash of Erbakan marked a very important milestone in Turkish politics; a party which adopted Islamism as its formal ideology was established for the first time in modern Turkey at pos-Ottoman period. Moreover, this act caused a duality in conservative central right-wing which led the way to formation of two different ideologies. MNP was not an extension of AP and religious conservative ideology; as we can also understand from its declaration of establishment, MNP was an Islamist party which did not acquiesce to laic and modern ideals of Kemalist Turkish republic and clearly manifested its desire of reverting back to Ottoman ideals which were determined by Shari’a. In this context, by this disunion an Islamist wing was established which formed official ideology of MNP, MSP, RP, FP and SP while official ideology of AP, DYP, ANAP and AKP is religious conservatism.

MNP was closed down on March 12th, 1971 by constitutional court as per the code of political parties which was prohibiting usage of religion for political purposes and carry on anti-laic operations. Roots of a great hassle were established with the decision of this closure which reached till our day. Conflict between constitutional court and Islamist parties radicalized both sides and claim that Islamists pose a threat against laic Turkey got repeated with each closure case. Islamist politics reached till our day through succession of closed parties with new ones. MSP was formed as successor of MNP and by alliance of İskender Paşa Community which is a branch of Nakshibendi Lodge with Nur Community; it received support from major part of religious communities. 1973 elections brought MSP to a key point and it consistently made a part of government following this date. Besides, movement capacity of Islamist circles in public space were promoted by assigning people that shared same ideology to the key points. This expansion in public space represents the training period of people that were supported by Islamic circles starting with ANAP term in pos-1980 period.

¹⁰⁵ “Milli Nizam Partisi” (National Order Party), 04.05.2013, Wikipedia, Acc. 13.06.2013: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mill%C3%AE_Nizam_Partisi

The most important transformation that MSP generated in Turkish politics was beginning of Islamist opposition's existence with its own elite staff and socio-economic base individually. In this sense, MSP undertook representation of a second axis against Kemalist elite and became a tool for assuring participation of traditional circles actively into politics, resolving identity issues of these circles, fixing socio-economic deprivations that industrialism caused and besides all, legitimizing Islamic political ideology in laic political system.¹⁰⁶

Conservative nationalism transformed into Islamic ummahism also in Turkey at the same time with all Muslim societies in the same period. In this context, MSP and its successor RP showed efforts to form a Muslim union that otherized the West.

3.1.3.3. RP Period

Islamist movement had trouble in identifying itself in the system between 1980 military coup and RP's achievement of mass support while it faced system's rivalry despite ANAP's support. But in this process Islamists realized their power gradually. Another effect that played role in evolution of Islamist wing was the circles which migrated to cities and were seen as new conservatives of urban life having a voice in politics. Religious traditions that play role in solidarity of migrant society are very important. New urbanized societies that were in identity crisis formed their new life by putting Islam in the center of their lives. These circles saw Islam as a salvation in the rapidly changing social life.

After 1980 military coup, ANAP came into force under Turgut Özal's assistance. Özal adopted Turkish-Islam synthesis which combined Turkish nationalism and Islamic values. This doctrine rejected political Islam while embracing Islam as a moral source. This philosophy proved that Islam could exist together with nationalism, democracy, Kemalism and capitalism at the same time. Turkey met with capitalism through Özal and reforms started. 163rd clause of Turkish Penal Code was eliminated. As a part of this liberalization, private television and radio channels were established.¹⁰⁷

An entrepreneur class arose in Özal period which became one of main purposes of economics and foreign policy. Özal believed that any restriction against freedom of

¹⁰⁶ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p.p. 23-24

¹⁰⁷ op. cit., Ebaugh, p. 41

thought would trigger fanaticism; therefore he was moderate towards religious education at schools. Veiling in public space was permitted but this attitude was criticized by laic society as it was perceived as a threat towards the state. However, ANAP lost its power following Özal's decease in 1993.

First step for the Islamist wing that got organized and founded a party in RP term was taken by MNP/MSP. But the community which Islamist parties attracted was the migrants that came from rural in pos-1980 period. People that were devoid of their communities or tariqahs because of migration reorganized by using social possibilities that RP provided. RP's success augmented laic-Islamist conflict. Each election that RP won was perceived as a victory against laicism and this became an element of self confidence for Islamist circles.

RP was established during Erbakan's political ban and was accepted to the parliament in 1991. Following his release Erbakan was elected as prime-minister and debates on political Islam became more feverish.

Islamist movement transcended masses that migrated from rural and saw Islam as a unifying element in RP axis. While percentage of votes that RP got in 1987 elections was 7.1 %, it climbed up to 21.5 % in 1995 elections and RP caught a higher success than any other central left and central right party. This situation shows that people were seeing RP as the main opposition. This result was quite remarkable as it showed that RP could also interact with the circles which were beyond party's social base.¹⁰⁸ Erbakan's efforts to attract electorate base of ANAP had a great impact on RP's success. As a matter of fact, Erbakan introduced his party as true follower of Atatürk, true defender of laicism, collaborator of Turkish Armed Forces and right party to take ANAP's place following Özal's decease in RP congress in 1996. Even though these statements were not welcomed by radical Islamist circles in the party it was clear that this moderate policy had an impact on former ANAP electorates.

Victory of RP in 1995 elections caused a chaos in political area, because the other elected parties did not tend to form a coalition with RP. Only six months later DYP and RP managed to form a coalition government. DYP leader Tansu Çiller was criticized by followers of her party for forming a coalition with anti-laic RP. Tansu Çiller stated that even though she still sided with laicism and did not like RP, she

¹⁰⁸ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 31

believed that only way to provide social reconciliation was to accept RP as a part of Turkish political life.¹⁰⁹ These words of Tansu Çiller were pointing out an important reality: Turkey was polarized between laics and Islamists rather than leftists and rightists from then on. Following this, RP was finally able to acquire a central position in the parliament. However it needed to tame its rhetoric and give certain appeasements in order not to be eliminated by a military coup which drew reaction from its electorates. The most important appeasements were approaching Israel to sign a military agreement and discharging military officials because of religious reactionary acts.

RP again polled a remarkable amount of votes in 1996 local elections. As RP was feeling more comfortable as a result of its success, it started to put its Islamist identity forward and implement cultural projects. One of those was to build a mosque in Taksim Square in Istanbul which was identified with democracy struggle. This move had a great impact and was heavily protested by laic circles. On the other hand right after the elections, a mortal traffic accident happened in Susurluk which revealed complex organizational relations between mafia and state and proved that state was using former rightist militants as a tool in domestic and external political relations. This situation also transformed into a protest of some social segments which acted with democratic concerns in a little while. But Erbakan assumed a hostile attitude with an expedient behavior against protesters which obviously did not constitute a part of his electorates and insulted them who were demanding justice by mentioning that they looked like performing a tribal dance. After this statement of prime-minister, police started to apply arbitrary restraint against protesters.

However, RP was successful at introducing itself as a party which defended civil society against state and periphery against center. They formed people's assemblies in the system which they called as direct democracy in order to show how affiliative they were. However, according to the observations of anthropologist Navaro-Yashin, these assemblies were formed in a serious hierarchic structure where no women participants existed. Self-governing was definitely in question in this context. Anthropologist Jenny B. White also shares same opinions while she adds that hierarchic structure transformed civilian institutions into the tools of social control.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ op. cit., Gülaip, p. 79

¹¹⁰ ibid, p. 101

RP reached this success through the support that it provided for indigent people. Islamist movement founded its organization by “being voice of silent audiences” pledge which is a widely used argument of central right parties that is generally intended to the dissatisfied audiences and assistance that was provided from conservative social networks.¹¹¹

Following 1995 elections, RP established its own administration mechanism with sources that came from municipalities during its short coalition government with DYP. Humanitarian assistance such as fuel aid, nutrition aid, vocational courses that were provided to indigent people both by party organization and local authorities created a satisfied electorate audience. Especially inhabitants of slums formed electorate audience of RP.

RP's this communication success bothered laic society and Turkish Armed Forces considered some incidents which occurred at different locations as religious reactionary acts and issued a memorandum as a measure in National Security Council on February 28th, 1997. Focus of this report was the acts against laicism. One of the allegations that took place in the memorandum was behaviors against dress code of 1934. Upon that, RP had its supporters who lived in Islamist quarters of Istanbul arrested at cost of protecting its interests.¹¹² Even though RP compromised its ideology with anxiety of losing its position, restraints against it did not decrease. Eventually a closure case was prosecuted against RP charging it with violation to constitution. RP was persuaded to leave political power estimating that it could decrease tension with this step, reinstate democratic process and even push army to the wall in case of winning elections.¹¹³ But, RP was closed by constitutional court with allegation of constituting a threat against laic system and Erbakan was banned from politics followingly. Unfortunately Islamist circles were left alone during February 28 period by nationalist and conservative circles which they collaborated for many years.¹¹⁴

Following this period, another report determining guidelines of the governance was published by National Security Council. Aim of this report was to decrease the effect of Islam in Turkey. This incident once more proved influence of the army on politics.

¹¹¹ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 31

¹¹² op. cit., Gülalp, p. 107

¹¹³ ibid., p. 108

¹¹⁴ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskişar, p. 32

In 1998 ANAP began to implement guidelines in the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz. İmam-hatip schools were closed, turban was banned at schools and universities and some of the businessmen were arrested for financing Islamic organizations in this context.¹¹⁵ Also a bill of indictment was prepared against MÜSİAD aiming its closure for its anti-laic acts.

At the same year, ANAP was accused of corruption and its place was taken by DSP in the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. Despite its success, new government could not resist economic crisis and a snap election was run in 2002. Winner of this and next two elections was the new AKP lead by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Even though FP was founded as RP's successor; party was having a discrepancy because of the conflict between traditional and reformist groups. However, FP committed itself to fit in the democratic molds from then on. FP attempted to change the 312th clause of Turkish penal code, which was organizing crimes against republican regime, claiming that it was limiting freedom of expression when Erbakan faced the risk to be sued in the eve of April 18th, 1999 elections. It was clear that they wanted to change the clause only when the code threatened themselves as they did not have any attempts to change it before.¹¹⁶ FP once more showed that it could not be democratic no matter how much it struggled. They only were remembering existence of democracy when exclusionary policies of laic order were committed against them. This actually marks one of the distinctive features of Islamist parties which is demanding freedoms only for their supporters and disregarding them for the rest of the society. Eventually end of FP was also the same with its pioneer RP. In 2001, a closure case was opened against FP with same reasons and it was closed consequently.

3.2. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF TURKEY

In the Cold War period Islam became a global policy tool through the efforts of USA in order to surround USSR. Therefore, several projects involving Islam have been propounded. In this part, an overview of these projects, USA's Islam policy, geostrategy

¹¹⁵ op. cit., Ebaugh, p. 44

¹¹⁶ op. cit., Gülaip, p. 113

of Islamism, Turkish political Islam in the globalizing world and Islam in Cold War politics will be handled.

3.2.1. Geostrategy of Islamism

Evolution of Islamism also depends on geostrategic factors besides ideological factors. Iran Islamic Revolution forms an example on failure of the Islamist model.¹¹⁷ Even though this incident was seen with different expectations by the Islamic world, the result has been a somewhat autocratic and so called democratic regime. Therefore the revolution was perceived as a threat by the Arab nationalists and laic circles in Turkey. These states condoned Sunni fundamentalism in order to fight against the revolution but they became the victim of this policy. Islamism played a separatist role rather than a unitive role in the Muslim societies.

If the socio-cultural relations are taken into consideration, these relations are relatively individual in Turkey than other states in the region. There were no movements which were capable to transform into social movements in Turkey until 1980's, but after this period networks got more organized and formed mass movements such as RP.

States adopted a dichotomic attitude towards Islamist movements in 1980's. While the state tried to establish control over Islamist movements, on the other hand the duty to Islamize the society was given to the state itself. This situation occurred by the trial of a moderate Islamist party to get integrated with the political system in Turkey and religion was defragged with the state by appointing Islamists to key positions. This transformation gets evident with Islamist rhetoric and increase of Islamic elements in the legal system.

In this context, compulsory religious education lessons were taken into academic program for primary and secondary education in 1972 and Turkey became a member of OIC in 1980. However because of the article regarding laicism in the constitution, only partial compromises could be given in Turkey. For instance some universities allowed

¹¹⁷ op. cit., Roy, p. 145

the use of turban while some others did not and only Islamic worldview was taken into consideration in religious education books.¹¹⁸

Islamism's transformation is also realized through political and social activities organized by the state. RP's and AKP's social base are good examples to prove that. But eventually Islamism is far from providing an economic or social solution to the societies.

3.2.2. Islam in Global Politics

Nationalist and Islamist politics that USA supported in the global politics continued following the fall of USSR. The global politics of USA after the fall of USSR was determined by the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis of Samuel Huntington. It was estimated that USA could only get stronger against a competitor. Therefore, new competitors were created namely the Islamic world and far eastern civilization.

Attacks of September 11 were the perfect opportunity for USA to start implementing its plan. Huntington did not want the rise of liberal thoughts and especially laicism in Islamic world. Only a limited democracy understanding was desired as it was appropriate for the interests of USA. Thus, as Muslim populated countries could not object western imperialism, they also would not be able to escape from western domination.

However, Turkey was presenting a threat against the project as it embraced laicism and liberal thoughts. Therefore, Huntington desired Turkey to leave the western values that Atatürk created and cooperate with the Islamic world. This anxiety was based on the thought of Turkey's risk of constituting a role model for the region countries and decrease western hegemony in the region as it embraced laic and democratic regime model based on sovereignty and independence principles.

Clinton saw Turkey as one of the most influential countries of 21st century and stated that it was necessary to preserve its laic and democratic structure in order to use Turkey as a defensive post if Islamic world would surrender to radicalism.

However, this policy was changed at the presidency of George W. Bush and Turkey started to be seen as an assault base rather than a defense post. Turkey, which

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 171

USA wanted to use as a weapon against radical Islam, was desired to get transformed into a moderate Islamic model to draw less attention from the Islamic world.

Thus, a moderate, West supported model was implemented against the radical political Islam which was dominant in the region countries and considered USA as the devil. Of course Turkey needed to step back from its laic and democratic values in order to implement this model in Turkey along with the countries such as Egypt and Iraq. This model was successfully imposed in Turkey through the alliance of some political groups and support of some tariqahs and Islamist groups.¹¹⁹ However, as this model completely contradicted with laicism, it also caused Turkey to get isolated as the result of reactions it took from the Islamic world because of its alliance with the West.

In this sense, even though moderate political Islam was functional for the Islamic world, it did not create expected results in Turkey.

3.2.3. Turkish Political Islam in the Globalizing World

The authors seeing center-periphery relationship as the main secession axis in Turkey dwell on the elements such as lifestyles, culture and ideology in their studies. Those authors consider that center is represented by Kemalism; therefore the society opposing this ideology has been isolated in cultural and political level and was pushed to the periphery. According to this theory, Islam is a contra-elitist movement which tries to rise against Kemalist elite. The power battle between republican elitists and Islamists is also visible in habitat, cultural codes and lifestyles.

Actually, RP really presented itself as civil society's party against the state. Nation states declined all around the world and states just organized their economies lost power against globalization at the end of 20th century. Effects of globalization led to ethnical separatist movements and religious revival movements worldwide.

Political Islam can be understood based on globalization and post-modernism. This approach rejects religious regression contra economic growth thesis and defends that Islam is not against globalization. Thus, globalization has a big role on Islamist revival in Turkey as Islamism promises different things to the people from different categories. RP was in the appropriate structure for populism which means action against

¹¹⁹ Emre Kongar, *ABD'nin Siyasal İslam'la Dansı (USA's Dance with Political Islam)*, Istanbul: Remzi, 2012, p. 52

status quo by some parts of indigent, middle class and wealthy population.¹²⁰ RP was successful in uniting those classes against Kemalism by Islamist movement.

Turkey experienced an economic growth dependent on import substitution for industrialization in pos-1960. Islamist opposition represented small and independent business owners which were under extinction in this period. Also electorate of the first conservative party, MSP, was formed from tariqah supporter conservative people and owners of small businesses.

According to the authors that see Islamism as a conservative political movement, Islam functions as an ideology which utters the reaction of small enterprises after Turkey's integration to worldwide market. However, this situation lost its effect in current Islamist platform; on the contrary, conservative investors grew and opened up to the world by using potential of globalism.

Political Islam caught an efficient ground with decline of classical worker class and rise of entrepreneurship in Turkey. Nevertheless, small entrepreneurs complain about lack of support from the state accompanied with an anti-statist discourse, but they mention that any kind of support would be accepted gladly.¹²¹ Majority of Islamist employers rise among small-scale entrepreneurs.

Apart from the small entrepreneurs, division of capital class as center and periphery is visible between the two businessman associations in Turkey. While TÜSİAD, which is supported by inveterate, modern and laic society, appeals to the large-scale enterprises that are supported by the state; MÜSİAD appeals to small and medium scale enterprises arose with free market which did not find support from the state. Especially MÜSİAD represents the new part of capital circle which supports political Islam and rises from the periphery. According to the speech of Islamist circles, interests of rentier capital that is close to political power and small-scale entrepreneurs are conflicting. So that, RP blamed rentier circles for being overthrown despite its success in 1995 elections. The same way, also MÜSİAD hold rentier circles, which clamored laic regime was under threat, responsible of RP's take down and interruption of democracy in its economy report.

According to Islamist economist Mustafa Özel, the rentier circle formed a monopoly by sheltering under Kemalism and exploited domestic market. He also

¹²⁰ op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 41- 44

¹²¹ ibid., p.p. 45-47

denotes that competitive and export oriented industrialists object to Kemalist ideology and support RP's Islamic liberalism.¹²² This statement clarifies the support that RP took from workers class. The statement, which defined supporters of Kemalist ideology as exploiters, could unite the winners and losers of neo-liberalist structure after 1980 with the advantage of globalization under a common identity poliics.¹²³ Populist rhetoric of political Islam especially attracted small-scale businessmen just immigrated to cities which were searching opportunities to climb up in social hierarchy. According to a research made in 1993, small-scale entrepreneurs combined Islamic trends and liberal manners under government policy in social subjects. The same way, grassroots opposition was also supporting Islamist party rather than social democrats.¹²⁴ RP was encouraged by this and aimed to unite workers and small-scale entrepreneurs under a common roof.

3.2.4. USA's Islam Policy

USA's politics on the Middle East region has always affected Turkish politics in large scale as Turkey was a very important ally. USA's Islamic world strategy was a plan which was called "Green Belt" and was developed for anti-communist propaganda, but this strategy was not abandoned after post Cold War period.

Even though moderate Islam attribution was considered as incorrect and separatist by the political scientists, this strategy was significant to the countries that did not support terrorism, but carried out a democratic Islamic model in USA's point of view. Therefore, USA continued to support Islamic parties in Turkey and the world. But ironically even though the parties came into power by elections, they were still seen as terror sympathizers by USA. Thus, there is no other country that passed through the same kind of political experience. But eventually USA's insistence on such a system for Turkey led to corruption in Turkish politics rather than improving democracy in other countries.¹²⁵ Actually this process should be seen as Islam's democratization rather than defining it with moulds as "moderate Islam".

¹²² *ibid.*, p. 52

¹²³ *ibid.*, p. 53

¹²⁴ *loc. cit.*

¹²⁵ *op. cit.*, Kongar, p. 54

The incident that revealed moderate Islam paradox was the terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda. Following the incidents, USA felt the necessity of distinguishing Islamist groups and the groups that organized terrorist attacks in the name of Islam. Attacks of September 11th marked a milestone in history of Islam and paradoxical moderate Islam attribution was one of the suggested solutions against increasing fanaticism.

USA formed many commissions contra terrorism. Reports of the commissions indicated that a comprehensive approach was adopted towards Islamic world and the main objective was to democratize them. This formed the basis of USA's Great Middle East Project.¹²⁶

USA's global policy is defined mainly by the deep state and incidents in different regions. In this sense, USA also designates its policy towards Turkey in the light of these elements. Most recent Middle East policy of USA is the Arab Spring.

However this strategy is quite risky for the region. According to author Emre Kongar, political Islam signifies both the ones of performing politics according to Islamic principles and the ones use any means including terror in order to seize state structure and reorganize it based on their will.

This hypothesis is also valid for Turkey. Thus, current AKP government aims to reorganize the state according to its benefit. Their insistence on a new constitution, urge to set the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan free and sideline the people that do not share their opinion by oppressive policies clearly show this tendency. Besides all, because Turkey is the only Muslim populated country that has a democratic regime, it always is used as an experimental subject.

Even though the dictatorships in Muslim countries are overthrown, they cannot get replaced by democratic regimes, because democracy cannot exist without a certain level of industrialization, labor class and freedom of media. For that reason, the domestic pressure of international intervention always resulted with replacing current regimes with new dictatorships. Moreover, election of representatives of political Islam which are the most significant organized powers in Arab Spring countries is quite suspicious. It is clearly seen that USA shapes Arab Spring movement according to its needs. While full support for Islamic dictatorships like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is given and political Islam is not even in question for these countries, fall of non-Islamic

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 61

dictatorships and their replacement with Islamic regimes is supported.¹²⁷ Under these circumstances, political Islam imposition to Turkey, which is the only laic and democratic country in the region, is insensible. But, Samuel Huntington's thesis has a significant importance for preparing the base of this imposition.

USA, which sees itself as the unrivalled leader of world, was shocked by the September 11th attacks and twisted the situation into its benefit by declaring war to the Muslim populated countries in the Middle East for guaranteeing its resources and security. But this pragmatism of USA may often affect its long-term plans.

Now, USA evidently suggests Turkey's imposed "moderate Islam" regime and looks for Turkey's economical, political and military assistance in this project. This can be understood if Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to the three countries that experienced Arab Spring manifestations and his support in favor of Islamist circles are considered. Even though suggestion of the Turkish regime as a model is an ornament, the perception of that regime suggested under the name "moderate Islam" as "democratic Shari'a" would result with a totalitarian regime even if it is accepted through the public vote.¹²⁸ In this case Islamic world's only democratic and laic country would get affected from this totalitarianism.

Turkey's consideration as a model for Islamic world was suggested by Samuel Huntington. But Atatürk's abnegate for that purpose as Huntington suggests would also eliminate the desired aspects of Turkey. After all, the model that Huntington suggests is a dependent regime practicing a so called moderate Islam democracy integrated with central capitalism. Moreover, not being an Arabic country is the main obstacle for Turkey on setting an example to the Arab world. In this sense, Barack Obama clarified the model country arguments when he visited Turkey in 2009 and underlined that the intended model is the laic and democratic Turkey which was founded by Atatürk while he especially avoided moderate Islam definition.¹²⁹

It is a fact that Islamic world still could not maintain the political conditions to be able to discuss about democracy and laicism. Disapproval of the laicism and democracy messages that Erdoğan has given in his visits to Muslim populated countries proves that. But what is even more surprising was Erdoğan's message in favor of

¹²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 100

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, p.p. 112-113

¹²⁹ *ibid.*, p.p. 151-159

laicism considering that he is the representative of an idea that defends laicism should be eliminated if people want. Groups that support Erdoğan were confused as a result of this unexpected discourse and delayed to praise this political posture. The reason of this confusion was Erdoğan's frequently changing discourse depending on USA's pragmatic policies. In this case it is possible to accept Erdoğan's laicism discourse as a part of American foreign policy. However, the same political approach was repeated also by Abdullah Gül in his visit to Tunisia in 2012.

It is true that there are efforts to adjust the developments in Turkey among Islamic world, but it is unclear if this effort is in favor of a system that is transformed by AKP or a laic Turkish model.

As Prof. Bernard Lewis indicates, Turkey is getting increasingly Islamized and AKP gains control of various institutions one after another. Besides the institutions that are already seized such as economy, business world, universities and media; the next step is to gain control over judicial system.¹³⁰

It is a fact that Turkey is more advantageous as it started the development activities in 1920 which its neighbors could only start in 1950 and this is one of the reasons that it is presented as a model.

In this context, along with Turkey's domestic and foreign policies, USA's approach is also a determiner for the possible Turkish model. Gülen Community has a significant importance because of its alliance with AKP and its strategy plays a determining role for the future of Turkey.

EU also has an important role in determining Turkish political system. As the recession of democratic and laic system would not be desirable for EU, they can protest any attempts in this respect. Because EU can influence Turkey in the current system and it would lose this privilege if the democratic system in Turkey fails.

As a result, it is very important that if USA expects a Turkey which is laic and democratic or a country that lost these features by getting defeated to the Shari'a. However, USA's requirement of a laic Turkey in order to realize its project to democratize Islamic world is inevitable.

¹³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 177

3.2.5. Islam in Cold War Politics

World War I caused elimination of the agricultural empires based on religion. Followingly, USSR and USA which suffered relatively less from the World War II arose as the new global rival powers. In this context, political Islam came into question as an ideological tool in international politics in the competitive environment of two great powers.

There were three elements of this new type of war: armament, economics, politics and ideology. Even though economy and armament were the main factors for determining the strong; ideological and political aspect was more important for Turkey as it was directly affected by the political and ideological decisions of both powers.

USSR considered religion and nationalism as discriminatory and defended that the real democracy was the equality which was realized in context of class dictatorship while USA highlighted religious and nationalist elements in context of democracy and human rights.

USSR was claiming that it was aiming something beyond the religious and nationalist states, it would create a classless society and it would realize the transformation through a temporary proletarian dictatorship.¹³¹

USA and the West decided to support Islamist and nationalist ideologies globally against this model. In many countries communist and socialist ideologies were banned, parties were closed and the intellectuals that were defending these ideologies were sentenced; nationalism and religionism were praised in this respect.

Political and ideological war was applied in all aspects of social life, especially the legal system. Legal system was executed against the people were pro-Soviet ideology and sometimes only to be libertarian was considered as a crime. While the approaches such as socialism, social classes and exploitation were banned, religion and nationalism were praised in this ideological war. Special efforts were made to emphasize Islam more than other religions, due to many Muslims living in USSR borders.

In the pos-1945 period, Islamist and nationalist ideologies ascended also in Turkey and as a part of the global trend, the parties that strived for freedom and peace

¹³¹ *ibid.*, p.p. 15-17

were also closed down; many leftist intellectuals, journalists, students and politicians were imprisoned; many publications were confiscated and restricted.

Stalin threatened Turkey with occupying its three Eastern provinces in 1945. Turkey preferred to make a part of the western camp rather than adopting the ideology of USSR which it had a problematic history. Therefore, Turkish president İsmet İnönü, asked for assistance to USA accordingly. USA started assistance through Truman Doctrine; but it asked for implementation of free elections, closure of village institutions which were founded in 1940 to educate teachers for rural schools and augment literacy rate and termination of development plans which aimed industrialization of Turkey in exchange. Following this, some opponent deputies from CHP, who were against Atatürk's reforms and reluctant about the land reform to protect their own interest, formed DP and pushed the government to execute the plan of USA.

DP embraced values of the society which were based on religion and agriculture. However, because its only reference was the single-party period, it adopted an authoritarian regime; restricted the freedom of opposition, speech and press along with worker unions. Thus, the path was paved for Islamist and nationalist fascism.¹³²

DP tolerated Arab imperialism, got into alliance with tariqahs and disseminated the imam-hatip schools. Even though a slight effort was shown to maintain democracy, the society could not transform into an industrialist and democratic society, because the state was deprived of democratic institutions except elections. People could not escape the servitude of feudal landlords, sheiks; worker class was not formed properly and people could not transform from vassalage to citizenship. It was still a society based on agriculture and religion. Moreover, DP's orientation to anticommunist nationalist and religious ideologies by taking the support of USA with the excuse of Cold War caused Turkey to get an extremely undemocratic form between 1950 and 1960.

Turkey was neutral in the World War II, but it declared war symbolically against Axis forces at the very last minute to be able to join UN. But still it was anxious about the threats of USSR, therefore it struggled to be accepted to NATO for a long time. USA, which understood the importance of Turkey, accepted it as a part of the western defense system and decided to assist it through the Marshall Plan. This way Turkey was able to have a place in the western defense system.

¹³² *ibid.*, p. 22

The most important move of the Cold War was USSR's surround from west and south by USA and creation of an anticommunist "Green Belt Project" based on political Islam.

One of the outcomes of communism threat in Turkish history was the 1980 Military Coup.

3.3. 1980 MILITARY COUP

1980 Military Coup was a military intervention which was realized by Turkish Armed Forces on September 12th, 1980. It was the third direct military intervention in the history of Republic of Turkey. The government in lead of Süleyman Demirel was overthrown, parliament was proscribed, 1961 constitution was abolished and the military governed period started that day. This period, which the political parties were proscribed and political leaders were judged, continued for three years while it took a decade to normalize the political and social life. However, when the constitutional amendments were accepted through the 2010 referendum, affected people denounced the responsible generals and the trial was held on April 4th, 2012.¹³³

End of the 1970's witnessed armed conflicts between the right and left wings which were resulting with several victims per day as an outcome of the authority struggle between USA and USSR over Turkey. In this atmosphere Turkish Armed Forces waited for a suitable time to intervene the bad course of events. The violence stopped suddenly following the coup and 50 were executed while 500,000 were arrested and hundreds died in prison.¹³⁴

There were several reasons for the decision apart from the violent events. One of the other reasons was the meeting that MSP organized in Konya on September 6th, 1980. Even though the meeting started ordinarily, it transformed into a power play of the Islamist groups in leadership of Necmettin Erbakan and protests against the laic state. Consequently, series of conflicts between political parties resulted with inability of assignment of a president by the parliament. Moreover, 1980's were the years of

¹³³ "Turkey 1980 Coup Leader Kenan Evren Goes on Trial", 04.04.2012, The Guardian, Acc. 10.04.2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/04/turkey-1980-coup-kenan-evren>

¹³⁴ "Erdogan and His Generals", 02.02.2013, The Economist, Acc. 10.04.2013 <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21571147-once-all-powerful-turkish-armed-forces-are-cowed-if-not-quite-impotent-erdogan-and-his>

conversion to neoliberal policies which were dictated by USA; but as it was not possible to realize the transformation in a conflicting environment, USA supported military coups in order to stabilize the political and social life in the target countries. Also USA's global policy necessitated a stabilized political and social life in Turkey due to its strategic importance towards Iran Revolution, Afghanistan's occupation by USSR and USA's objective to implement the Green Belt Project. After all it was proved that USA had an important role in coordination of the military coup.¹³⁵

Islamism and Kemalism live on each other in order to keep their permanence. The relation between state and Islam was redefined in the pos-1980. In this period, the powers that undertook Kemalism's advocacy saw moderate Islam as a requirement either to take Islamic movements under state's control and use them against other ideologies such as communism that posed a threat. While conservatives gladly supported this idea, Islamists preferred to adopt values of the opposition by Islamizing them.

Official ideology of the September 12th, 1980 military intervention was synthesis of Turkish Islam. This ideology served as an integral culture project and it was an autocratic regime rather than a democratic one because it aimed to change some features of the Turkish culture. In the culture reports that were published by the state at that period, it is especially mentioned that Islam was an inseparable part of Turkish culture. Turkish Islam synthesis facilitated the domination of Islam in the public space and it made the use of Islamic elements especially in the education system possible. Thus, Islam's new position gained ground in the official culture by strengthening the Islamist powers and Islamic communities.

Islamist cadre gained legitimacy and the threat perception of military government approximated the nationalists and Islamists towards this new policy.¹³⁶

In the period following the coup, the economy policy that ANAP adopted with January 24th decisions and Turgut Özal's liberal attitude helped the social transformation of Islamic circles.¹³⁷ Following September 12th, 1980, the middle class that used to survive with protective policies of the state was eliminated and replaced

¹³⁵ "Birand'dan Kasetli İspat" (A Recorded Prove from Birand), 14.06.2003, Akşam, Acc. 10.04.2013: <http://arsiv.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2003/06/14/gundem/gundem4.html>

¹³⁶ op. cit., Komşuoğlu & Eskişar, p.p. 26-27

¹³⁷ loc. cit.

with a middle class that was mainly formed of provincial tradesmen, artists, small and medium size entrepreneurs and leaders that were trained in technical schools.

While this new formation assisted the Islamic circles to define their identities in the public space, it also set the ground for strong Islamist elite that would finance investments such as media institutions which would help Islamist circles to build their own identity.¹³⁸

ANAP knew how to benefit from the tiredness that political unrests caused in pre-1980, the disappointment that social democracy caused and the civil war horror. Therefore it avoided to base its arguments on left or right axis and carried on with the apolitical process that started in the pre-1980 period.

While left wing was negatively affected from the amendments in the 1982 constitution, Islamist circles came forward. In the direction of new economic policies, demands of different identities started to be considered as an outcome of liberalization.

3.4. TURKISH DEMOCRACY CULTURE AND PLACE OF RP IN TURKISH POLITICS

In order to understand how the society gradually polarized, an analysis of Turkish political system should be done.

3.4.1. Turkish Democracy Culture and RP

Professor Ali Yaşar Sarıbay explains the reality of Turkish society at the present day with these words:

“As ‘touting votes no matter how’ understanding is dominant in all Turkish parties, it is also possible to see the effects of this understanding ideologically. Majority is only reduced to quantitative values and the quality is never considered. We compare the number of the veiled to the ones that do not use it, check who has a larger support in the political meetings, and only hang out with the people that we accept as one of us just based on the symbols to increase our number. Hereafter we live in an era that people does not question ideologies, aggregation and vanity is kept above everything.”¹³⁹

¹³⁸ op. cit., p. 28

¹³⁹ Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Kamusal Alan, Diyalojik Demokrasi, Sivil İtiraz (Public Space, Dialogic Democracy, Civilian Objection)*, Istanbul: Alfa, 2000, p. 161

This situation becomes concrete with the typical “99 % Muslim country” rhetoric in the context of Islamist parties which is a sheer quantitative dissolution. It is not acceptable for the democracy culture to regiment the electorates like that and strive for the election of unqualified candidates. This aggregation and vanity has turned to an irrational populism in sense of the political power. In this context, people see each other in the same category regardless of quality just because they are making a part of the same group while democracy struggle is seen identical to fulfill the increasing demands of the voters of political power.¹⁴⁰ The strategic importance of the political power increases in direct proportion with the demands.

One of the most worrying sides of Islamist parties is their aim to drag the entire society into politics. This is clearly a symptom of a totalitarian regime. This situation started at RP term and reached the present day by AKP.

On the other hand, dependence on this ideology provokes the anxiety of losing the political power as well as aiming to build a monopolistic control. Therefore, political powers aim to call out any type of control mechanism in order to form a monotype society.

As a result, parties that share an Islamist ideology constitute a legitimacy issue because they do not get approved by the entire society and they try to reach a greater society such as AKP does today by adopting liberal values and a more flexible Islamic rhetoric in order to come over this situation. In fact, this tendency started at RP term, but its lifetime was not enough to see its results.

3.4.2. RP’s Legal Pluralist Model

It has been a matter for discussion in the pos-1980 if Islamist movement presents a threat towards democracy or it contributes to the advance of democracy by civil society. While Islamists criticize liberal democracy for belonging to a western value on one hand, on the other hand they covertly mention democratic values by claiming their legitimacy for being elected.¹⁴¹ This creates an inconsistency for their situation.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*, p. 162

¹⁴¹ *op. cit.*, Gülaip, p. 158

A multi-national and legal pluralist system became a matter for discussion in the pos-1990 against the unitarianism of modern state, but Islamists again found themselves in Islamic inconsistency of liberal democracy.

According to Islamist authors, democracy is inappropriate for denying the supremacy of God; therefore they suggest the multi-cultural and legal pluralist system. Even though this system was implemented in the past, it was not retained. Moreover, even if this system would be implemented, issue of legitimacy would be inevitable as there would be two willpowers in such a system. However this system is a manifestation of the increasing pluralist identity demands in the globalizing world against the nation-state's suppression. According to the authors that criticize authoritarian Kemalist regime in Turkey, supporting democracy is equal to Islamism.¹⁴²

Erbakan suggested legal pluralism to reach Islam's golden age. This was a model that was suggested as an alternative to democracy and which was implemented at the first years of Islam state. According to this model, each community of faith would have its own legal system and be governed according to its own rules. Responsibility of the state would only be to secure the existence of these systems. However, this system would not give them the opportunity to live as they wish by dividing the society in different faith systems, on the contrary it would limit their freedom as it would not let them to give decisions as individuals. Thus, the people identifying themselves as a member of more than one society would be forced to select a single community.

Even though it is claimed that the suggested model would strengthen civil society against state, it is clear that the model which Islamists want conveys a totalitarian aspect. This situation is clearly stated by Ali Bulaç: "Islam carries totalitarian features only for Muslims and Muslim block."¹⁴³ But Islamists' depiction that 99 % of the Turkish society is Muslim would provide a clue about what do they strive for. In fact, the civil society that Islamists defend which would progress with political Islam does not bear democratic features. The system that they defend is something equal to the nation system in Ottoman Empire. It is true that Ottoman Empire was pluralist as the other pre-modernity empires at its period, but this cannot be perceived as a democratic structure. Ali Bulaç defends that, civil society was free through Shari'a until the 1839 Ottoman Imperial Edict of Reorganization which

¹⁴² *ibid.*, p. 161

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 96

changed the balance in favor of the state and civil society was imprisoned by the abolishment of Shari'a through the proclamation of constitutional monarchy which was followed by republic.¹⁴⁴ Civil society and Shari'a are identical according to this thought. The only way to free civil society from pressure is totalitarianism.

But as the subjects will be a member of the group which represents their identity in a multi-cultural system, this actually will be divesting their personal freedom. Bulaç asserts that rights of the minority could easily get eradicated by the majority in a representational democracy. This situation can get resolved by a pluralist model that gives each group the possibility to represent their area, such as in self-administration.¹⁴⁵

Moreover, dividing the power to each social group can create a state of anarchy as it would prevent the existence of a united legal system. Besides, because this system divides people into groups according to their identity, some people may not be able to find the right group for themselves as they may have more than one identity and may prefer to remain individual rather than joining collective groups. Even if the individuals select one of the groups, this would mean that minorities would still remain under different groups. Therefore, such kind of a system would only ignore the real problem. In this sense, Islamism and postmodernism cohere also on the ideas about alignments based on identity.

While democracy is accepted as a suitable system for a homogenous society like the West which passed through the enlightenment period, it is claimed that it is not suitable for a country like Turkey that hosts many beliefs.¹⁴⁶

However this system has mistakes in any way. Even though Islamists are considerate towards non-Muslims, they accept Muslims as a single bloc with a totalitarian understanding and do not compromise. This attitude of Islamists is not correct at all and it also conflicts with Islamist theories. The current situation in Turkey generates a good example for this view. According to Islamists, Turkey is a Muslim country and everybody who consider themselves as Muslim should live in a certain way. Therefore the secular circles that are used to live religion in a more personal way frequently get pressurized by this totalitarian understanding. Eventually the idea that

¹⁴⁴ op. cit., Bulaç, p.p. 278-279

¹⁴⁵ op. cit., Güllalp, p. 165

¹⁴⁶ op. cit., Bulaç, p. 88

secular circles defend is expressed in a phrase from Quran: “There is no pressure in religion.”

In this aspect, author Haldun Gülalp criticizes the pluralist legal system Islamism suggests;

- Person’s identity and the legal system that they will belong are unclear. Besides, if alteration between systems would not be possible, a totalitarian regime can arise.
- A non-democratic repressive system can arise in case the legal systems get authoritarian within themselves.
- It is also unclear how the relations between people from different legal systems will be organized.¹⁴⁷

It can be clearly seen pluralism and democracy are not the same thing in this context.

Legal pluralist model is not ipso facto democratic, because there are no suggestions in regards to participation and collective responsibility in this model. Therefore, as pluralism and democracy cannot be directly associated, it is also impertinent to expect that it will definitely strengthen democracy. The sidelining of social groups for making part of a certain identity lies beneath their struggle to obtain some rights. Then, if subjects get identified independent than their group identities in the frame of universal rights, a big step would be taken for a resolution.

As the state has a binding nature in terms of citizenship, democracy can only be performed by the state rather than the civil society. In the end, the monopoly to entitle rights is under state’s control.

3.4.3. RP’s Double Standard Policy

Following the resign of Erbakan in June of 1997, a new government was formed in the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz of ANAP. RP officials resorted to the method of blaming left wing, which became a tradition in the right wing parties over the history, for the situation that they experienced. They claimed that the army was leftist because its biggest supporter was İP about seizing the control over the government. They also claimed that the newly constituted government was leftist for the reason that the so

¹⁴⁷ op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 169-171

called leftist DSP was among the associates of the coalition and the government was supported by the social democrat CHP.

Even though it is pointless to claim that Turkish Armed Forces had a tendency to left, RP and Islamists immediately collaborated and asserted that whatever befell to Turkey was because of the left-wing. However, when they saw that the government was supporting Islamists' opinion about the veiling issue in the public space, a few months later they instantly made a u-turn as they did before.¹⁴⁸

New government started implementing the guidelines that were advised by the Turkish Armed Forces. The initial alteration was the increase of mandatory primary education to eight years. This way the middle part of the imam-hatip schools which were founded in 1940's to educate clerics, but later became the focus of Islamist ideology. Islamist circles this time complained that the aim of this policy was to spread state's official ideology rather than assuring quality in education. However, Islamist MSP had followed the same method when it seized control over Ministry of National Education between 1974 and 1980 and raised the number of imam-hatip schools. In this context, incoherence of Islamists is clearly seen which clearly shows the habit of Islamists to interpret the incidents as they serve their interests.

Imam-hatip schools were considered as the stronghold of Islamist ideology. As a matter of fact, many important Islamist politicians and intellectuals such as Tayyip Erdoğan and Ali Bulaç were graduated from these schools.

In January 1998, constitutional court came to a decision to close RP and to ban its executive board from politics for five years. Even though RP launched a democratization campaign in the political arena before the decision came into effect, the other parties did not approach RP as they knew the real aim was not democracy.

3.4.4. Lack of Democracy in Turkey and Totalitarian Tendencies

Some authors suggest that Islamic politics refer to the rise of civil society against the state; therefore it contributes the improvement of democracy in Turkey. However, the totalitarian tendency of the Islamists or Islamist parties is ignored. For instance, if RP was elected with a majority vote, its execution of a totalitarian program was

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 109

inevitable that current AKP governance is the most significant example of this situation. However, it is also a fact that the laic circles or institutions also did not follow a democratic path in their struggle Islamist parties and this was what kindled the political Islam debate.

Another fact that proves the totalitarianism of religion is objection of Islamist circles to democracy claiming that it contradicts with God's dominance. In this sense, author Abdurrahman Dilipak expressed his ideas with these words: "Democracy has transformed into the Trojan Horse of the West."¹⁴⁹

During the period of his candidature to Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's mayoralty Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arose as the new face of Islamist movement and proceeded to the agenda with saying that democracy was only a tool. He mentioned his opinion with these words in an interview:

"Democracy was sometimes seen as a tool and sometimes as an objective up until now. There were also people construed it both as a tool and an objective at the same time. It is a tool for choosing a system depending on the one you want to head for. I mean, systems come and systems go with democracy. Of course realization of this through democracy and by the manifestation of people's willpower is a good thing. At this point we can define democracy as the manifestation of people's willpower. But, today democracy is interpreted as an objective in our country and the democracy which is seen as an objective, keeps a totalitarian order in agenda. Today we see a dictate regime in Turkey in the name of democracy. Unfortunately democracy concept is not settled in our country yet."¹⁵⁰

The meaning that could be deduced from the interview is "people can overthrow democracy if they want." It is true that there are deficiencies in Turkish democracy, but overthrowing democracy is not the method to resolve this. In this context it is clearly seen that Erdoğan wanted democracy until he reached the political power.

The interviewer asked what if the people elect a totalitarian regime which used democracy only to constitute its political power upon this answer. Erdoğan had difficulties in giving a satisfactory answer to this question: "If people want a totalitarian regime, we have to respect that. But if they would not be satisfied with the new regime, the ones to change it are again the people."¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 94

¹⁵⁰ *loc. cit.*

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, p. 95

Another question the interviewer asked was how such a regime would be changed. Erdoğan answered: “The people again... None of the regimes can exist despite the people.”¹⁵²

However Erdoğan could not clarify how the dictate regime that he wanted to overthrow could stay in power for seventy years. So as this regime was also elected by the people, what did Erdoğan complain for?

As a matter of fact, he gave the signals of his objective at a meeting which he held a speech to the crowds on December 12th, 1997 in Siirt. During his speech he read a poem of a Turkish intellectual, Ziya Gökalp, by rewriting some parts of it. The poem was as in the following:

“The minarets are bayonets, the domes are helmets / Mosques are our barracks, (Muslim) believers are soldiers / This holy army guards my religion / God is mighty, God is mighty.

Our objective is the holy war, its sequel is martyrdom / Our religion requires service with trustfulness / Homeland is our mother, nation¹⁵³ is our father / Oh Lord, may you assure prosperity of the homeland / Oh Lord, may you assure elatedness of the nation.

My pennon is oneness, my flag is the crescent / One is green¹⁵⁴, the other is red / Deplore for Islam, take revenge from the enemy / Oh Lord, may you assure prosperity of Islam / Oh Lord, may you assure misery of the enemy.

Many brave comrades in the battle zone / Martyred for religion and the homeland / May the ideal stay alive, may not the hopes disappear / Oh Lord, do not let the martyr be mournful / Oh Lord do not let the posterity be miserable.”¹⁵⁵

Besides, Erdoğan skipped five verses of the poem which were: “Our commander, officer fathers / Our sergeant, noncom brothers / Order and respect are our laws / Oh Lord, may you assure steadiness of the army / Oh Lord, may you assure the superiority of the pennon.” Through this speech Erdoğan praised the religious values, attempted to disintegrate the society, differentiated between different segments of the society and implied that there is an army which was formed of Islamist believers at the mosques. Moreover, he pointed laic society and the army as a target to his followers by stating that each period had Pharaohs and Nimrods and the Moses and Abrahams would

¹⁵² loc. cit.

¹⁵³ In Turkish there are two ways of saying nation. One is “millet” and the other is “ulus”. “Millet” signifies to the people living under the ownership of a state and share the same religion while “ulus” means a legal ownership under the citizenship of a state. The stated word here is “millet”.

¹⁵⁴ Green is the color of Islam.

¹⁵⁵ Murat Bardakçı, “Şiiri Böyle Montajlamışlar” (They Montaged the Poem Like This), 22.09.2002, Hürriyet, Acc. 05.04.2013 <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=99109&yazarid=28>

overcome the obstacles and clean the ways which were full of sordidness.¹⁵⁶ Erdoğan also proved his hostility against the army by consciously skipping the verses of the poem about it. Erdoğan is still alleged by the laic circles with already having a hostile agenda against the army and the laic society since 1997. As a result of his speech, he received a penalty of imprisonment for a year and a fine according to the article 312/2 of Turkish Penal Code which regulates the crimes on provoking the society to hatred and hostility. However his penalty was decreased to four months. On the other hand, Erdoğan stated that the poem was not an altered version of Ziya Gökalp's poem; it was cited from a different source named "Türk ve Türklük" which was advised as a school book in his defense.¹⁵⁷

Same kinds of thoughts were also mentioned by the leader of RP, Erbakan. Erbakan mentioned that the objective was not democracy, it was returning back to the golden age at the beginning of Islam.

Necmettin Erbakan criticized democracy for paying importance to the votes of ordinary people rather than the divine commands.¹⁵⁸ Erbakan also paid attention to the freedoms, but only to the freedoms of Islamists. Ali Bulaç stated that what Muslims understand from freedom is nothing more than the elimination of different obstacles while they practice their religion freely.¹⁵⁹ The exclusive attitude of Erbakan can be found in a speech he held for his supporters on May 13th, 1990. He stated that:

"If you do not serve for RP, none of your prayers would be accepted. [...] We will obey the commands of RP as the whole community and believers; we will make a part of this army. The ones which avoid from that, belong to the potato religion. [...] RP is this army and you will work for the evolution of this army. If you do not, you belong to the potato religion. It is a must to obey the jihad."¹⁶⁰

A frightening and authoritarian austereness is sensed in that speech. Totalitarian tendency was also distinctive in RP's organization method. It is notable that 4 million of its 6 million electors were official members of the party in 1995. Erbakan mentioned that soon they would have a great number of members that no elections would be thrown, the only thing to be done would be going to the notary in order to register

¹⁵⁶ "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Şiir Davası Hükümü" (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Poem Case Decision), Last Updated 23.04.2009, WikiSource, Acc.. 05.04.2012
http://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Recep_Tayyip_Erdo%C4%9Fan%27%C4%B1n_%C5%9Fiir_davas%C4%B1_h%C3%BCkm%C3%BC

¹⁵⁷ ibid.

¹⁵⁸ op. cit., Gülalp, p. 97

¹⁵⁹ op. cit., Bulaç, p. 268

¹⁶⁰ op. cit., Gülalp, p.p. 97-98

party's rulership. Erbakan cared so much about integrating with the society that he claimed that he represented the interests of whole 60 million. This totalitarian approach derived from the same hypothesis as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned in his speech: "We believe that almost the entire Turkish population is already Muslim due to their existence, the geography they live in and their historical mission. But practicing their characteristics was obstructed by force. If we eliminate the captivity in their minds, they will again choose Islam; because they have faith in their essence."¹⁶¹

The austerity of Islamists also shows itself in terms of the racist tendencies. Even though the West is not approved, Zionism is seen as the source of all perversities. Erbakan refused to enter the EU as he considered that it would be possessed by Israel sooner or later.¹⁶² Likewise, he considered the UN as a Zionist organization for pioneering the foundation of Israel.¹⁶³

This Islamist austerity unfortunately caused terrible consequences. Madımak Hotel in Sivas where the Alevi citizens were staying for a festival was set to fire on July 2nd, 1993 by the Islamists and approximately 40 people were burnt to death. Ironically, many lawyers that defended the criminals were elected as deputies of the parliament and were assigned as ministers.

3.4.5. Republic, Public Space and Political Islam

Public signifies to "which is open to everyone". According to Habermas, "Public, presents itself as a private space that distinguishes itself from the public space and sometimes as a space which is the opposite of public power; a space of public opinion. Depending on the situation, sometimes state agencies or sometimes media channels which serve for the state can be considered as public space."¹⁶⁴ However, the "open to everyone" meaning of public space is seen in Arendt's conceptualization more. According to Arendt, public space has two dimensions, one is the space of appearance and the other is a space which keeps the people altogether. In Arendt's thought, public space is directly related to power. If a space arises as a space of common act, this space

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*, p. 99

¹⁶² *loc. cit.*

¹⁶³ *loc. cit.*

¹⁶⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *Kamusal Haya'n Yapısal Dönüşümü (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere)*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2012, p. 59

can be a public space. It means that a city square is not a public space if there is not a common act while a hall which people come together to listen to a presentation may be.¹⁶⁵ While the limits of public space and private space were defined more clearly in the past, as a result of the transformation that market economy caused on the society, society gradually became the subject of public opinion and developed in off the limits of political authorities. This way, private space of the governing elite was transformed into the public space.¹⁶⁶ Public space is usually handled in two axes. One of them is the public space which is not the personal space. In terms of the liberal regimes, personal rights and freedoms are perceived as the private space while the rest is defined as public space. The second and more debated axis is the public space which signifies to the institutions that are financed through the taxes. This second definition forms the main argument of the Islamist circles in terms of turban conflict and political power.

On the other hand, republic signifies “which belongs to the public” in respect of its meaning. In this sense state’s attribution to the public is equal to public’s possession of the state. The fact which legitimated this situation has been the limitation of personal benefits for the common good.¹⁶⁷

However the method of determining common good by limitation of personal benefits is a matter of discussion. The determiner of this situation is citizenship according to the classical understanding. Citizenship necessitates being a part of a society which is called the nation and state is the base of this unity. State has a public characteristic because it represents the unity which forms the base of republic idea. As a result of the increasing elitism of state and public space, civil society was formed but public space still could not evade the monotypic frame. With the transition from monarchy to republic, community perception was transformed into individualism. In this sense, members of the society were transformed into individuals from being vassals. However this individual mentality has never fully functioned in Turkey, because the state itself was perceived as the community as it undertook a protective role upon society. Therefore, the citizenship was not perceived as a right but a duty and the state could not get through its totalitarian and autocratic structure. State’s prediction of only a unifying publicity prevented the individualism to develop.

¹⁶⁵ Seyla Benhabib, *Models of Public Space*, Cogito, Is. 8, 1996, p. 242

¹⁶⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *Kamusal Alan: Ansiklopedik bir Makale (Public Space: An Encyclopedic Article)*, Birikim, Is. 70, 1995, p. 64

¹⁶⁷ op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 17

In this context, laicism could not form a boundary between the state and the society which resulted with state's suppression on society to impose only one type of belief rather than assuring freedom of thought. This was while laicism became a new political religion, civil society became politicized.¹⁶⁸ The circles that aim to legitimate their truth as the only truth through this path became communitized by using political Islam.

After the foundation of republic, the protective and monotype policies implemented by the state disaffected the society from the state. Islam got eventually politicized upon the vote competition between parties following the transformation to multi-party system.¹⁶⁹

Because of the vote competition, CHP started to legitimize the Islamic values against DP's success in elections. Also DP adjusted some arrangements on protecting laicism to address a greater electorate audience while sustaining its moderate Islamic rhetoric. These incidents resulted with Islam's adoption as a party policy. The reason for attributing that much importance to Islam was its comprehension as a political legitimacy source as a settled political culture did not exist in Turkey. The reason of DP's success was based on its good organization in the rural areas.

As a result of the lack of a political culture, democracy-Islam relation was not shaped entirely. In this sense Kemalism's emergence as the dominant ideology, resulted with the regime opposers to adopt Islam and create an us-them distinction.

Turkey's bureaucratic-authoritarian governance understanding caused the both parties to see Islam as a legitimacy source. As CHP had difficulties legitimizing its own policies, it possessed its competitor's source by using an Islamic rhetoric.¹⁷⁰ Because of this bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality, Islam was politicized. DP blamed CHP with betraying the society and CHP blamed DP with betraying the state. While doing this, both sides were in the asseveration of doing the most realistic interpretation of Kemalism. But in reality, these were the practices that were done with desire to shape the state, society and politics in a bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p. 21

¹⁶⁹ Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye (The Turkish Experiment in Democracy)*, İstanbul: Hil, 1996, p. 441

¹⁷⁰ *op. cit.*, Sarıbay, p. 23

¹⁷¹ *loc. cit.*

Kemalism's usage to legitimize two opposite attitudes got possible by sanctifying it. This policy which CHP already had was also carried on in the term of DP. This way Islam became uncriticizable.

Islam's compliance with Kemalism instead of with democracy was taken as a base in transformation to the multi-party period.¹⁷² In this context, 1960 military junta leader Cemal Gürsel, who took DP down by blaming it with betrayal against Kemalism and giving credit to the Islamic circles, stated that Islam, as being the most sacred and the most dynamic religion, can not be the reason of lagging behind; the real reason of retardation was the incorrect introduction of religion which proves that situation.¹⁷³

1960 military junta restored the bureaucratic-authoritarian mentality according to the needs of the modern society; provided more pluralism and freedom in the society by a new constitution and revitalized the religious opposition. Pluralism in the modernism process broke down the power of central elites and provided more opportunities to the periphery elites to affect the state politics. Thus, Islamic opposition rose in the political life with its own elite cadre and socio-economic base. Islam became the politics itself rather than being a political tool in the political line of MNP, MSP and RP. Many social services started to get designed in a conservative way. Also the communalization movements were started to be conducted through modern propaganda tools rather than notification.¹⁷⁴ MNP and MSP headed for legitimizing Islam as an element of the modern political life.

Kemalist laicism understanding was not seeing the involvement of an Islamic political party into the political system as legitimate. That's why MNP and MSP strived for showing that also Islam can be a legitimate element of the political process by being a part of it and they aimed to make a political definition of Islam. The idea of being as much legitimate as the demand seen from the society lies beneath RP's propaganda to the masses by using political tools idea.

RP's this opinion was equal to DP's and CHP's attitudes of seeing Islam as a tool in the transition process to democracy, only this time the democracy was the element that was seen as a tool. In this context, according to RP's understanding in a country of which 99 % is Muslims, the decision of the majority was to be done.

¹⁷² loc. cit.

¹⁷³ op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 21

¹⁷⁴ Ruşen Çakır, *Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi (Neither Shari'a nor Democracy)*, İstanbul: Metis, 1994, p.p. 81-82

This majoritarian understanding rose as religious nationalism; strived for settling the belief that ummah is core of the nation and the benefit of ummah should be above everything. Thus, an alternative was formed against secular nationalism and a nominal detach from modernism was realized.

RP put forward the idea that Islamic opposition got smothered because of the lack of democracy culture. RP's democracy perception was only composed of quantitative majority. 'Tout votes no matter how' understanding is equal to "opportunism" which puts the values aside. One other point is RP's desire to seize the state's political power to satisfy its electorates. In this context, RP always handled the issues in respect of the state's interests instead of democratic necessities. Thus, as much as the demands of RP's base increased, strategic importance of the political power increased and RP kept on following a stringent attitude in its politics. In that frame, a political culture devoid of trust, tolerance and ethical values was emerged in the public space.

In terms of the democracy culture, RP included some features of the single-party mentality. For example, its desire to politicize the society entirely was an indicator of this. It clearly strived for destroying the limit between the state and the society. RP's use of Islam as a political tool in every opportunity was a part of its totalitarian mentality. Its stringent devotion to the ideology caused a monopoly control desire over the society and anxiety of losing its political power. Democracy cannot be discussed under these circumstances.

As democracy is a regime that enables the expression of differences, this also includes the freedom to express different versions of a religion in public space. In this context, religion should not be the source of a political power that would establish an absolute control over the society; different forms and religious pluralism should be seen as legitimate.¹⁷⁵

Civil society emerged as a structure that was based on religious expression of the people at the beginning, but as the religions attained a shape that limited religious freedoms in the frame of unique truth, civil society changed its meaning in time. However the existence of sects and tariqahs proves that all religions have different interpretations within. Although, the unique truth perception of political Islam stresses

¹⁷⁵ op. cit., Sarıbay, p. 25

that any interpretation is an aberration. This is an indicator of the desire to conduct Turkish modernism under a monopolistic understanding.

3.4.6. Islamists' Discovery of Public Space

After the failure of the government through February 28 postmodern coup, Islamism in Turkey stepped into a brand new era. Hereafter, the search to place democracy into the Islamist paradigm started rather than objecting it because it is a western value.¹⁷⁶ Thus, the liberal democracy started to get embraced and incorrectness of imposing an Islamic system by seizing the state started to be discussed. Islamists admitted that such kind of a policy would be the same hostile political approach conducted against them by the army. Following this, all Islamist parties started to continue their struggle in democratic platforms and supported Turkey's EU admission process thinking that it may evolve democracy.

However a gap in the Islamist political movement emerged following the closure of RP. FP was formed as the successor of RP, but while it was struggling with leadership issues, it shared the same destiny with its pioneer and was closed in 2001. Hereafter, two new parties were formed with indeterminate ideological facts. One of them was SP which was founded by the traditional circles that were near to Necmettin Erbakan and the other was AKP which was formed under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership by the more liberal and charismatic young staff of RP. Both parties were in favor of liberal democratic principles. However there was a visible halt in politics either in Islamist and left ideologies at this period. Arguments of both sides have not gone further than a western originated "human rights" idea by the effect of the democratic system they had to adopt.

1980's and 1990's have been a transition period for Islamism. While Islamism was an ideology that was suggesting an alternative to Kemalism, with the effect of its integration to the global system, it transformed into a frame that refused the modernity itself.

At the present day, after the problems of multiculturalism came out, the importance of handling issues according to the democratic principles is understood. One

¹⁷⁶ op. cit., Güllalp, p. 171

of the reasons for the approval of this theory was the possible issues that could occur by forcing subjects into the fixed identity groups and locate them into the political structure.¹⁷⁷

The demands based on identity politics increased as a result of globalization. Questioning the nation-state structure formed new civil organizations and implementation of a supranational welfare was aimed. In this context, the idea of determining the rules of the public space by the values that correspond in all religions emerged.¹⁷⁸

No matter how liberal it gets, the main issue of Islamism is accepting the Muslimhood as a block. For example, not veiling is a privilege given to the non-Muslims while the Muslims do not use turban is implicitly claimed of not being a Muslim. There is even a harsher discourse about alcohol consumption; it is strictly not acceptable to consume alcohol in a Muslim society.¹⁷⁹ When this rhetoric is taken into consideration, we can clearly see that Islamists conflict within themselves and could not absorb the values of liberal democracy adequately.

If it is considered that democracy is accepted as the principle of cohabitating equally and as its main value is showing respect to different views, approving a trend unilaterally would void democracy.

3.5. AKP ERA IN TURKISH POLITICS

Following the closure of FP, reformist wing of the conflicting sides founded AKP and traditional wing founded SP which could not maintain its pioneers' success. In this context, it would be more accurate to analyze AKP, which used its political preference from conservative politics by breaking up from Necmettin Erbakan's line, as it is not possible to identify with the party entirely with Islamism. AKP's base is formed of a social layer that preserved their traditional conservative values which gained ground step by step since the foundation of Turkey and transformed in the process. This society that was pushed to the background for a long time, managed to reach out by AKP. With the elections made in 2002 AKP came into

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p. 174

¹⁷⁸ Ali Bulaç, *Din, Devlet ve Demokrasi (Religion, State and Democracy)*, İstanbul: Zaman, 2001, p.p. 94-100

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p. 100

power in Turkey. This party, its members and admirers are known to be adherents of the Gülen Movement and this fact has been seen as a bigger threat by the laics since then. There is a large group of well educated people who are defending that AKP was founded in order to end the republican era in Turkey. Recently, it was claimed that the name of this party was given after a Moroccan party called Justice and Development Party which promotes Islamism and Islamic democracy which had almost the same logo with AKP.

The target society of the party is formed of the religious conservatives that voted for AP, ANAP or DYP in the past, because this society is capable of voting for the parties that adopted Islamic rhetoric in case their demands are fulfilled. But RP and FP could not get a wide support because of army's and laic society's opposition and therefore could not form a conservative government. But a great transformation started in FP when the reformists seized the party administration in May 2000.

It is possible to see AKP as a structure that was formed in the direction of social demands both to reach greater masses and balance political sensitivities. Therefore, while this structure shelters Islamist staff, it also embraces different conservative and liberal groups under its roof. Party's policy is proximate to central right and its increasing electorate percentage is proves that it could reach to the masses. The circles that never accorded with the transformation that Kemalism intended and believed that they also were not supported economically; this time oriented their support to AKP.¹⁸⁰

AKP announced that it stands against the efforts of the center to generate an ideal type of citizen that continued since the single-party government in its first government program with its "AKP sees any imposed, imperious, monotypic approaches that are based on social engineering as an obstacle for democratic system." words addressing to the society that it claims to represent. It is possible to say that the party shows a structure that manages to keep different groups together, shaped around a charismatic leader that can lead masses and the politics, oriented to the conservative circles in central right and politically supports certain types of liberal policies.¹⁸¹

Leaders' effect on society is very important in political Islam. Also Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has an important role in AKP's success on communication with people. Consubstantiation of the party leader with people strengthens the belief that the party

¹⁸⁰ op. cit., Komsuoğlu & Eskisar, p. 35

¹⁸¹ loc. cit.

could understand and fulfill people's demands.¹⁸² Party's success on communication, is also supported by the mechanisms which were formed around municipalities. AKP provides concrete aid to the people that have difficulties to acquire their needs such as clothing, fuel, occupation and education by being major power in the parliament and possessing majority of the municipalities.

During its long term, AKP could maintain the social compromise at a level, but it has experienced difficulties in equilibrating with the circles that want to gain control over political power. Despite the attitude of Turkish state against Islam, Turkey generated two important Islamic movements: AKP and Gülen Movement.¹⁸³

AKP is a party which expanded and emerged through the Islamist movements that has been continuing since the last thirty five years. In the meanwhile, it is the first party that could evade from the traditional Islamist effect of Necmettin Erbakan.

The steps taken for democratization caused Islamic parties to gain strength. The liberalization that Turgut Özal started in economy in 1980's strengthened entrepreneurs and businessmen in the rural areas, recently urbanized lower classes and urban conservative intellectuals.¹⁸⁴

Even though the traditional rural conservative businessmen class appreciates Atatürk as a reformer and a leader that liberated the country from western imperialism, it sustains a deep identification with the Ottoman history and they get irritated from the idea of underrating and disparaging the Ottoman and Islamic past.¹⁸⁵ This class provides financial support for Islamist parties and Gülen Movement.

Islamic publications showed a great increase in the 1980's and with the increase of Islamist intellectuals, the place of Islamic values in society was started to be discussed. The army supported religionism and nationalism against communist tendencies through the support of USA during the 1980 coup. Islamist parties had great successes in the 1990's. The young generation that split from Erbakan's party, which was closed in 1998, founded AKP. AKP got lessons from the previous mistakes and was elected as the major party in parliament in 2002 elections. AKP has a different structure than the traditional Islamist parties. AKP stated its confidence in democracy

¹⁸² loc. cit.

¹⁸³ Graham Fuller, *Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti: Yükselen Bölgesel Aktör (The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World)*, İstanbul: Timaş, 2008, p. 100

¹⁸⁴ Jenny B.White, *Türkiye'de İslamcı Kitle Seferberliği: Yerli Siyaset Üzerine bir Araştırma (Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics)*, İstanbul: Oğlak, 2002, p.p. 114-115

¹⁸⁵ op. cit., Fuller, p. 101

and approached moderately towards secularism. However, it insists on secularism should be defined as state's neutrality towards any kind of religious faith and philosophical opinion and state should be restricted rather than the individuals with this principle.¹⁸⁶ This way, it refuses the laicism definition of Kemalism which defends state control over religion. Besides, it avoided Islamic identifications by introducing itself as a conservative democrat party in order to brush the attentions off.

AKP adopted a bipartisan policy that engaged both with EU and Islamic world politics. However, a great part of the Turkish electorates approach AKP with doubt as it retains deputies from the cadres of former Islamist parties.

Moderate political Islamists stuck to the democratization agenda in Turkey for a long time. The counselor of prime-minister Yalçın Akdoğan identified AKP as “a national mass party conservative in values which claims its history, former culture and religion”.¹⁸⁷ In other words, the party handles issues from a religious perspective and does not aim spreading Islam. Thus, its non-alignment with any religious or ethnic group lies beneath the wide support that AKP takes.

AKP sees itself as a party that is formed of moderate Muslims rather than a moderate Islamist party.¹⁸⁸ According to this concept that AKP members acknowledge, the religious values of people serve as a source of inspiration, but this should not be interpreted as a part of their political identity.¹⁸⁹ While accepting that religion is a basically a personal value, AKP defends that religion could be attached to public and political spaces without compromising secular state system.¹⁹⁰ Party strives for polling votes through supplying basic needs of the people rather than reflecting an ideology.¹⁹¹

Professor Graham Fuller states that he sees AKP as “an Islamist party which is not only moderate but also and more importantly as a party that tries to explore what does integration of religious values with political life mean”.¹⁹²

Fuller explains why he sees AKP as an Islamist party as:

- A great part of the AKP leaders come from Turkey's most developed and biggest Islamist movement.

¹⁸⁶ op. cit., White, p. 274

¹⁸⁷ op. cit., Fuller, p. 105

¹⁸⁸ ibid., p. 106

¹⁸⁹ loc. cit.

¹⁹⁰ op. cit., White, p. 274

¹⁹¹ Hakan Yavuz, *The Transformation of a Turkish Islamic Movement*, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, Is. 3, 2005, p.p. 105-108

¹⁹² op. cit., Fuller, p. 107

- While AKP defines itself as a conservative party, actually it meets the desire of many believers share by acknowledging and praising the Ottoman legacy rather than suppressing it.
- Even though the party is widely supported by Islamists, AKP electorates are not limited with that.
- It concentrates on necessary reforms over religious issues at the cost of creating polarization.
- AKP followed many socio-religious policies. It defended freedom of veiling in public space, strived for listing adultery as an act of crime, worked for integrating imam-hatip schools into the academic system, desired more freedom for Islam in public space, made arrangements on Islamic banking and supported the historical elements of Ottoman-Islam symbolism.
- AKP members generally show religious features. They often get criticized by the laics on AKP's dishonesty about defining itself only as conservative and their alleged secret agenda to Islamize Turkey.
- AKP leaders underline the need of maintaining a good relation urgently with the other Muslim countries and terminating isolating these countries to end radicalism. This way AKP mentions its desire to undertake leadership role in the region.¹⁹³

When all these are taken into account, it is possible to categorize AKP as an Islamist party. But AKP does not demonstrate a clear tendency towards implementation of Shari'a law. Instead it adopts a wider Shari'a vision in the context of assuring social justice, respect towards religious traditions, education, healthcare, national power and social welfare.

It is also true that a part of the Turkish Islamists started to question the idea of seizing the control over the state and imposing Islamization from the top. Instead they orientated to the civil society organizations rather than using the state to promote Islamic awareness. In this context, Muslim intellectuals apply to instilling method by working together with the society rather than a legal approach imposed by the state.

Religious conservatives emphasize that the state should not interfere with the faith field and society should have the freedom to commit sins. Former Director of

¹⁹³ *ibid.*, p. 108-109

Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoğlu, made this statement about religious understanding on January 15th, 2010:

“Each society and individual reduces the religion from top to down their own personal world and reflect their religious perception to practice in the frame of their inner world’s capacity... There is no reform in religion itself, only innovation in our religious perception is the case, a constant innovation... We should not accept the religious interpretations verbatim as a model, except the main religious resources. Each period has religious perception according to that period and the conditions of that period; we can produce ideas and gain experience from those.”¹⁹⁴

It is seen that there was also an innovation and liberalization in the perspective of Department of Religious Affairs at the beginning of AKP’s term. The evolution of this new Islamic approach in Turkey can be explained with the factors such as expansion of Turkey to the world in terms of modernization and democratization, orientation of Islamists to new quests due to Kemalist repressive approach and Turkey’s isolation from the tendency between the West and Islamic world through its social and geopolitical location.

However, even though AKP adopted a moderate policy, it also could not avoid from experiencing a closure case as its pioneers. However, it was luckier than the previous Islamist parties. A closure case was presented against the party by Abdurrahman Yalçinkaya, the attorney general of the High Court of Appeals, in 2008 with the allegation of becoming the focus of anti-laic acts. The indictment was inherited to the Constitutional Court soliciting closure of AKP and banishment of 71 politicians from politics including President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on March 14th, 2008.

Indictment stated that the principles which political parties should respect as being in relation with the state and civil services as a part of democratic life were defined by the constitution, alignment of their practices with current codes and the constitution was inspected according to the laws and it was Public Prosecution Office of the High Court of Appeals’ responsibility to request closure of a party considering social requirement and the frequency of its acts that did not accord with democratic mentality if it became focus of the mentioned acts.

¹⁹⁴ “Bardakoğlu: Ateist de Özgürce Yaşasın” (Also Atheists Should Live Freely), 15.01.2010, Ntvmsnbc, Acc. 11.07.2013 <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25044563/>

Table 1: Allegations on AKP's Case of Closure

Crime Element	Examples
Intending to set the ground which would change the basic principles of Republic of Turkey.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposals to change the constitution and Code of Higher Education• Attempt to eliminate laicism principle through the amendments of constitution on turban freedom• Practices on filling the civil services with AKP adherents and persons who are known to be inclined to political Islam• Support given to Gülen Movement by Abdullah Gül at the time of his membership of the cabinet• Some speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Using religious elements with political concerns.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Erdoğan's "Think that even if turban is used as a political symbol. Can you accept that wearing a political symbol is a crime?" speech during his visit to Spain• Employment of veiled doctors at some public hospitals• Enforcement of the enterprises bearing alcohol license to move to the outskirts of the city• Censor of some explicit banners in Istanbul
Dividing the society as religious and non-religious.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Speeches which stated a determination to transform the laic republic into a new lifestyle and order• Mortal attacks to the Council of State upon its decision on unlawfulness of a teacher's veiling at school
Attempting gradually to reconfigure the laic legal order and manipulate.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Erdoğan's "the right to utter about veiling is ulema's duty, not the jurisdiction" speech was highlighted and it was defended that the party was giving religious statutes according to Shari'a purpose• Erdoğan's advisor Egemen Bağış's "turban freedom should be valid also for the parliament beside universities and the other public space" statement• Cüneyt Zapsu's "forcing a woman to unveil is indifferent from forcing a woman to take her underwear off in the street" statement
Opening future of the regime in discussion.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• It was stated that AKP did not cease its link to closed FP and RP, AKP's ultimate objective is the Shari'a order• It was stated that AKP's tendency was political Islam, its political principle was Shari'a and AKP was using taqiyyah (dissimulation) which was based on Shari'a as it aspired after Shari'a

Source: "İşte Başsavcı'nın İddianamesi" (Here is the Allegation of Attorney General), 17.06.2008, Ntvmsnbc, narrated by Wikipedia, Acc. 13.05.2013:
http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adalet_ve_Kalk%C4%B1nma_Partisinin_kapat%C4%B1lma_davas%C4%B1

Becoming the focus of anti-laic acts is defined in the 68th and 69th articles of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey. These articles state that the acts and programs of political parties cannot be against the democratic and laic principles of the state and they hold High Court of Appeals responsible of detecting anti-laic acts of the political parties and take necessary actions. It was also stated that objective of the laic system which targets impartiality of the state towards all religions, does not mean the indefiniteness of religious liberties, it only aims organization of the state in a rational and scientific way. It was mentioned that religious rules were completely different from state

administration and principles.¹⁹⁵ It was mentioned that the prime minister, the president, several deputies and many members from AKP's body made statements against laicism principle.

The closure case was highly debated at the parliament and it was stated that urge of closure of a party which is the government at the parliament by the Constitutional Court was arousing suspicions; it was defended that a party which was elected should leave through elections¹⁹⁶ and closure of a party with motivation of laicism was intervention to democracy.¹⁹⁷ Some highlights from the bill can be seen on Table1.

Murat Yetkin stated on his article at Radikal dated March 19th, 2008 that finding the attitude of the general attorney politically incorrect would not mean the prosecution was not legal. Election of a party by obtaining 47 % of the votes would not make a difference legally; there was a specific weight which was political, not legal. Therefore what had been debated was the alignment of the prosecution with politics, not the laws. The one that had seized the power with majority would use its power on rewriting the laws, but dominance of the political power would not depend on simple majority vote. It was AKP's political preference to place its ideology into the political agenda. As this attempt was restricted by the judiciary, the boundaries of both politics and the judiciary should be redefined. Therefore, as the prosecution in course, everybody should wait the results of it.¹⁹⁸ In addition, CHP stated that if there was a crime, attorney general should do what was necessary as constitution was concerning also the political parties.¹⁹⁹

Attorney general defended that the prosecution was based on legal enforcements and stated the legal bases in his allegation. However, Bülent Arınç from AKP deputies claimed that the case was prepared with inadequate proofs and it was an outcome of hate and grudge while another deputy stated that the coups had transformed and judges had taken the place of tanks and guns, the allegations were entirely ridiculous and

¹⁹⁵ "İste Başsavcının İddianamesi" (Here is the Bill of Indictment of Attorney General) Acc. 18.05.2013 <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/439362.asp>

¹⁹⁶ "Sarigül: Seçimle Gelen Seçimle Gitmeli" (Sarigül: An Elected Should Leave through Elections), 14.03.2008, Haber 7, Acc. 12.05.2013: <http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/306388-sarigul-secimle-gelen-secimle-gitmeli>

¹⁹⁷ "Erkan Mumcu: Bu Demokrasiye Müdahaledir" (Erkan Mumcu: This is an Intervention to Democracy), 15.03.2008, Haber Aktüel, Acc. 12.05.2013: <http://www.haberaktuel.com/erkan-mumcu-bu-demokrasiye-mudahaledir-haberi-116775.html>

¹⁹⁸ Murat Yetkin, "Kapatma Davası Ergenekon Soruşturmasına Engel mi?" (Is the Closure Case an Obstacle in Front of the Ergenekon Case?), 19.03.2008, Radikal, Acc. 12.05.2013 <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=250559>

¹⁹⁹ "CHP Başsavcı ile Aynı Fikirde" (CHP Shares the Same Opinion with Attorney General), 14.03.2008, Zaman, Acc. 12.05.2013: http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_chp-bassavci-ile-ayni-fikirde_664787.html

nonsensical.²⁰⁰ These statements actually show that AKP was uncomfortable with the situation and was anxious about the outcome. Some politicians from different parties also defended that the prosecution was not democratic and stated that political parties should be closed only for giving support to acts of violence.²⁰¹ Also Newsweek stated that it was a judicial coup d'etat.²⁰² Minister Ertuğrul Günay claimed that the real reason of the closure case was to prevent to prosecution of Ergenekon Case which was a pending action to reveal so called connections of the deep state.²⁰³

Constitutional Court announced that it was decided not to close the party but to deprive it from financial aid on July 30th, 2008 by six votes against five where the approval of at least seven members was required for closure.²⁰⁴ This way AKP had the possibility to stabilize its power once more and received the majority once more at the elections on June 13th, 2011 by raising the rate of its votes by 3.17 %.

It is seen that even though AKP claimed that it changed and it did not have a secret agenda, laic circles clearly did not share the same opinion, consequently a closure case was opened. While the righteousness or alignment with democracy could be debated, it is obviously seen that the case was not entirely insubstantial. It is possible to see that AKP accepted the religion rhetoric as its primary political agenda and showed that it still bears some of the features which caused the closure of its pioneers. This mostly relates to corruption of the political system with certain ideologies. As it is stated, religion was used as a political tool starting from the 1950's, so it was not a new thing; but this incident clearly shows that not much things were changed in Turkish politics during the last sixty years. Therefore, this understanding is the main responsible of the polarization in society.

²⁰⁰ Oktay Ekşi, "Davacı Kim, Davalı Kim?" (Who is the Prosecuted, Who is the Prosecutor?), 20.03.2008, Hürriyet, Acc. 13.05.2013: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/8500140_p.asp

²⁰¹ "Yazıcıoğlu: Demokratik Değil" (Yazıcıoğlu: It is not Democratic), 14.03.2008, Zaman, Acc. 13.05.2013: http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_yazicioglu-demokratik-degil_664813.html

²⁰² Morton Abramowitz, "Turkey's Judicial Coup D'etat", 05.03.2008, Newsweek, Acc. 13.05.2013: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/04/05/turkey-s-judicial-coup-d-etat.html>

²⁰³ "İlginç İma: Davayı Ergenekon Açtırdı" (Interesting Implication: Ergenekon Forced to Present the Case), 18.03.2008, Radikal, Acc. 13.05.2008 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/ilginc_ima_davayi_ergenekon_actirdi-843307

²⁰⁴ "AKP Kapatılmadı Hazine Yardımı Kesiyor" (AKP was not Closed , the Treasury Funds are Cut) , 30.07.2008, CNNTürk, Acc. 18.05.2013 <http://www.cnnurk.com/2008/turkiye/07/30/akp.kapatilmadi.hazine.yardimi.kisiliyor/486570.0/index.html>

3.6. GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS

As stated before, Gülen Movement was one of the most important outcomes of the Islamist mobilization of Turkey. Gülen Movement has become a social phenomenon first in Turkey in the late 1980's and later in a wide range around the world by the beginning of the 21st century. The enlargement of this community's radius was not a coincidence. Because of the political conflicts between young people in the early 1980's as an aftershock of 1968 generation, communism was a threat for Turkish Military. That is why the military paved the way for Islamic movements trying to influence and ward off young people.

This so called non-political movement which was initiated by a Turkish preacher called Fethullah Gülen aims to give a peaceful, moderate, tolerant message to the entire world and to clear up the prejudices about Islam. It receives a great support from numerous conservative; rich Turkish and foreign businessmen, thus has a great financial potential. By the help of this financial power, the movement naturally sees it very logical to find a place for itself in the private educational system in Turkey in order to carry out its mission connected with moderate Islam.

Even though the Gülen Movement seems to be apolitical, it has the ability to affect Turkish politics indirectly. The movement originates from the Nur Movement which emerged at the last years of Ottoman Empire and is seen as one of the most important socio-religious movements of the 20th century. The movement was born through the economical and emotional depressions at the decadence epoch of Ottoman Empire in the lead of Islamist modernist intellectual Bediüzzaman Said Nursi.²⁰⁵ Said Nursi spent his life to prove that Islamic values are effective in coping with the problems of modern world.

Gülen Movement was inspired by the Nur Movement. Whether or not political, community's area of influence was wider with the governmental support especially during Turgut Özal era and then it was time for them to train their own men in order to fulfill the necessities of their cause. By the end of the same decade Gülen Movement was the most powerful Islamic organization in Turkey. Fethullah Gülen left to USA in

²⁰⁵ op. cit., Ebaugh, p. 114

1999 because of the political atmosphere in Turkey following the February 28 period and sustains his life in USA since then; he is accepted as one of the most important Turkish Islam intellectuals as an outcome of the success of his movement. Considering USA's Greater Middle East Project, its support to the movement which is identified with moderate Islam makes sense. Fethullah Gülen is often blamed to be a secret agent by the laic circles upon the fact that he never came to Turkey since 1999. Especially after September 11, he is one of the most important Turkish and probably Muslim person that give speeches about Islam being a modest, tolerant and loving religion. His indestructible connection with the current government in Turkey is evident. Besides, how he became one of the most powerful persons from being a simple preacher at a mosque is a complete mystery. Moreover, he was sentenced to death by Saudi Arabia because of announcing himself a sheikh and his activities to attract followers.

The movement operates through organizations, schools and foundations in many countries. Even though it strives for spreading Turkish-Islamic identity, it has an international reputation through his schools which provide quality education. Gülen Movement is characterized with integrating national sensation with Islam in a certain way.²⁰⁶ The movement intends to transform Turkish society by spreading the propaganda of Islamic values in the social level. It has a centralist and communal aspect.

Even though Fethullah Gülen endeavors for not conflicting with the state, he is usually criticized on being dishonest, hiding his real aim and tending to seize control over the laic state and declare Shari'a by especially the laic circles in Turkey.

Even though the movement glorifies the traditional values, it bears a modernist approach. It pays attention to education, but a biased education, to transform the society; it defends that comprehension of religion and progress of society is only possible through religion. Therefore, Gülen Movement formed an education network which covers more than a hundred countries. The financial resources of the organization come from the businessmen that are members of movement and the donations made by the society. However, there are suspects that the movement is also supported by the official institutions and state funds in some countries including Turkey and USA. As a matter of fact, if USA's moderate Islam project towards Turkey is taken into account, it

²⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p. 115

can be considered as possible. But there are no official evidents to prove this relation. Even though official Turkish education curriculum is applied in the schools, which are accessible to anyone, it is known that the schools have secret practices to impose religious values. The recent incidents in Uzbekistan which resulted with closure of the schools and deportation of the responsables prove that.²⁰⁷

Teachers are directly recruited within the Gülen community and the movement provides dormitories for the students upon request. Laic circles accuse the movement with imposing religious doctrines by brainwashing the students which are not completely impertinent.²⁰⁸ It is also known that Gülen encourages publication of biased sources by cooperating with some academicians.

The movement disapproves any kind of violence and defends that these kinds of acts do not correspond with the message of Islam. Therefore, Gülen undertakes the responsibility of reconciliation between different religions, sects and religious communities. However, because it is Sunni Islam oriented, ironically it precludes sects such as Alevism.

Gülen Movement is extremely successful on promoting itself through media channels. It also spreads its propaganda through the member media institutions beside the social media. Zaman Newspaper serves as the voice of the movement.

Gülen Movement avoids being directly involved into politics and it is against foundation of political parties based on religion as they could cause conflict and damage the reputation of religion among society. Even though, it cannot escape from being criticized by some circles on not being involved in a political organization because it does not want to limit itself with the Code of Political Parties. Moreover, many intellectuals agree that Gülen Movement is definitely not apolitical.

Its studies to transform the society usually bear political features. Even though the movement does not participate in the process as an institution, it is indeed a political movement in terms of carrying out political activities indirectly. Despite the movement is excluded by the laic circles and the army, it has a great impact on the police force. This situation is considered as threatening by some circles. As a matter of fact, there are doubts about movement's desire on overthrowing the laic and Kemalist system. The

²⁰⁷ Bayram Balcı, *Fethullah Gülen's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and Their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam*, Religion, State, Society, Vol. 31, Is. 2, 2003, p. 153

²⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p. 160

movement was appreciated by the Turkish politicians in the scope of Turkish-Islam synthesis project that was supported by USA during the Cold War period. It is seen as a nationalist value that can fight with the leftist ideologies by the Islamist circles.

Gülen Movement works in the scope of Turkish society, not as part of a pan-Islamist movement.²⁰⁹ Therefore, it is compatible with the values of Turkish nationalism. As it does not fantasize about supranational Islamism, it operates in context of a local cultural form that could be called as Turkish Islam. As a matter of fact, both because of the multi-ethnic society and religious tolerance of Turkish states along the history and not passing under the yoke of anybody else, it is true that there is a different perception of religion in Turkey.

The movement considers that religion, modernity and state are compatible to each other. As a principle, Gülen Movement suggests an Islam perception which admits different national expression styles but does not deny Islam's universal character.²¹⁰ In this context, it is not acknowledged by the supporters of Islamic union who has a radical Islamist ideology. This segment acknowledges the Arab form of Islam as the true Islam.

Gülen Movement accepts legitimacy of the state, but it is persistent on more religious freedom. That's why it is seen as a threat by the laic circles, because laic elites and Islamist elite compete to gain control over the state. However, it is not possible to talk about a strong governmental structure when NGO's or civil associations are this much powerful. This community is gathers millions of dollar every year and it claims that this money is spent for poor people, uneducated people and whoever needs it. For example, a charitable institution called Deniz Feneri which is renowned by its close relations to the community has been charged with fraud. Millions of dollars and assets vanished; still the media is not posing any accusations towards them.

Ironically Gülen Movement also cannot get along with the Islamist parties, because political activities of Islamists draw attention over it. However, since AKP started to follow a more moderate policy, they are in a harmony with the movement. This relationship creates a strong perception in society that the movement and AKP collaborate closely to appoint people close to the movement in key positions at the state level in order to realize the desired state model. Henceforth AKP is seen as the component of Gülen Movement in the political arena.

²⁰⁹ op. cit., Fuller, p. 121

²¹⁰ ibid., p. 124

The movement organized Abant Platform²¹¹ in 1998 and 1999 which targeted social reconciliation and is considered to be an important step in terms of social and political structure of Turkey. Platform defends a government model which is based on popular sovereignty; modern, democratic, pluralist, centralist and tolerant.²¹² However, how much of the society shares the opinions of the platform is debatable.

Acknowledgement of the opinions of the platform by Islamist parties is promising. But majority of the society is doubtful about honest application of principles. However it is clearly seen that the definition of laicism is in an evolution process.

It is not possible to talk about a strong governmental structure when NGO's or civil associations are this much powerful. This community gathers millions of dollars every year and it claims that this money is spent for poor people, uneducated people and whoever needs it. However very recently in Turkey, a charitable institution called Deniz Feneri which is renowned by its close relations to the community has been charged with fraud. Millions of dollars and assets vanished; still the media is not posing any accusations towards them.

²¹¹ See Also: Glossary

²¹² *ibid.*, p. 131

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN TURKEY

4.1. POLITICS AND POLARIZATION

Anatolia has been home to many civilizations throughout history, such as the Persians, Greeks, Urartians, Armenians, Romans, Georgians, Circassians, Kurds, Seljuq Turks and Ottomans. Each of these civilizations left their cultural, social and political marks on Anatolian society one after another which formed the present Turkish traditions. During the long Turkish history in Anatolia, society underwent many great transformations, as it does at the present. Because society is like an organism, changing life conditions transform it. Relatively tolerant Ottoman rule which lasted longer than six centuries was successful in melting many cultures in the same pot and forming a unique Ottoman society.

However, this significant harmony was spoiled as a result of poor administration skills of the sultans, decrease of central authority and increasing arbitrary practices on Islam as well as Ottomans' failure of adjusting global transformations and industrialism. Turkish, who were seen as the protectors of Islamic world, started to question themselves for their deterioration and thought that they would regain their power by importing innovations of the West; but they never considered that it might be the religion until some clerics realized that the real issue might be the Muslim identity at the end of 19th century. In the process of overcoming this problem, clerics disaccorded and they were divided into two concepts as the ones that perceived the problem in Islam religion and the others perceived in Muslims. The reforms which were desperately implemented to reorganize the society caused even a greater polarization in Turkish society.

At the present day, Turkey subsists with a society that is almost divided in two as of the one take its identity from traditional values and the one embraces western values. Dissolution of those two identities especially derived from the laic policies that Kemalism imposed. Thus, Kemalism fell behind replenishing the space that was opened by the elimination of Islam from the social life and Turkey encountered the danger of polarization.

According to Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, polarization shows itself in every aspect of life:

- There are two types of Turkish language; one segment uses a traditional Turkish which is integrated with Arabic and Persian words while the other uses a pure Turkish which is purged from Arabic and Persian.
- There are two histories; while one segment adopts a history which ignores all elements that evoke Islamic culture and even feel indisposed with those elements, the other embraces the traditional history perception which utters the strongest period of the state that is almost sanctified as a result of the inferiority complex.
- There are two Islam perceptions; while one is the Islam which one segment thinks that it should be a conscientious thing and the primitive sides of it should get modernized, the other is a superficial Islam which is traditionally embraced by the other segment that is limited with a modal and stereotyped worshipping perception rather than its social, intellectual and cultural sides of it.²¹³

Even though the polarization is not something specific to the Turkish society, the recent developments show that it is the foremost problem of Turkey. It is not possible to explain the polarization in Turkey in the context of a specific theory. This is mostly pertinent to the historical perspective and demographic features of Turkish society.

Even though this polarization can be explained by taking several theories into consideration, one of the most pertinent theories that can enlighten the current conflict is the culture theory. This theory presents two subcultures that are low or popular culture and high culture which categorize the society according to their social perceptions and lifestyles.²¹⁴

Low culture or popular culture was emerged in the 19th century with the original meaning of the group of people from the less educated and low wealth society. Popular culture is highly affected by the media and permeates the everyday life of the people because it is understandable by more people. It is unquestionable that the low culture is basically the leftovers after the high culture definition was found. The entities of this group are extremely introverted, religious and conservative; they make parts of big families with strong ties and attribute a great attention on country freemanship. This

²¹³ op. cit., Ocak, p. 145

²¹⁴ John Storey, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*, Hartfordshire: Hemel Hempstead, 1993, p. 6

group forms the social segment which came to the city from the rural and found their own way of remaining traditional especially through the help of Islamist or religious conservative parties such as RP. Majority of this society prefers to live in slums and usually mostly in the same buildings or the same neighborhood to sustain their traditional culture. Low culture is mainly identified with the religious and traditional conservative groups as well as Islamists. This segment has a central or conservative right political ideology and forms the main electorate profile of AKP, SP and MHP. Majority of this segment is the follower of AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with a bold fanaticism while they strictly discriminate the opposite segment which is more conscious, modern and laic. Because of their collectivist understanding, they value benefits of the clientelist network which AKP provides for them. It is a well known fact that AKP owes its success to this network as it is mentioned above in the third chapter. Also due to their low economical conditions they fall for the concrete aid that religious conservative parties provide for them through the clientelist networks rather than cogitating on the common good. In that sense we also can consider them as individualists for being egocentric in a way. However this should not be perceived as if the whole group is in needy conditions. On the contrary, as a result of globalizing world, this segment also created its own elite, high income society through the assistance of clientelist networks that Islamist movements provided.

As a part of their traditionalism, the entities of low culture still pay a high importance to their Ottoman-Islam past; get irritated by any critic against it and still consider themselves as vassals of the state. Even though this segment used to respect Atatürk as a figure that liberated the country from imperialism, as an outcome of the ascending polarization in society, this respect that was shown decreased drastically. Needless to say that Erdoğan's aspersions against Atatürk and his values with the concern of consolidating his legitimacy and maybe other interests were extremely efficient in this decline.

On the other hand there is the high culture which can be defined as the patterns that distinguish the society's elite group of people and is the contrary of the low culture that was mentioned above. It is used to define the group of people with high or middle income who are well educated white collar employees that mostly work in the private sector or civil services while they make a part of central left, socialist or liberal political

ideology and form the main electorate profile of left-wing parties such as CHP and İP. This group is formed of those who already born or have been living in the urban areas for a long time as well as the people who immigrated from the rural but could adjust to the urban life. The members of this segment usually come from nuclear families and they form the questioning, individual and secular layer of the society while they do not demonstrate strong ties with religious identity. They attribute a high importance to individualist, Kemalist values of modern Turkish republic and tend to strive for the common good of their nation. It is also true that there are also people who imagine Atatürk as a deity along with the people who are more liberal and humanitarian in this segment. In this sense we can say that some members of this segment also have the same discriminative approach as the primary group. The high culture segment started to become a minority in Turkey especially after the 1980's as an outcome of rapidly increasing migration.

In this chapter, focuses of polarization will be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the polarization, public opinion about the current polarization will be evaluated based on the data collected and finally the results of this polarization will be overviewed.

4.1.1. Focuses of Polarization

In this chapter of the research, effects of the social polarization will be handled in the light of above mentioned theoretical frame and based on the contribution of turban issue, education, urban life and immigration to the social polarization. First of all contribution of turban issue to the social polarization will be studied.

4.1.1.1. Turban Conflict

Handling social polarization in Turkey without mentioning the conflict about veiling, in other words turban conflict as it is positioned in Turkish social life would be an inadequate analysis. Turban has been a major issue in the pos-1990 period as the subject was intensively corrupted and politicized by the Islamist movement and RP as a result of the struggle for political power. Hence, the contributions of turban conflict to

social polarization will be analyzed after a short study on the historical basis of veiling is done.

Veiling is considered to be a requirement of following Islam religion according to “And say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts and do not display their ornaments except what appears thereof, and let them wear their head-coverings over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands.” verse in An-Noor section²¹⁵ and “O Prophet! say to your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers that they let down upon them their over-garments; this will be more proper, that they may be known, and thus they will not be given trouble; and Allah is Forgiving, Merciful” verse in Al-Ahzab section of Quran.²¹⁶ In addition to these verses women’s existence at the same place with strangers is considered to be a sin according to “A man should avoid staying alone [in the same room] with women that are not his intimate.” hadith of Prophet Mohammed.²¹⁷

Therefore, some women who follow Islam religion in Turkey also prefer to veil themselves as many Muslim women do around the world. According to industrialization theory, religion’s influence on society should decrease. However, as said before, Turkey makes an exception in Islamic world by embracing modernism and Islamic elements together. As being an exception in exception, Turkey modernized with religion. Thus, as a result of the long lasting political polarization, turban issue arose as a factor of social controversy.

Veiling is not an extension of the classical burka, but is the new form of women’s involvement in the society. The most important disagreement between laic and Islamist societies is the enforcement of western model to leave traditional values. Veiling is still a conflict between conservative and laic societies. While laic people consider it as an anti-laic act, conservative people defend that it is a human right. Veiling issue was reflecting the most important side of new neo-liberal policy, which caused rise of Islamic impact in public space.²¹⁸ Those policies also caused a religious impact on economy and media which encouraged Islamic ideas.

²¹⁵ Quran, Al Noor, 024.002, Acc. 10.06.2013, <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/024-qmt.php#024.002>

²¹⁶ Quran, Al Ahzab, Acc. 15.06.2013 <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/033-qmt.php>

²¹⁷ Quran, Nikaah, Acc. 10.06.2013 <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/062-sbt.php>

²¹⁸ op. cit., Ebaugh, p. 42

As mentioned above, Turkey is divided in two societies, as of modern and traditional.²¹⁹ Therefore, according to Culture Theory, veiling shows the features of a popular culture in Turkish example as it is based on rural, traditional and conservative perception. While there was not any kind of issue in the first years of laic republican regime, it transformed into a conflict as a result of globalizing society and migration from the rural. In other words, turban issue has been the propulsive force of Islamist movements and Islamic dressing became a desperate rebellion against this corruption in values.²²⁰

While Kemalists defends that turban should be banned in public space with the intention of protecting the laic nature of the state and sustainability of the regime; Islamists defend that the ban is illegitimate and bring the state and the public over against. As the agenda of modernization of Turkey was determined by the state, it resulted with entrance of religion under control of the state. Islamist rhetoric handles this subject on state and public or the elite and people contrast. Therefore, frazzling the statist elites which defend the laic principles gradually became a strategy in Islamist rhetoric. The definition of public space forms the most important part of the continuing turban debates in Turkey.²²¹

According to Jenny B. White, the symbolical context of veiling is extremely paradoxical. While it gives credit to an “Islamic modernity” idea which anticipates women to get education, be professionally and educationally active; on the other hand it attributes to the values such as male-dominant hierarchy, gender discrimination, considering the motherhood as the principal objective of the women and defining their place as home. Some other times it consists of a fashion which indicates being urban, modern and keen on advancing in a veiled way even though it is not in reality. She also mentions that this symbolical burden exposes the women who really want to advance to dissatisfying conditions as it associates to two different meanings. So, even though veiling is symbolized as the key point of the Islamist movement, it has a powerful cultural reflection in the social life and carries many symbolical meanings with

²¹⁹ See Above: Politics and Polarization

²²⁰ op. cit., Roy, p. 84

²²¹ See Above: Republic, Public Space and Political Islam

reflecting the class identity beside its religious and political identity in the life of lower class society.²²²

Turban conflict is based on the social and political outcomes of veiling ban in all public institutions including the schools and universities as well as some private corporations in Turkey. The court decisions which banned turban in public space with allegation of being the symbol of political Islam and application of the same ban for all kinds of veiling generates the base of this conflict. The first issue ever regarding veiling in Turkish history occurred in 1951. By the initiative of DP religion courses started to be organized for the female students in imam-hatip schools which were designed to educate male religion staff. This incident brought about the problematic if girls could attend courses veiled or not.²²³

The first turban protester was author Şule Yüksel Şenler. Turban defender Şenler, carried her protest which was initiated in Istanbul out to Anatolia. She made turban propaganda through her conferences in 1960's at rural cities and invited women to veil. Moreover, she drew the guidelines of turban by stating that headscarf should hide the hair and dewlap, a topcoat should be worn. She did not settle with turban and decided to wear a burqa in 1980's.²²⁴

The turban ban is applicable for all teachers, students and other staff at schools and universities regardless of being private or public as well as the officers of judiciary system, the parliament, workers of government-owned corporations and all other civil servants. However, this ban is only valid for the women who are actually working or studying at these institutions. There are no restrictions for the women who intend to visit or get service in public institutions. Likely, the ban only involves judges, lawyers, public legal officers, other legal staff and workers. On the other hand, this ban is practiced strictly in military institutions; while female military officers cannot veil at all, visitors and relatives of the officers are accepted into the military zone only if they wear traditional headscarves which do not associate with political Islam. Image 1 and Image 2 show the difference between headscarf and turban; the additional cap underneath turban and tying style are the basic determiners of the difference between two.

²²² op. cit, White, p. 351

²²³ "Türkiye'de Türban Sorunu" (Turban Issue in Turkey), 10.06.2013, Wikipedia, Acc. 19.06.2013 http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkiye'de_t%C3%BCrban_sorunu

²²⁴ Ercüment İşleyen, "Türkiye'nin Başındaki Ağrı" (The Headache of Turkey), 10.05.1999, Milliyet, Acc. 27.06.2013 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1999/05/10/haber/hab01.html>

The modern turban was imported from Lebanon. It was created by an Iranian Shiite cleric who lived in Lebanon in order to protect women from Palestinian Sunni guerillas in 1970's.²²⁵ Even though the styles are different, ban was extended gradually to all types of veiling as a result of politicization of the topic. Nevertheless, restrictions are not too heavy for the women that preferred traditional style of veiling as it is not perceived as a political tool. However, it is possible to say that number of the women who wear a headscarf decreased in the last years as an outcome of the partisanship that current social polarization caused. The conflict forces the society to choose a side, either laic or conservative. The religious conservatives claim that turban is a requirement of their religious faith, and wearing it, is a democratic right while it is perceived as a symbol of political Islam.



Image 1: *Headscarf Style*



Image 2: *Turban Style*

²²⁵ Murat Bardakçı, “Türbanın Bu Çeşidi Lübnan’dan İthaldir” (This Type of Turban was Imported from Lebanon), 23.05.2004, Hürriyet, Acc. 25.06.2013 <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=227729>

As indicated at the beginning, one of the major conflicts is experienced in educational institutions. Any kind of veiling is prohibited in primary and secondary education according to the 4th article of the dress code of Ministry of National Education.²²⁶ However, some alterations were done recently in the dress code of public schools which can be considered as steps for transition to an absolute liberty.²²⁷

The imam-hatip students were allowed to veil themselves only during the lessons related to Quran through the 12th article of the dress code which was accepted in 1981.²²⁸ According to the code, students have to attend other lessons unveiled. However, as these schools are relatively homogenous regarding the type of the student, imam-hatip school administrators were conniving at the situation. Especially during the AKP term, the code was mostly ignored. Through the latest amendments in the education system which is known as 4+4+4 system, elective Quran lesson was implemented at public schools and veiling was set free for this lesson through the 3rd article of the new dress code which was accepted in 2012.²²⁹ This way, students were allowed to attend a lesson veiled for the first time at public schools while uniform obligation was also eliminated. These alterations were criticized by the circles which were concerned about extension of this practice to all lessons.

The same dress code also allowed imam-hatip school students to veil in all lessons as it was only limited to the lessons related to Quran before which was set by the 1981 dress code. The middle part of imam-hatip schools were reopened through the 4+4+4 education system which meant that a student who attended imam-hatip school at the age of ten could be influenced to veil herself at a minor age. These alterations were heavily criticized by the laic circles who were concerned that a gradual transformation to Shari'a state was in question. Cumhuriyet Newspaper columnist Sinan Tartanoğlu states that students of some public schools started to attend all lessons with turban unlawfully following the change in dress code which was obviously not practiced by the school administration. The columnist also criticizes that the students were wearing jeans

²²⁶ "Milli Eğitim Bakanlığına Bağlı Okul Öğrencilerin Kılık ve Kıyafetlerine Dair Yönetmelik" (Dressing Code of the Students Registered to Public Schools that Function under Ministry of National Education), 27.11.2012, Official Gazette, Acc. 04.06.2013 <http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/k%C4%B1%C4%B1kk%C4%B1yafet/kilikkıyafet.html>

²²⁷ "Turkey Embarks on Free Dress Code Era in Schools", 28.11.2012, Sabah, Acc. 02.06.2013 <http://english.sabah.com.tr/National/2012/11/28/the-era-of-free-dresscode-in-schools>

²²⁸ "Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ile Diğer Bakanlıklara Bağlı Okullardaki Görevlilerle Öğrencilerin Kılık Kıyafetlerine İlişkin Yönetmelik" (Dressing Code of the Students and Employees of the Public Schools that Function under National Ministry of Education and Other Ministries), 07.12.1981, Official Gazette, Acc. 02.06.2013 <http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/52.html>

²²⁹ loc. cit., "Milli Eğitim Bakanlığına Bağlı Okul Öğrencilerin..."

under which proved that they were not wearing the turban for religious purposes.²³⁰ Columnist Saygı Öztürk states in his article on Sözcü Newspaper dated November 28th, 2012 that real aim of the alterations in the education system and dress code is to allow turban gradually in all schools. He adds that turban liberty for the imam-hatip school students can be perceived as a matter of inequality and the liberty can be extended to all schools followingly.²³¹

Following this regulation, it was detected that teachers were also entering the classes with turban in some schools despite there was no change in the code for civil servants. For instance, Radikal Newspaper's article states that a newly assigned teacher to a school in Western Turkey was detected wearing burqa at school. Parents were extremely dissatisfied with the situation and reported the situation to the Ministry of National Education while the teacher defended that she was wearing a topcoat. Ministry stated that they were investigating the situation.²³² According to the 5th article of 1982 Dress Code of Civil Servants which is currently in force, teachers are obliged to unveil at their workplace unless there is a special type of uniform which should be used by the directive of school administration. Consequently, considering that turban is not a special uniform and the school administrators do not interfere, there is violence against the law.

On the other hand, even though admitting veiled students in education institutions contradicts with laic ideals; forcing veiled students to unveil at classrooms may cause a human rights violation according to the international law.²³³ However, it is also a dilemma if veiling of a minor is a human right or not as it clearly cannot be her free will to use turban at a minor age.

Turban is also forbidden at universities according to the additional 17th article of Code of Higher Education that took effect on October 25th, 1990 which states that there is a liberty of dress only if not against the laws in effect. The mentioned laws in effect are the 10th and 42nd articles of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey. In the period before 1980 military coup there was not a centralized authority for the orientation of the universities. Therefore, dress code was defined by each university and some of the

²³⁰ Sinan Tartanoğlu, "Her Derste Türban" (Turban in All Lessons), 30.12.2012, Cumhuriyet, Acc. 05.07.2013 <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=389188>

²³¹ Saygı Öztürk, "İmam-Hatipler Tamam, Sıra Diğer Okullarda" (İmam-Hatips are Done, the Next are Other Schools), 28.11.2012, Sözcü, Acc. 05.07.2013 <http://sozcu.com.tr/2012/yazarlar/saygi-ozturk/imam-hatipler-tamam-sira-diger-okullarda-132010/>

²³² "Balıkesir'de Tesettürle Ders İddiasına Soruşturma" (Prosecution for Veiled Course), 19.09.2013, Radikal, Acc. 19.09.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/balikesirde_tesetturlu_ogretmen_tartismasi-1151569

²³³ "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights", Acc. 09.06.2013 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>

articles at the constitution. Upon the mortal incidents and increasing religious reactionism the military coup was done in September 12th, 1980. Following the coup, due to the normalization efforts in politics, military regime prepared 1982 constitution and its subsidiary regulations. Ascendancy of turban conflict and move to the front lines of Turkish political agenda was a result of the Council of Higher Education's turban ban through the alterations in its dress code for students. Since January 10th, 1983, when the amendments took effect, turban debates never finished at the universities. However, the rule was moderated through the initiatives of ANAP. As the atmosphere was more tempered, ANAP attempted to pass a law package which was accepting turban liberty at the universities in 1984. This attempt was not welcomed by the generals and President Kenan Evren carried the case into the Constitutional Court. Council of Higher Education started to call any kind of veiling as turban as a protest against ANAP's initiative in order to specify that the issue was political.²³⁴

The student protests at universities which started in late 1960's had been a propellant power for the turban conflict. The first incident about veiling at universities was Hatice Babacan Case. Babacan was a student at Faculty of Theology of Ankara University in 1967 that did not want to unveil and insisted on her decision. As a result of her insistence she was dismissed from the class and thus Hatice Babacan became the leading actor of a campaign that was started by a part of the press. Following the incident, the first turban boycott ever was initiated and many other students started to enter the university with turban. As a result of the unpleasant events, Babacan was expelled from the school to menace the others.²³⁵ Thus, turban issue became a political symbol.

Nesrin Konukçu was a student at the Faculty of Medicine in Ege University who sued the school to be able to attend the lectures veiled. However the case was rejected by the Council of State with this decision:

“Our girls who are not educated adequately cover their heads without significant reasons under influence of their social environment and traditions. Regarding this matter, it is known that some of our girls and women who took enough education not surrender to the influence of their social environment or traditions cover their heads exclusively in order to protest the laic principles of our republic and indicate that they embrace the religion based government system. Headscarf becomes the symbol of an ideology which is against

²³⁴ loc. cit. İşleyen...

²³⁵Reha Muhtar, “Hey Sen Başörtülü Kız” (Hey You Veiled Girl), 18.09.2007, Vatan, Acc. 27.06.2013 <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/0/137315/4/yazarlar>

freedom of women and our republic's basic principles rather than being a harmless habit for these people."²³⁶

This decision later based the justification of annulment of the law on turban liberty at universities by Constitutional Court in 1989. For the first time, a legal justification defined polarization of the society on turban basis.

Another incident was Leyla Şahin Case. While Şahin was a student at Medicine Faculty of Istanbul University in 1998, she got a disciplinary penalty from the school as she insisted on attending the lectures with her turban. Şahin sued Turkey at ECHR, but lost the case. ECHR decided that Turkey's sanction had a legitimate basis upon Turkish constitution; Turkish dress code was clearly defining the rules and laicism was an indispensable condition of democracy.²³⁷ This case bears a great importance as it became a binding prejudication precedent in ECHR.²³⁸

On February 9th, 2008 long debated amendment in the constitution for turban freedom at universities was approved by President Abdullah Gül. Veiled students attempted to enter the courses at universities before the law was ratified by President Abdullah Gül, but they faced reactions by the university authorities as the code was still not published at the Official Gazette.²³⁹ The code came into effect by the changes on 10th and 42nd articles of Turkish constitution on February 23th, 2008. Alteration added new lines to the articles which stated that everybody was equal before the law on enjoying any kind of civil services and assured that nobody should be deprived of using their higher education liberty for any reason which was not enacted by law.²⁴⁰ Under those circumstances, additional 17th article of Code of Higher Education was neutralized as the 42nd and 10th articles of the constitution were changed. The legislation was roughly criticized by some rectors who stated that they would not let veiled students in courses until an alteration made in the Code of Higher Education.²⁴¹ Thereupon, many

²³⁶ loc. cit. İşleyen...

²³⁷ "AİHM Leyla Şahin'in Türbanla İlgili İtirazını Reddetti" (ECHR Rejected Leyla Şahin's Objection about Turban), 10.11.2005, Hürriyet, Acc. 06.07.2013

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3504033&tarih=2005-11-10>

²³⁸ "Leyla Şahin Davası AİHM'de Emsal oldu" (Leyla Şahin Case Became Binding Prejudication Precedent in ECHR), 15.02.2006, Hürriyet, Acc. 06.07.2013

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3504033&tarih=2005-11-10>

²³⁹ "Türbanlı Öğrenciler Üniversiteye Girdi" (Students Entered in the Universities with Turban), 11.02.2008, Acc. 16.06.2013 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/egitim/anasayfa/8208361.asp>

²⁴⁰ "Türban Yasası Yürürlükte" (Turban Package is in Enforcement), 23.02.2008, Acc. Hürriyet <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/8295679.asp>

²⁴¹ "17. Madde Değişmeden Türbanla Öğrenci Almayız" (We do not Accept Veiled Students without a Change on the 17th Article), 23.02.2008, Hürriyet, Acc. 16.08.2013

<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/8293568.asp?gid=71&sz=16425>

journalists warned the authorities not to make any changes on additional 17th article as it would create the necessity of defining the tying style of the veil which would result with a democracy scandal.²⁴²

However, CHP carried the legislation to the Constitutional Court and requested annulment of the amendments about turban with allegation of being against the laic principles of Republic of Turkey. Thus, the legislation was annulled on June 6th, 2008 through decision number 2008/116 of Constitutional Court and turban ban got into effect once more at universities.²⁴³

Many veiled students cannot continue education because of the turban issue. However, some students which do not persist on being obstinate with the laws attend their courses unveiled or wearing a hat or a wig instead.²⁴⁴ Even though the professors are obliged to comply with the dress code because of their positions as civil servants, following this date many universities agreed on veiling is a democratic right and moderated their attitude towards university students as an outcome of the democratization process alongside with the assignment of rectors who were known of their adherence to AKP.

The 13th article of Code of Higher Education that regulates the assignment of rectors by the President of Republic of Turkey causes inequality, damages independence of universities and causes their politicization. According to the law, rectors are elected by the universities, but if the president does not approve a candidate, he can choose one other from the list of candidates. As a result, the rectors who are known with their proximity to the political power can be assigned. Engin Ören's article dated August 11th, 2008 on Milliyet Newspaper states that the rector assignments which were performed on August 8th, 2008 witnessed the debates which reflected the polarization in Turkey. Therefore, his attitude left an impression as he acted with political motivations. The columnist also states that one of the candidates that could not show success in elections was assigned by the president. This raised the perception that the president had undertaken an ideological cleanup mission at the universities. Moreover the columnist

²⁴² Hayrettin Karaman, "17. Maddeye Dokunmayın" (Don't Touch the 17th Article), 17.02.2008, Yeni Şafak, Acc. 05.06.2013 <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/HayrettinKaraman/17-maddeye-dokunmayin/9378>

²⁴³ "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı" (Constitutional Court Decision), 22.10.2008, Official Razette, Acc. 16.06.2013 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/10/20081022-15.htm>

²⁴⁴ "Türban Yerine Peruk" (Wig Instead of Turban), 08.10.1997, Hürriyet, Acc. 17.06.2013 <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=-267901>

criticizes the president for assigning a candidate who was a former deputy candidate from AKP.²⁴⁵

Following the positive political atmosphere after the 2009 Local Elections, steps had started to be taken for democratization by AKP. A referendum was held for constitutional amendments in 2010 in order to rule the undemocratic effects of 1982 Constitution out which was prepared by the coup generals. The constitution was extremely repressive and had prohibited the responsible generals from being accused for their practices. Majority of the people voted in favor of the amendments and thus the constitution was changed. Next step for democratization of the country was seen as the turban liberty by AKP. As execution of the 2010 law package stopped, turban was still a matter of conflict at universities and other public space.

In the meanwhile, election propagandas had started for the 2011 General Elections at the time and parties were handling their election speeches. Unexpectedly CHP released a turban report in lead of its new moderate chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and opted for admittance of the students at universities with turban claiming that it was a democratic right; however it was still strictly disapproved for civil servants. Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that AKP should show its sincerity by not using turban conflict for political reasons.²⁴⁶ CHP proved its terms by passing the warning of Council of Higher Education to Istanbul University not to dismiss veiled students from lectures off.

Even though the alterations on dress code for schools placated the religious conservatives, turban issue still remains in the public institutions. Recent alterations in dress code of schools raised turban liberty also for the civil servants into question. Guidelines of the dress code for civil servants were determined by Dress Code of Civil Servants which came into effect on October 25th, 1982. 5th article of the code brings the obligation of unveiling at their workplace for all civil servants.

One of the most known incidents is the case of Merve Kavakçı. Kavakçı was a Turkish politician who was elected as a deputy from FP in 1999 General Elections. When she entered the parliament with her turban in order to swear her oath, she was protested by the DSP deputies and dismissed from the parliament. Followingly she was

²⁴⁵Engin Önen, “Rektör Atamaları” (Rector Assignments), 11.08.2008, Milliyet, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-/engin-onen/ege/yazardetay/12.08.2008/977415/default.htm>

²⁴⁶ “CHP’nin Türban Raporu Hazır” (CHP’s Turban Report is Ready), 08.10.2010, Radikal, Acc. 07.07.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/chpnin_turban_raporu_hazir-1022708

denationalized as she did not inform the authorities about her dual citizenship. According to the bill of indictment of High Court of Appeal dated June 4th, 1999 for FP's closure case, incident was organized by FP's executive cadre in advance.²⁴⁷ Also some statements of the party executives were indicated in the indictment. She rejects the claims about turban being a harbinger and she defends that it is a part of the Turkish culture and states that 60 % of the Turkish women are veiled. She also claims that there was no restriction of Turban when she entered with her turban in the parliament. However this is not correct; deputies at the parliament are also subject to the 1982 Dress Code of Civil Servants through the Discipline Regulation of National Assembly dated July 13th, 1984. Kavakçı stated that her denationalization was only a pretext for the government to expel her from the Turkish politics.²⁴⁸ However, indictment stated that FP was the successor of Islamist RP and Kavakçı was striving for the declaration of an Islamic regime by showing a speech she held at a conference that was organized by Islamic Association of Palestine in USA.²⁴⁹ Kavakçı applied to ECHR and won the case against Turkey for the oath incident, but could not pursue politics as she was not regranted with her Turkish nationality.²⁵⁰

One of the other persons who rekindled the turban conflict was Lawyer Emine Aykenar. She was protested by her colleagues upon her decision to attend the trials with her turban in 1970's. The bar association decided that it was impossible to reconcile the religious veil with modern dressing and professional appearance and discarded Aykenar from the association. Aykenar extended the debate by carrying her case into the Council of State. Her lawyer also was a deputy of Islamist MSP. As she was also found guilty by the Council of State, she could not return back to her occupation.²⁵¹

Even though veiling is seen as a requirement of religion, it is also a fact that many conservative women also prefer it as a dressing style. This perception also arises as a matter of conflict. At this point, conservative women who see turban as a dressing style are roughly criticized by radical Islamist and laic circles for emptying the meaning of religion by preferring unsuitable ways of veiling which do not fit in the Islamic style.

²⁴⁷ "Fazilet Davası" (Fazilet Case), 04.06.1999, Hürriyet, Acc. 08.06.2013

<http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/dosya/fazilet/ekiddianame.htm>

²⁴⁸ Merve Kavakçı, "Turkey's Fashion Police", Foreign Policy, 145, Nov-Dec 2004, Washingtonpost Newsweek Interactive LLC, pp. 16-17

²⁴⁹ loc. cit., "Fazilet Davası"...

²⁵⁰ "AİHM'den Merve Kavakçı Kararı" (Merve Kavakçı Decision from EHCR), 01.04.2007, HaberTürk, Acc. 06.07.2013 <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/18962-aihmden-merve-kavakci-karari>

²⁵¹ loc. cit. İşleyen...

In an Islamic style of veiling all parts of the women body should be covered with nontransparent, unattractive loose dresses which do not fit on the body. Therefore under normal circumstances wearing jeans, short skirts, close-fit shirts or lurid colors are not approved as a correct way of veiling.²⁵² On Image 3, an example of the disapproved style of veiling is seen. Thus, turban conflict arises as a political and sociological fact in Turkish society. As religion holds an important place in rural/conservative lifestyle, imposition of veiling to the young women at a very early age by their patriarchic and conservative families, discloses the idea of being veiled no matter how understanding. However, it is also a fact that in real democratic systems these kinds of discriminative attitudes should not exist.



Image 3: *Criticized type of Veiling*

In the light of the information above, it is asked what the subjects that participated in Study C think about the people fitting religious values according to themselves such as veiling and wearing revealing dresses at the same time. While Subject 1 answered as “After a point, religious values transformed into political tools and values lost their significance. Promotion of religious values by a political party is bothersome”; Subject 2 answered the same question as “I think dressing is also a preference; everyone has the right to dress according to their taste regardless being veiled or not. That is why; I tolerate and do not feel uncomfortable about it.” The answers show that the attitude against veiling depends mostly on the political opinion. It

²⁵² Hasan Çalışkan, “Müslüman Hanımın Kıyafetinin Özellikleri” (Features of the Dressing of a Muslim Lady), September 2006, Vol. 69, Acc. 15.08.2013 http://www.gulistandergisi.com/dergi_oku.php?id=277

is seen that while the subject that has a relatively laic opinion was against turban's prominence, the other subject who is relatively more conservative mentioned that she tolerates. Therefore, social polarization shows itself in the responses of this question. On the other hand, as the second subject mentioned that she is tolerant to any kind of lifestyle; reflects the liberal values of Subject 2. This variation will be analyzed more detailed below.²⁵³

In the final analysis, as the legal basis of this issue is still not set, turban issue in education seems to remain unresolved in the near future. In the next parts of the thesis opinions of Turkish society about the turban conflict will be reviewed. Before moving to the opinions, polarization in education will be handled.

4.1.1.2. Education

One of the major spheres that suffer polarization is education. Education has a special importance in politics for being the main institution to impose official state policy on the young brains. Therefore along the Turkish history especially starting from the transition to multi-party period, it was seen as a policy tool by the supporters of both ideologies. As we saw in the third chapter, especially starting with the 1950's education was politicized gradually. As a result of the arbitrary practices on education, main issues of Turkish education are turban issue, gender disparity in education, status of imam-hatip schools, compulsory religion education at schools and role of religious communities on education at the present day.

Even though colleges and minority schools are usually preferred by the modern elite and laic circles, urbanized religious conservative elites also started to prefer private schools as a result of the increasing number of Gülen Movement institutions. On the other hand, the lower layers of both segments attend the same public schools where usually the conflicts on conservative-modern axis arise as a result of the current practices. İmam-hatip schools which are the schools to educate required clerics provide very limited education and they are under control of religious conservative or Islamist parties as well as religious communities such as Gülen Movement together with some

²⁵³ See Below: Polarization Axes

private schools. However, rise in the number of imam-hatip schools made a big contribution on schooling of the children which come from conservative families.

The highly intensive central management of Turkish education does not meet the needs of a diverse society. Public schools serve the public interests by preparing students for society and by teaching common values, but private schools can better meet special interests by providing alternatives in order to address diversity so that parents can act in the best way according to their perception of the interests of their children²⁵⁴.

As indicated above, one of the major issues is turban which is not allowed in primary and secondary education according to the 4th article of the dress code of Ministry of National Education while universities do not have a common decision. Strict policies of Turkish state regarding the turban issue decreases the enrolment rates of girls in Turkey. Consequently, if they have enough money, many families send their children abroad for university education. The Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that his two daughters had to complete their university education in USA because of their dressing style. However, another article from Proleter Internet Newspaper, states that Erdoğan's daughter actually left to USA for not being qualified in university placement test.²⁵⁵ This means that turban issue was once more used as a political tool.

Table 2: Facts about Turkish Education

Education Expenditures
2.9 % of GDP (2006)
Country comparison to world: 145
Literacy
Definition: Age 15 and over can read and write
Total Population: 94.1 %
Male: 97.9 %
Female: 90.3 % (2011 est.)
School Life Expectancy (Primary to Tertiary Education)
Total: 14 years
Male: 14 years
Female: 13 years

Source: CIA World Factbook / Turkey
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>

²⁵⁴ Mustafa Cinoğlu, Private Education as a Policy Tool in Turkey, International Education Journal, 2006, Vol. 7, Is. 5, p. 676

²⁵⁵ "52 bin TL Maaş Alan Sümeyye Erdoğan'ın Eğitim Hayatı" (Education life of Sümeyye Erdoğan who gets 52 bin TL), 12.01.2013, Proleter, Acc. 14.06.2013 <http://proleter.net/52-bin-tl-maas-alan-sumeyye-erdoganin-egitim-hayati/>

Table 3: Turkish Gender Inequality on Education

Population with at Least Secondary Education	
25 and Older	
Female	Male
2006-2010	2006-2010
26.7%	42.4%

Source: The 2013 Human Development Report – "The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World"
http://www.tr.undp.org/content/turkey/en/home/library/human_development/hdr2013/

While the turban issue continues, Turkey also struggles with the gender disparity in education. In Table 2 it is seen that there is a significant disparity between the girls and boys in literacy while female education period is a year less than male students. While 97.9 % of men are literate, this number drops down till 90.3 % for women.

Table 4: Schooling Ratio by Education Year and Level of Education

Öğretim Yılı Educational Year	Yaş -Age	Okul Öncesi ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Pre Primary Education			Okullama Oranı ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Schooling Ratio			İlköğretim ⁽¹⁾ Primary Education			Ortaöğretim ⁽¹⁾ Secondary Education			Yükseköğretim ⁽¹⁾ Higher Education		
		Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females
		Brüt - Gross			Net - Net			Brüt - Gross			Net - Net			Brüt - Gross		
2007/'08	3-5 Yaş	-	-	-	-	-	-	104,54	106,41	102,57	87,55	94,04	80,70	38,19	42,62	33,56
	4-5 Yaş	-	-	-	-	-	-	97,37	98,53	96,14	58,56	61,17	55,81	21,06	22,37	19,69
2008/'09	3-5 Yaş	-	-	-	-	-	-	103,84	104,91	102,71	76,62	80,96	72,05	44,27	49,05	39,28
	4-5 Yaş	-	-	-	-	-	-	96,49	96,99	95,97	58,52	60,63	56,30	27,69	29,40	25,92
2009/'10 ⁽²⁾	3-5 Yaş	26,92	27,34	26,48	Brüt - Gross	106,48	107,05	105,88	84,19	89,14	78,97	53,43	58,14	48,48		
	4-5 Yaş	38,55	39,17	37,91	Net - Net	98,17	98,47	97,84	64,95	67,55	62,21	30,42	31,24	29,55		
2010/'11 ⁽²⁾	3-5 Yaş	29,85	30,25	29,43	Brüt - Gross	107,58	107,36	107,81	89,70	94,42	84,73	58,45	62,65	54,04		
	4-5 Yaş	43,10	43,70	42,47	Net - Net	98,41	98,59	98,22	66,07	68,17	63,86	33,06	33,44	32,65		
2011/'12 ⁽²⁾	3-5 Yaş	30,87	31,23	30,49	Brüt - Gross	108,42	108,21	108,65	92,56	95,68	89,26	66,23	70,58	61,68		
	4-5 Yaş	44,04	44,56	43,50	Net - Net	98,67	98,77	98,56	67,37	68,53	66,14	35,51	35,59	35,42		
	5 Yaş	65,69	66,20	65,16												

Öğretim Yılı Educational Year	Yaş -Age	Okullama Oranı ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Schooling Ratio			İlkokul ⁽¹⁾ Primary School			Ortaokul ⁽¹⁾ Lower Secondary School			Ortaöğretim ⁽¹⁾ Upper Secondary Education			Yükseköğretim ⁽¹⁾ Higher Education		
		Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females	Toplam Total	Erkek Males	Kadın Females
		Brüt - Gross			Net - Net			Brüt - Gross			Net - Net			Brüt - Gross		
2012/'13 ^(1,3)	3-5 Yaş	30,93	31,42	30,41	107,52	107,21	107,84	107,64	106,12	109,24	96,77	99,60	93,77	74,86	79,51	70,01
	4-5 Yaş	44,04	44,86	43,18	98,86	98,81	98,92	93,09	93,19	92,98	70,06	70,77	69,31	38,50	38,40	38,61
	5 Yaş	55,35	57,34	53,24												
	Net - Net	39,72	41,03	38,33												

Not: 1. 18.08.1997 tarihli ve 4306 sayılı Kanun ile 1997/'98 öğretim yılından itibaren 8 yıllık kesintisiz, 30.03.2012 tarihli ve 6287 sayılı Kanun ile 2012/'13 öğretim yılından itibaren de 12 yıllık kademeli zorunlu eğitime geçilmiştir.
2. 2000/'01-2005/'06 öğretim yılları arasında okullama oranları 2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı sonuçlarına göre yapılan nüfus projeksiyonlarına göre, 2007-2008 öğretim yılından itibaren okullama oranları Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi, Nüfus Sayımı sonuçlarına göre hesaplanmıştır.

(1) 10-13 yaş grubu için "Ayarlanmış Ortaokul Net Okullama Oranı" toplam %99,70 olup, erkekler için %99,85 ve kızlar için %99,54 olarak hesaplanmıştır. Bu oran zorunlu eğitim çağındaki ve 10-13 yaş grubunda olup da ortaokula devam eden 4.814.431 öğrenci, okula erken başlayan ya da sınıf atlayan 10-13 yaş grubundaki ortaöğretime devam eden 64.731 öğrenci ile yönetmelik gereği kaydı ertelenen veya sınıf tekrarı yapan 10-13 yaş grubundaki 276.809 ilkökul öğrencisi toplamının 10-13 yaş grubu nüfusuna oranıdır.

(2) Okul öncesi okullama oranları 3-5, 4-5 ve 5 yaşları net okullama oranlarıdır.

Note: 1. Compulsory education was expanded to 8 uninterrupted with law No. 4306 dated 18.08.1997 as of 1997/'98 educational year, but to 12 gradual years with law No. 6287 dated 30.03.2012 as of 2012/'13 educational year.

2. Schooling ratios for the educational year 2000/'01-2005/'06 were calculated according to the population projection based on the results of General Population Census 2000 and schooling ratios as of the 2007-2008 educational year were calculated according to the results of the Address-Based Population Register System Population Census.

(1) "Adjusted Lower Secondary Net Enrollment Ratio" for 10-13 age group is 99.70% in total and 99.85% for boys and 99.54% for girls. This is the ratio of 4,814,431 students studying in lower secondary schools and 64,731 students started education earlier or move up the class in the age group 10-13, and 276,809 primary school students whose enrollments are deferred according to regulation or repeated the class in the age group 10-13 to the total number of population in the age group 10-13.

(2) Pre-primary schooling ratios are net schooling ratios for ages 3-5, 4-5 and 5.

Source: Ministry of National Education, National Formal Education Statistics, 2012-2013
http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/istatistik/meb_istatistikleri_orgun_egitim_2012_2013.pdf

Likewise in Table 3 it is seen that while 42.4 % of men above 25 have a high school diploma, only 26.7 % of the girls are able to complete high school. This shows that many girls drop school during puberty.

Six year net and brute schooling rates according to the school year and education level based on gender are given in Table 4. Pre-primary schooling rates also take place starting with 2009-2010 data. The pre-school schooling rate is 30.93 % for 3-5 year olds, 44.04 % for 4-5 year olds and 55.35 % for 5 year olds. The schooling rates of girls and boys follow each other tightly. Schooling is higher between 4-5 year range and 5 years. However, when the country total is taken into consideration, it is seen that almost half of the population is excluded from schooling. There is still a big gap between male and female schooling at high school and higher education. Such as in Table 3, also here it is seen that many girls do not proceed to high school or higher education. The numbers that were analyzed show that every year approximately 2 % to 5 % of girls remain unschooled. In 2012-2013 period it is seen that the percentage of schooled females is higher than the male percentage interestingly. This shows that the efforts made by the institutions such as UNICEF and Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği to meliorate the rates of education for girls have been successful.

There are several reasons for above-mentioned disparity. One of them is the long distances that the girls have to walk until they reach their school. Approximately 15.500 girls need to walk every day to attend their classes especially in Eastern Turkey which is not welcomed by conservative families as they are not comfortable with letting their daughters alone in the streets because of religious and safety reasons.²⁵⁶ Besides, many families do not think that girls' education is important; they rather strive for bestowing their daughters to marry at an early age or keep them at home to help with household chores which actually can be considered as against the 4th article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²⁵⁷ as well as the 7th article of Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child.²⁵⁸ Foremost reason for the conservative families not to send their daughter to school is mainly their religious and traditional perspective.

²⁵⁶ "Making a Difference for Children: Girls' Education", Acc. 17.06.2013
<http://www.unicef.org/turkey/dn/ge29.html>

²⁵⁷ "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights", Acc. 09.06.2013 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/#atop>

²⁵⁸ "Declaration of the Rights of the Child", Acc. 18.06.2013
<http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/resources/child.asp>

Conservative families are concerned to raise their daughters' as "chaste" individuals. Main sources that base the claims of religious conservatives and Islamists to avoid sending their daughters to mixed schools. However this perception usually contradicts with Al-Alaq verse of Quran: "Read! In the name of your Lord Who created."²⁵⁹ Therefore, it is clearly seen that actually Islam does not have any restrictions for education of girls; it only has a restriction towards not being veiled which while being educated which would take us back to the turban topic.

Besides the turban issue there is another important conflict which is the perception of western style education system that was implemented by Atatürk as "atheist" (or laic in other words) by those religious conservative circles. The reflection of this state of mind is seen in everyday life which beholds the girls from having their compulsory education. Provided that, preventing girls from going to school because it does not provide an education according to Islamic values and speaking of the human rights is quite disingenuous. The question of the parent of a 7 year old to Islamist intellectual Nureddin Yıldız makes us think:

"I have a 7 year old daughter. We did not send her to school. We sent her to the Quran lectures organized for minors at İsmailağa Mosque for the reasons such as preventing her from being educated at the schools of infidel system, to encourage her for veiling at an earlier age, to raise her up as a chaste person, not to have any unperformed salats. [...] Our daughter wants to attend school, but she hesitates to ask us. What do you think we should do?"

Nureddin Yıldız replies as: "[However], while sending her to school, you have to search for a way to 'disinfect' her when she returns."²⁶⁰

If this conversation is evaluated, it can be seen that the parent who asks the question clearly defines current education system as infidel and implicitly accuses the girls going to public schools with being unchaste. Moreover, Nureddin Yıldız suggests "disinfecting" her, which basically means brainwashing. In this sense, it is true that the parents are responsible from education of their children, but forcing a minor to adopt a certain life style also does not comply with human and child rights according to the 10th article of Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child.²⁶¹ The same kind of gender discrimination is also seen in the messages that Ministry of National Education sent to

²⁵⁹ Quran, Al Alaq, Acc. 10.06.2013 <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/096-qmt.php>

²⁶⁰ "Kız Çocuğunun Okula Gitmek İstemesi" (Young Girl's Will to Go to School), Fetva Meclisi, Acc. 10.07.2013 <http://www.fetvameclisi.com/fetva-kiz-cocugunun-okula-gitmek-istemesi-14910.html>

²⁶¹ loc. cit. Declaration of the Rights of the Child...

the parents. The message basically states that the parents should give extensive freedom to the boys while they keep their daughter under control.²⁶²

Nevertheless, there are also the conservative elites which adopt rather a modern lifestyle compared to fundamentalists. These circles form the more intellectual and urban part of the religious conservative society. While the average layer of this society prefers to send their children to imam-hatip schools, high-profile members prefer to send the schools which are connected to Gülen Movement.

Another problem in Turkish education which becomes a subject of polarization is the imam-hatip schools. Imam-hatip schools are the vocational high schools which were founded at the early years of republic to educate the required staff for religious affairs. The imam-hatip schools especially spurted during 1970's in connection with the rise of religious and nationalist movements against communism threat. In this sense, supporting such kind movements became the official policy of Turkish.²⁶³ Imam-hatip schools were especially embraced and adopted by the religious conservative families who wanted to teach both positive sciences and basics of religion to their children. The basic reasons for this support were the possibility of veiled girls to study with minimum interaction with boys, encouragement of foundation of new imam-hatip schools as an outcome of the power struggle of political parties and the imam-hatip solidarity network which gave them the opportunity to unite.²⁶⁴ Therefore, as the number of imam-hatip graduates outnumbered the available jobs, they headed towards other vacancies. Rough debates took place about admitting them to civil services such as police force, army and judiciary system or not. This rapid development was not welcomed by the laic circles. Laic circles have always approached to imam-hatip schools suspiciously.

Imam-hatip schools, which were established as vocational schools at the beginning, are criticized for deviating from their aim and for admitting many girls as obviously they cannot be imams. These circles which see imam-hatips as vocational schools propound that they have progressed more than the other vocational schools and served for education of surplus imams and preachers. Also they were worried about imam-hatip schools' transformation into alternative education institutions over public

²⁶² "Milli Eğitim'den Velilere: Oğlanı Bırakız Kıza Bakın" (Message from the National Education to the Parents: Leave the Boys, Control the Girls), 20.08.2013, Radikal, Acc. 20.08.2013
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/milli_egitimden_velilere_oglani_birakin_kizi_kontrol edin-1146930

²⁶³ See Above: Islam in Global Politics

²⁶⁴ Ruşen Çakır, İrfan Bozan, Balkan Talu, *İmam hatip Liseleri: Efsaneler ve Gerçekler (İmam-Hatip High Schools: Legends and Facts)*, İstanbul: Tesev, 2004, p. 25

academic high schools.²⁶⁵ Again, this anxiety of the laic circles was not insubstantial. İmam-hatip graduates had the possibility to choose any university course by the amendment made in the constitution by the military government in 1982. In 1990, TÜSİAD prepared an education report and detected that imam-hatip graduates were highly opting for different courses as their first choice at the university placements.

Table 5: University Preferences of İmam-Hatip Graduates in 1988

Department	Candidate that Marked as the 1st Option	Total Placed
Law	8714	313
Public Administration	4754	199
Theology	2496	988
Medicine	2078	188
Engineering	2016	286
International Relations	1255	34
Other	1189	1828
Teaching (4 Year Cycle)	1102	404
Management	496	145
Teaching (2 Year Cycle)	474	815
Distance Learning	453	4058
Press	450	23
Vocational Higher Education	341	51
Turkish Language & Literature	285	134
Economics	182	94
History	170	130
Labor Economics	165	72
Finance	123	81
Education Programs	61	62
Geography	51	26
Total	26855	9931

Source: Zekai Baloglu; Education in Turkey Report, 1990, 137

Table 5 shows that first two preferences of the majority were law and public administration. This actually shows that the Islamist mobilization actually strived for seizing the control of the state by placing themselves in key points at civil services and political cadre. Moreover laic circles claim that imam-hatip schools became the backyard of Islamism.²⁶⁶ While imam-hatip schools used to provide both middle and high school education until the February 28 memorandum in 1997, only the high school section of imam-hatip schools remained open after the memorandum as a result of the eight year compulsory primary education legislation that was advised by the generals.

²⁶⁵ loc. cit.

²⁶⁶ loc. cit.

This decision was highly influenced by the TÜSİAD report of 1990. Therefore, AKP's progress towards the political power was seen as a hope by imam-hatip schools as many politicians from its cadre were imam-hatip graduates.

Table 6 shows us the evolution of numbers of imam-hatip schools and students. According to Table 6, while imam-hatip schools had only 71,100 students in 450 schools at the beginning of AKP term in 2002, number of the students quintupled and school number grew up to 708 in ten years. It is seen that while the number of schools and students remained stable until 2009-2010 term, they started to rise after then. The reason of this increase is the melioration of university admittance process by changing the coefficient rates in Student Examination System. Coefficient system was a measure to limit higher education alternatives of imam-hatip graduates with theology faculties which was presented after the February 28 period. In 2009, the coefficients were attempted to be overruled by the pro-government president of Council of Higher

Table 6: *Number of Students that Attended İmam-Hatip High Schools by Years*

Academic Year	Number of Students	Number of Schools
2002-2003	71.100	450
2003-2004	90.606	452
2004-2005	96.851	452
2005-2006	108.064	453
2006-2007	120.668	455
2007-2008	129.274	456
2008-2009	143.637	458
2009-2010	198.581	465
2010-2011	235.639	493
2011-2012	268.245	537
2012-2013	380.771	708

Source: Ministry of National Education Formal Education Data, Edited by Eđitim-Sen Education Union
www.egitimsen.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=20064&sube=0#.UjNnM8ZdCuA

Education, but the decision was precluded by the Council of State.²⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the constant increase in number of the schools and students has been a worrying development for laic circles. Also, Eđitim-Sen mentions that positive discrimination of AKP government towards imam-hatip schools in every aspect is seen

²⁶⁷“Katsayı Mađdurlarına Tazminat Yolu Açıldı” (Compensation Option Has Been Provided for Sufferers of Coefficients), 25.07.2013, Radikal, Acc. 18.08.2013
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/katsayi_magdurlarina_tazminat_yolu_acildi-1143252

at every step of the process; while state schools suffer inadequacy of funds, imam-hatip schools never face such kind of an issue. In the last two periods of the chart, it is seen that number of the schools drastically rose from 493 to 537 and then to 708 while the students grew up more than 150,000 in the last two years.²⁶⁸ The article of CNNTurk dated August 10th, 2013 states that while imam-hatip high schools were placing only 25 % of their students to non-theology university programs during the period that coefficient was in question, the number rose up to 35 % after the elimination of the rule.²⁶⁹ The changes can be considered as an outcome of army's deteriorated Kemalist authority over politics and covert efforts of Islamist movement to reinforce its rulership through education of approved generations.

AKP introduced the new education system which was called 4+4+4 on March 30th, 2012 that basically raised compulsory education to twelve years and divided it to four equal parts allowing circulation between all types of academic and vocational schools including imam-hatips. Thus, middle parts of imam-hatip schools were reopened.²⁷⁰ Moreover, legislation also abolished the coefficient system; previous system was multiplying the final grades with 0.15 if imam-hatip graduates wanted to proceed to theology faculties and with 0.12 for all others. As an outcome of this abolishment, imam-hatip graduates became entitled to have the same rights to proceed to any higher education institution they wish according to their rank at the exam results.²⁷¹ Even though the previous system was an equity constraint, it is clear that the amendments were made for benefit of a certain society. Unfortunately Turkish education system at the pos-1980 period was constantly seen as a political tool and changed frequently according to the ideology of the ruling parties which left the students in a difficult situation. This amendment is also one of many other alterations, but yet the most extensive one.

²⁶⁸ "MEB, Ortaöğretime Geçiş Sisteminde Öğrencilere Kırk Katır mı Kırk Satır mı Dayatması Yapıyor" (Ministry of National Education Imposes the New System on Students whether They Like or Not), 15.08.2013, EğitimSen, Acc. 19.08.2013 www.egitimsen.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=20064&sube=0#.UjNnM8ZdCuA

²⁶⁹ "İmam-Hatip Okulları Tekrar Yükselişe Geçiyor" (İmam-Hatip Schools Rise Again), 10.08.2012, CNNTürk, Acc. 12.07.2013

<http://www.cnnurk.com/2012/turkiye/08/10/imam.hatip.okullari.tekrar.yukselise.geciyor/672480.0>

²⁷⁰ "12 Yıllık Zorunlu Eğitime Yönelik Genelge" (Circular for 12 Years Compulsory Education), Acc. 17.07.2013 <http://www.meb.gov.tr/haberler/2012/12YillikZorunluEgitimeYonelikGenelge.pdf>

²⁷¹ "Coefficients in Turkish University Exam Lifted", 01.12.2011, Hürriyet Daily News, Acc. 17.07.2013 <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/coefficients--in-turkish-university-exam-lifted.aspx?pageID=238&nID=8288&NewsCatID=341>

This education system was subject to rough critics with the accusation that it would drop the number of students which would attend school and it was seen as a focus of religious reactionary and an anti-laic act as it was giving the option of transferring to imam-hatip schools. Thus, CHP took the amendment to the Constitutional Court and pressed a charge for annulment of regulation and suspension of execution with the allegation of unconstitutionality of the regulation regarding the articles which reduce the schooling age to five, implement elective religion lessons such as Quran and Prophet Mohammed's Life in addition to the compulsory one while still maintaining the religion lesson as compulsory, disintegrate continuous education to three chapters of four years that would increase drop-outs, re-implement imam-hatip middle schools and reduce their admission level to eleven years. CHP considered all those alterations as against the children rights according to the 7th and 10th articles of Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child which was ratified by Turkey and 2nd, 10th and 24th articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey which takes the laicism as an irreversible right in every aspect of administration and life; also forbid mixing state and religious affairs. In this sense, prosecutor CHP deputy Emine Ülker Tarhan stated that there is an imposition in question through the establishment of imam-hatip middle schools and implementation of compulsory lessons such as Quran and Prophet Mohammed's Life.²⁷² She continued her words as in the following:

"Imposition of such kind of an influence on a minor child is against the rational education, [...] and principles of the laic state. Laic state has equidistance to all faiths. The citizens from different faiths were ignored by this regulation. The regulation is against the rule of conduction of education based on modern principals settled by the 42nd article of the constitution. This decision is against the freedom of religion and conscience. No relation can be settled between religion and the state in a laic state. Using the laws and the state in order to raise a generation that fits in one's ideology is clearly abuse of religion; it means giving priority to one belief and ignoring others. It is against the 10th and 24th articles of the constitution. Religion education is up to the request of the student and their guardians. Optional course and elective course concepts are entirely different from each other. Everybody is forced to announce their faith through this regulation. Moreover, their faith is tried to be measured. This means to insulate the children from their parents' influence and educate them systematically in direction of a specific perspective through imposing a certain ideology. Only the oppressive regimes that want to educate monotype people want to use such kind of a method."²⁷³

With these words, the polarization can be clearly seen between the laic and religious conservative parties. The accusations are actually accurate in regards to the

²⁷² "4+4+4'e İptal Davası" (Nullity Suit for 4+4+4), 08.06.2012, Haberler.com, Acc. 20.06.2013 <http://www.haberler.com/4-4-4-kanununa-iptal-davasi-3693438-haberi/>

²⁷³ loc. cit.

Turkish constitution. As a matter of fact, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan already stated that he strives for educating a religious generation at a press release he made at the presentation of an educational project. He made the following statement:

“We cannot agree with you (the journalists) here but when we talk about ‘a modern generation’, cannot a religious generation be modern? Cannot it be both religious and modern? Gentlemen, bend your head down and think how a generation both religious and modern is educated.”²⁷⁴

Even though the intention is clearly seen in the words of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Constitutional Court dismissed the lawsuit on September 20th, 2012 and published its justified decision in the Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey on March 18th, 2013 with 2012/128 registration number.²⁷⁵

The court listed the following reasons in its justified decision:

“Laicism is a feature of the state rather than being a feature of the society.[...] There are two interpretations of laicism; the strict version does not approve the reflection of religious faith to the public space while more flexible version considers that personal dimension of religion is a social fact. [...] The individuals that are making part of different religious beliefs are under protection of laic state. [...] 2nd article of the constitution signifies that laicism does not mean to be a non-believer; each individual can follow the religion or sect they desire and comply with its obligations and not to be subject of a different procedure in regards to their religious beliefs.[...] The state should remove the obstacles in front of religious and conscious freedoms of individuals and provide an appropriate environment for them to live according to their beliefs as an outcome of its positive responsibility. [...] According to 5th article of the constitution, state is responsible of removing social, political and economic obstacles which limit individuals’ basic rights and freedoms and provide necessary conditions for evolution of moral and material existence. [...] As constitution does not allow foundation of private religion institutions, naturally it should be state’s responsibility to provide religion education. It is clear that the elective lessons that were introduced by the code are the requirements of the religious education that will be provided by the request of oneself and their guardian. Name preference of Quran and Life of Prophet Mohammed lessons do not necessarily mix religion with state affairs as the names are designed only to show respect to the followers of the religion. [...] Besides, foundation of schools to educate clerics was stipulated by the Law on Unification of Education of March 3rd, 1924 which clearly holds Ministry of National Education responsible of the education of clerics. 24th article of the constitution gives the possibility of providing a state-run religious education while it prohibits determination of the principles of the state based on religion. Therefore this regulation is not against the 2nd and 24th articles of the constitution.”²⁷⁶

Even though the Constitutional Court stated that the amendments are aligned with the constitution, CHP stated that they will reapply for reconsideration. Considering that the law is open for interpretation, it can be seen that the interpretations of the

²⁷⁴ “Erdoğan Dindar Nesili Savundu” (Erdoğan Advocated Religious Generation), 06.02.2012, Radikal, Acc. 19.04.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan_dindar_nesili_savundu-1077899

²⁷⁵ “Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı” (Decision of Constitutional Court), 18.04.2013, Official Gazette, No: 28622, Acc. 19.04.2013

[http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130418.htm](http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130418.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130418.htm)

²⁷⁶ loc. cit.

Constitutional Court and CHP are completely different from each other. As mentioned before²⁷⁷, the court also stated that there are two interpretations of laicism and the court clearly decided to interpret it according to the more flexible version that is known as of Anglo-American type of secularism. However, considering this, the amendments are actually against the constitution if they are considered in the context of the French laic understanding which is stricter than secularism. In this sense, it is possible to say that Constitutional Court gave its decision in favor of the government. This attitude is an outcome of the recent structure of the Constitutional Court, which was changed through the referendum held in 2010. The new structure abolished independence of the Constitutional Court by letting three of its members to be selected by the parliament and seven by the president.²⁷⁸

While the 4+4+4 education system is still a matter of conflict, there were more steps taken by the government that would concern the laic society. For example, according to the article of a Turkish internet newspaper Ntvmsnbc dated June 19th, 2012; Ministry of National Education founded 67 new imam-hatip schools in 39 counties of Istanbul following the 4+4+4 regulation.²⁷⁹ However, the concerns are not limited with the increase in the number of imam-hatip schools.

As mentioned above, the 4+4+4 education system introduced elective religion lessons at public schools. Even though this implementation was considered as rightful by the Constitutional Court and the legislation was not abolished, its effects are debatable. Compulsory religion lesson was introduced in the curriculum at the pos-1980 period as a result of the military coup government's pro-Islamic attitude against the communism threat, but the minorities and laic circles were always in favor of its elimination. Therefore, introduction of new religion lessons and conservation of the compulsory lesson was seen as a threat by those circles.

Nevertheless, the worries are not groundless. According to the article of Milliyet Newspaper dated January 15th, 2013, an exclusion anxiety emerges on the kids that do not select elective religion lessons. The article states that even though each student was affected differently, the majority is unhappy with existence of religion lessons. There is

²⁷⁷ See Above: DP and AP Term

²⁷⁸ "Can Erdoğan Pull it Off?", 09.09.2010, The Economist, Acc. 06.07.2013
http://www.economist.com/node/16994644?story_id=16994644

²⁷⁹ "İstanbul'da 39 İlçeye 67 İmam-Hatip Okulu" (67 İmam-Hatip School to 29 Districts of Istanbul), 19.06.2012, Ntvmsnvs, Acc. 10.07.2013 <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25359468/>

also the effect of the discomfort originated by the exam based evaluation which brings faith and obligation together. Besides, exempt of some Alevi students based on the decision of European Court of Human Rights from religion lessons has been a hope for many families that strive for rescission of the lesson. However, the families which were expecting a rescission faced a bad surprise by implementation of new elective religion lessons on top of the compulsory one instead of abolishing them. Moreover, the article states that even though some electives such as Democracy or Human Rights are not opened, the lessons about religion are always opened. Thus, if another lesson is not opened, the students get forced to take religion lessons. This situation is especially inconvenient for the Alevi students as their Muslimhood beliefs would be evaluated in case they refuse to take the lessons.²⁸⁰ Moreover, this system also causes tagging of the students which avoid electing religion lessons. As is seen, the curriculums are clearly organized in favor of the government's biased policy. As a matter of fact, religion should not be this much prominent in a laic state. Even though compulsory religion lesson is insisted, a new curriculum that includes different sects should be created, because this way the system is against the human rights as per 24th article of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In this sense, polarization in the society which is embittered by the current education system is seen in the words of an Alevi citizen who enjoyed the right of exemption of his child from religion lessons:

"I am the first person who sued the compulsory religion education and won. My child was not attending religion lessons, instead was having a break at the yard as there were no other course options. He was exposed to questions and harassed, therefore because he was fed up with explaining the situation, he started to say that he was punished by the teacher. He was only ten. I spoke to the school manager and provided him with staying at the classroom; we won the case, but could not prevent my son to take the lesson physically. I also faced problems in my job, they forced me to resign, I was threatened, my son was leaving school under assistance of the police, my house was kept under surveillance by the police against threat risks."²⁸¹

This is not the only discriminative incident at schools. According to the article of Vatan Newspaper dated August 28th, 2013, middle school student Nazlı Şirin El, who preferred not to attend the religion lessons and carried the incident to court due to her

²⁸⁰ "Türkiye'de Alevilik" (Alevism in Turkey), 15.01.2013, Milliyet, Acc. 07.07.2013 <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-de-alevilik-secmeli-din-dersi-nde-dislanacagim-kaygisi-/gundem/gundemdetay/15.01.2013/1655403/default.htm>

²⁸¹ ibid.

religious faith, was classified with 2 over 5 for the religion lessons and lost her chance to obtain a certificate of appreciation for her overachievement.

Moreover, according to the 86th and 99th articles of the regulation, sanctuaries could be placed at schools in case of request and students of imam-hatip schools would be responsible for education of the public by organizing one-on-one meetings with the people within the range of school's neighborhood.²⁸² These alterations show that a comprehensive religion project is in question. Saygı Öztürk mentioned that these alterations would lead to conflict of the teachers and students who practice salats and who do not. He also expressed that the next step might be formation of separate schools for boys and girls.²⁸³ However, Ministry of National Education did not accept the allegations, defended that the objections to the new education system were ideological and blamed the circles who criticize the implementation with not being able to give up the habit of education monotype generations by assimilating differences.²⁸⁴ This blame is critically discriminative and reflects the intolerance of the government against criticism. In the first place, criticism is a democratic right and the criticism is not entirely insubstantial. It was proved many times that the Islamist and religious conservative parties had the tendency of conveniently misunderstanding. Thus religious conservatives usually claim criticism as in their monopoly.²⁸⁵

As is seen from these incidents, following another religion, sect, belief or political thought and enjoying the rights that is obtained through these identities is not welcomed in Turkey. These are typical exemptions that the laic people suffer at the present day. The society is under influence of a strict Sunni understanding which exempts other understandings and accepts Sunnism as the only truth and unfortunately such kinds of oppressive attitudes also became a major element in politics. This attitude is seen either in politics and social life. As mentioned many times before, the real reason of polarization in Turkey is based on religion.

²⁸² "Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Ortaöğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliği (Ministry of National Education Code of High School Institutions), 07.09.2013, Official Gazette, Acc. 15.09.2013 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/09/20130907-4.htm>

²⁸³ Saygı Öztürk, "Eğitimde Yeni Hedef Kız ve Erkekleri Ayırmak" (Separating Girls and the Boys is the New Target in Education), 15.09.2013, Sözcü, Acc. 15.09.2013 <http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/yazarlar/saygi-ozturk/egitimde-yeni-hedef-kiz-ve-erkekleri-ayirmak-371617/>

²⁸⁴ "MEB: Ortaokul ve Liselerde Türban Serbest" (Min. of Nat. Edu.: Turban is Allowed in Middle and High Schools), 05.06.2012, Sol, Acc. 05.07.2013 <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/meb-ortaokul-ve-liselerde-turban-serbest-haberi-55604>

²⁸⁵ See Above: RP's Double Standard Policy

Another concern is the elimination of academic public schools from education system in alignment with the 4+4+4 education system. Academic public schools were serving for the students which did not wish to specialize in vocational or religious spheres and could not be successful in the high school placement test. The exam gives the possibility for the students to access an academic quality education in special public schools that are called Anatolian High School. However considering that the pre-condition of being admitted to these schools is to pass the exam, it means that elimination of academic public high schools forces the students either to attend to private schools or specialize in vocational or religious schools. Basically, it can be seen that the system covertly directs the students to imam-hatip schools.

With the initiation of the process, many repressive incidents started to arise. According to the article of Radikal Newspaper dated August 22nd, 2013, during transformations of the schools according to 4+4+4 system, it was detected that despite the lack of interest, approximately 20 public schools in a conservative city called Konya were transformed into imam-hatip schools which were previously providing academic education. Moreover, registrations of the students who were attending those schools were transferred automatically to imam-hatip schools.²⁸⁶ Article also states that registrations were transferred beyond the parents' knowledge. Even though the school managers stated that parents can transfer their children if they are not content, in a small conservative city such as Konya, where the social pressure is extremely high, it is impossible for the parents to take the risk of being otherized.²⁸⁷ It is clearly seen that the state tries to direct the students to imam-hatip schools which is a sheer violation of law.

Eğitim-Sen states that 1,112,604 students which attended to the last exam show that the students are still interested in academic education; it is seen that Ministry of National Education strives for canalizing the students to educate cheap workforce by vocational schools and obedient citizens by imam-hatip schools.²⁸⁸ However, after the complaints that Ministry of National Education received and manifestations of the students, Ministry of National Education had to retreat by announcing that obtaining the desired education is a democratic right and promising that classrooms will be

²⁸⁶ "Çocuğunuz Otomatik Olarak İmam-Hatipli Oldu" (Your Child Became İmam-Hatipper Automatically), 22.08.2013, Radikal, Acc. 22.08.2013
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/cocugunuz_otomatik_olarak_imam_hatipli_oldu-1147303

²⁸⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸⁸ *loc. cit.* MEB, Ortaöğretime...

introduced that will give academic education in a part of vocational schools. But, it is ironic to see that they considered it as a democratic right while they did not think about this before introducing the new system.²⁸⁹

In the recent years there is a significant raise in the number of conservative families who send their children to the private schools and other institutions for better education. This is due to the raise in the number of private schools and strong encouragement of the state in extent of raising schooling rates. Besides, the Gülen Movement schools are sought after for their quality education, outstanding opportunities and accessible prices as well as more conservative environment compared to the public schools.

Fethullah Gülen started an educational movement in Turkey and different parts of the world since 1990 through private schools, after-school courses, universities and university dormitories. While there were only 125 schools of the movement in Turkey in 1998, Prof. Helen Rose Ebaugh, who is a sociologist in collaboration with Gülen Movement, stated that the number of movement schools reached approximately to 1000 in Turkey on an interview she gave on CNNTurk on January 12th, 2011.²⁹⁰ He passionately supports this educational movement. Students who attend these schools and courses usually score high in the university placement tests as a result of the high quality education. However, the increasing cheating scandals in the university placement tests aroused suspicions against the movement institutions.²⁹¹ This makes the movement identical to elitist Islam. Even though Gülen supports the schools, he denies the existence of an organic relationship between himself and these institutions. He claims that the financial resources for establishment of the schools are provided by conservative businessmen.²⁹² However these schools are heavily criticized by the laic circles for serving Great Middle East Project by pioneering moderate Islam. In this sense, the claims of the laic circles are not insubstantial. As a matter of fact, the movement does not hide its objective of providing education based on Turkish-Islam synthesis.

²⁸⁹ “Meslek Lisesi ve İmam-Hatip istemeyenlere care bulundu” (Solution is Found for the Ones who Does not want Both İmam-Hatip School or Vocational Schools), 20.08.2013, Radikal, Acc. 20.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/meslek_lisesi_ve_ihlyi_istemeyenlere_care_bulundu-1146888

²⁹⁰ Cüneyt Özdemir, Helen Rose Ebaugh, 5N1K, 12.01.2011

²⁹¹ “KPSS’de Vurgun Cemaat mi?” (Is the Loot Cemaat’s in the Examination for Civil Servants), 02.09.2010, Sol, Acc. 18.07.2013 <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/kpssde-vurgun-mu-cemaat-mi-haberi-32885>

²⁹² loc. cit. Gülen Hareketi...

Apart from the private schools, the critics concentrate on movement's dormitories and private apartments which are called "Houses of Light". It is widely known that as a part of Gülen movement's education system based on Turkish-Islam synthesis, the dormitories and apartments serve as missionary houses. Some people are forced to stay there and read books about the movement or Fethullah Gülen. On İlker Akşit's article on Free Kocaeli Newspaper dated December 23th, 2011, an interview with two university students that were staying in the movement's dormitories shows that the movement does not hide itself anymore. While approximately six, seven years ago the movement's members were hiding themselves, in the last years they became more prominent. Akşit states that the activity style of the movement has changed as an outcome of the changing political environment in Turkey. The dormitories are cheap and it is obligatory to perform salats five times a day. The author states that there is a big effort to brainwash by forcing students to watch only the movement's television channel and read its newspaper.²⁹³ Another article in Aydınlık Newspaper dated January 06th, 2012 tells a story about three students that were forced to stay in the dormitories and were obligated to sign a yearly contract. The students stated that the dormitories were missionary schools and they were approached to be converted to missionaries, however when they could not pay their rent, they ended up in court.²⁹⁴

The above mentioned profile forms the main reason of the controversy of Gülen inspired institutions by the modern laic circles. As seen from both articles, there is a heavy effort to educate a religious generation. However, it is debatable whether the only objective is to educate or influence the students. The community pays great importance to winning at least five or ten students from each school. This is why they choose especially poor children win their hearts by offering them things they will never have on their own and forcing them to perform salats and fasting. This contrast between what is being said and what is being done is suspicious. Education system of Turkey is being used politically. The community makes great effort not to go public. Like headhunters they are searching for poor, needy and uneducated people to include them in the community. If the main purpose was to create a Golden Generation it would not draw

²⁹³ İlker Akşit, "Cemaat Yurtlarında Öğrenci Olmak" (Being Student in Religious Community Guesthouses), 23.12.2011, Özgür Kocaeli, Acc. 10.08.2013 <http://www.ozgurkocaeli.com.tr/roportaj/cemaat-yurtlarinda-ogrenci-olmak-83824.html>

²⁹⁴ "3 Muhafazakar Genç Işık Evlerini Anlattı" (3 Conservative Youngsters Told Enlightenment Houses), 06.01.2012, Aydınlık, 08.08.2013 Acc. <http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/7361-3-muhafazakar-genc-iik-evlern-anlatt.html>

this much attention. It is seen that the concept is organized; the movement picks up the students who are more conservative and raise them to serve for the movement in different levels as missionaries. As a matter of fact, every year during the university registrations, missionaries of the movement try to attract the confused freshmen by accessible prices.²⁹⁵ This heavy repressive attitude of the movement members occasionally become a subject of conflict. According to the news, movement members tried to influence the freshmen by accusing the other dormitories with not providing secure conditions. In this frame, the protests of laic modern students against movement members in Middle East Technical University were not welcomed by the conservative media and parties.²⁹⁶ However, in this case again it is possible to see the classical victimhood argument of the religious conservatives in biased media.²⁹⁷

The most important polarization focus in Turkish social life was handled in *Education* section of the thesis. Since long years education has been used as a political tool by each party which came into power, but this is the first time that the religious conservatives have reached their long-lasting dream of being the majority in political power. As AKP came into power, they implemented the most drastic alterations on education with an objective of educating a religious generation and they immediately initiated the transformation. However, apparently the alterations do not reflect support of the entire society. While the alterations are done in favor of the religious society, basic needs of the laic society and the citizens from different faiths are excluded. Moreover, Turkish society gets more and more polarized each day and otherizes each other. Education system which is under heavy influence of the government is far from meeting the requirements of a peaceful and united Turkish society.

Even though education system has a heavy influence over the current polarization of Turkish society, it is not the only reason. One other focus is immigration and urban life. People from different societies live side by side in the same cities and same neighborhoods. This makes the conflicts inevitable. In this part of the thesis the effects of immigration on society will be reviewed.

²⁹⁵ “Kampüs Önü Öğrenci Kapma Savaşları” (Student Attraction Wars in front of the Campuses), 08.09.2013, Acc. 08.09.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/kampus_onu_ogrenci_kapma_savaslari-1149744

²⁹⁶ “ODTÜ’de Başörtülülerin Kovulması İnceleme” (Investigation to the Dismissal of the Veiled Ones), 06.09.2013, Radikal, Acc. 06.09.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/odtude_basortululerin_kovulmasina_inceleme-1149582

²⁹⁷ “ODTÜ’de Başörtülülere Faşist Baskı” (Fascistic Repression Against Veiled in ODTÜ), 05.09.2013, Star, Acc. 05.09.2013 <http://haber.stargazete.com/guncel/odtude-basortulu-ogrencilere-fasist-baski/haber-786741>

4.1.1.3. Urban Life and Migration

The industrialization phenomenon, which started in the 18th century in the developed countries, could only start in 1950's in Turkey. As the result of the industrialization movements, the major part of the population immigrated to nearest settlements first and as a result of improvements in the mass communication, rapid transportation and socio-economical improvement; the population agglomerated in a few principal locations.²⁹⁸

After 1950's, traditional and conservative members of the rural culture fled into urban areas with the hopes to have a better life standard. But while they were coming, they also brought their cultural values with themselves and because they were living in the same neighborhoods with their fellow countrymen, they could not adapt into the city.

At first they were considered to fit in the urban life in time, but this did not happen. Rapidly rising rural population in the cities drastically changed the social structure and this transformation carried the half urban-half rustic popular culture, accordingly the popular Islam, to the cities. New slums arose and old solidarity between neighbors, old lifestyle got disappeared in transformation of the tribal frame.²⁹⁹ Before the wave of immigrants in the late 1980's, high culture urban population was forming the majority in the cities. During the 1990's the conflict between the members of rural and urban cultures gradually transformed into a status struggle. Migrated religious conservatives urbanized with their traditional culture and when they started to attend schools, work in the urban culture, their differences caused conflict and they were otherized by the modern urban elites. As the conflict escalated, the society polarized gradually. The religious conservatives started to blame the laic system, Kemalist republican values and the urbanized modern elite for their otherization and they organized under the Islamist movements to claim their rights.

The migrants created the slums at the outskirts of the cities and as they were deprived of their social network and religious facilities, they tended to create a vernacular network in their neighborhoods with the help of Islamist movements. This

²⁹⁸ Mustafa Öztürk & Nihat Altuntepe, *Adaptation of the Migrants to Urban Life and Labor Market in Turkey*, Journal of Yaşar University, Vol. 3, No.11, 2008, p. 1587

²⁹⁹ op. cit., Roy, p. 81

was the element which defined Islamist parties' success. Resocialization was provided by mosques and foundations in slum neighborhoods. Social differentiation was taken as the main data and Islamic clubs and organizations were founded in order to rebuild traditional solidarity network.³⁰⁰

It is easy to recognize the low culture in the cities. Those are usually the circles which have large families that live in the slums with a minimum wage. The crime rates in these parts of the cities are higher. Slum parts of the city are in poor maintenance and the less educated people in these parts crave to become like those from the higher culture.

Following their settlement in 1980's Islamist masses became urbanized inhabitants through the help of their vernacular network, development of education and employment opportunities. In time, low culture migrants took the place of high culture urban citizens while noble families left the city's conflict and moved to suburbs.³⁰¹ The young intellectuals, who come from the families that were urbanized short time ago and were educated in western oriented state schools, form the cadres of Islamist parties.³⁰²

A new cultural model depending on financial power arose in these new cities. Modernism brought pride of the higher class and demands of poor people together which caused hostility against the West. Experiences told about Western culture raised the aim to commit sins. Therefore Islamists try to imprison themselves to a certain lifestyle and dignify virtue.³⁰³ Islamism's success lies beneath the opportunity that it gave to the youth, which was disappointed, to compensate this inequality.³⁰⁴ Embracement of Western culture brought the pleasure to a point which is impossible to reach.³⁰⁵

As it was mentioned above, the masses, which live in the rural areas or in the slums of cities, manifest their political and social demands with an Islamic identity in today's Turkey, take their power from the rustic popular Islam. These circles bring popular Islam out as an opposing identity against the ruling elite. By the access of 2nd or 3rd generations that migrated from the rural and settled in the cities into leadership positions in education, politics, and bureaucracy; Islam that was eliminated by the

³⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p.p. 84-85

³⁰¹ *ibid.*, p. 81

³⁰² *ibid.*, p. 76

³⁰³ *ibid.*, p. 84

³⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p. 83

³⁰⁵ *loc. cit.*

reforms again gained ground in public space. This is the situation that laic circles characterize as political reaction. The majority of the society that was not heard since the single-party period demands their rights now. Their struggle with the laic circles is for not losing the benefits they obtained since now.³⁰⁶

Urbanization is the transformation process that social change causes on the behaviors, social relations, values, economical and moral lifestyles of individuals as a result of the civic progress. It has two aspects which are social and economical urbanization.³⁰⁷

As the rural migrants did not have the necessary features to adapt to the urban life, they had difficulties to identify their new habitat that they migrated. That is why the primary relations such as fellow countrymanship, neighborliness relations exist. This process concomitantly brings the clientelist relations.³⁰⁸

The migrant population has been increasingly stamping its presence onto the city in physical and social terms, and the migrants have become major actors in politics, especially in local politics. In time, the city has produced its subcultures.³⁰⁹

The migrant community acts as a means of granting an identity to the migrant in cosmopolitan atmosphere of the city. In Turkey, fellow countrymanship operates as a mechanism of membership to a particular group of people with similar origins. If fellow countrymanship is regarded as an identity category for migrants separating migrants from others; the requirement for the membership is being a rural migrant in the city. For those living in slums, fellow countrymanship mainly becomes a means of separating the established urban population from the population of rural origins. In order to benefit from the offers of the network they have to emphasize their associations with their rural backgrounds. As it is seen, this structure explains how and why the Islamist movement became powerful among the migrants. The migrants preferred to stay as a closed community in the first years of their migration and in order to benefit from the fellow countrymanship network they needed to communize in their neighborhoods. As Islam also shares the traditional values, the Islamist network was easily accepted among the migrants. However, it is also known that religion is more valued in the rural areas of the

³⁰⁶ See Above: Islamic Opposition to Kemalist Modernization

³⁰⁷ Kemal Kartal, "Kentleşmenin Ekonomik ve Sosyal Maliyeti" (Economical and Social Cost of Urbanization), *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol. 16, Is. 4, December 1983, p. 92

³⁰⁸ Mübeccel Kiray, *Kentleşme Yazıları (Stories on Urbanization)*, İstanbul: Bağlam, 1998, p.p. 185-187

³⁰⁹ Tahire Erman, *Becoming Urban or Remaining Rural: The Views of Turkish Rural-to-Urban Migrants on the Integration Question*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, Is. 4, Nov. 1998, p. 542

world. In this sense, it would be correct to say that affection of the migrants to religion is also a sociological fact.

On the other hand, this analyze also proves how the society was polarized and marginalized gradually. As the migrants arrived in the city, they increasingly changed the social fabric of the cities. Urban culture was intensively affected by the rural culture and thus a popular culture which is a mixture of urban and rural cultures emerged. This popular culture also included a type of popular and urbanized Islam understanding. While the migrants were closing themselves into their own local networks, they forgot about the outside world and avoided to integrate to the urban society. Therefore, members of the urban culture were anxious about the results of this transformation could bring to their social and business life and thus the otherization process was started by the both sides. Even though both sides had many differences such as urban-rural, modern-traditional, religious conservative-social democrat, Islamist-laic; most of the differences reconciled through the assimilation process. Traditional people started to adapt to the urban life through their schools or jobs, in time the people started to be more liberal and democrat, they were modernized; but identity of the people in Islamist and laic axis never changed. The migrant groups brought their religious identities with themselves to the cities that which were thought to assimilate in time and importance of religion would decrease, but this never happened. Instead, the low culture embraced religion and modernism together; started to modernize with Islam. This lead to the transformation of Islamist parties to a more moderate form and stabilize their legitimacy in politics.

Those migrants who experienced economic betterment and wanted to integrate into the urban middle classes without breaking their ties with their villagers felt the need to prove to other migrants that they were not changed.³¹⁰ They strongly opted for keeping their identities alive and not to deny their villager past. This also showed itself in the social life of the migrants. When they went to their villages, they needed to fit in the village codes and to the city codes when in the city. Thus, they formed a different identity group. They continued to remain rural depending on the case. Tahire Erman cites the thoughts of a migrant woman in her research as follows:

³¹⁰ loc. cit.

“Once when I was cleaning the house, I saw my brother-in-law climbing up the hill. He had just come from the village to visit us. I was wearing a dress with short sleeves, and my hair was uncovered. I was afraid that he would see me like that. I rushed into the house, changed my dress and covered my hair.”³¹¹

These thoughts give an idea about the role of the rural community. It emerges as a tool of psychological support to the new migrants, but also as a mechanism of social control especially for the women. It shows that gender plays an important role in the rural society and chastity of the women is seen as the decency of whole family or community. Therefore, this finding explains why the urban society was otherized by the rural society and why the society is this polarized at the present day. There is the saying “neighborhood pressure” in Turkish. This saying is used when the others pressurize somebody with their behaviors and speeches. For example kissing in the streets or drinking alcohol can be a conflict between the traditional and modern cultures. This pressure is highly related to the mentality of societies. In this sense, traditional rural circles clearly limit the freedom of the urbanites by threatening their freedom.

Tahire Erman states that the research on Turkish society points the role of bureaucratic and military elites in the modernization project carried out by the state³¹², more strictly in the early republican era. Moreover she mentions that the elites attempted to transform the society into a modern, secular and democratic one oriented to the West, and they tended to legitimize their leadership in this transformation via the evolutionary-positivist view of development in which those “who knew the truth” (those who were educated about the laws of the society) had the responsibility to go to the masses to educate them.³¹³ Moreover, she states that some political scientists regard the elites as the motor of social change toward a democratic and secular society, by which they mean a tendency of a small, privileged sector to dominate society, and consciously or unconsciously to regard its domination as legitimate and desirable because of the cultural or intellectual inadequacy it attributes to non-elite elements.”³¹⁴ Even though the class structure was highly based on the leadership of urban elites until the end of last decade, election of AKP in 2002 completely changed the balance in favor of traditional, religious conservative society as a result of the rise of political Islam as an opposing socio-political project. As mentioned before, this increasing otherization between the

³¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 547

³¹² *loc. cit.*

³¹³ *ibid.*, p. 542

³¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 547

urban moderns and modernized conservatives and their scramble for political power should be taken into consideration while studying the reasons of polarization.

The higher quality of the urban elites in terms of education, culture and knowledge as well as their material and power advantage has been a distinguishing feature between them and the rural migrants. Tahire Erman states that while the first generation migrants emphasized the first point in her research, the second generations emphasized the latter. According to the research while first generation feels uncomfortable with socializing with urbanites because of not being able to act free like them and not sharing the same values; the second generations stated that urbanites does not accept rural migrants as a part of them as they do not want to discredit themselves.³¹⁵ She cites the thoughts of a young migrant student in one of the interviews:

“Of course, we experience exclusion. Look at the Cankaya (an upper-class district) youth who imitate Western culture. They definitely pretend that our people do not exist, they reject them. I cannot be friends with them. I cannot listen to the same music they listen to. Yet, I can live together with them if I am put in a room, but they cannot live with me. Why? Because they are conceited, they put on airs; they are inclined to look down on people like me.”³¹⁶

These words of the student explain the polarization between the urbanites and rural circles at his school. However, this situation widely changed in the 2000's. It is true that these people were excluded in the first years of their arrival; however as a result of the changing balances they were able to access the high class society through their Islamist clientelist network.

The Islamist project is also based on leadership of the educated elites, their elite lifestyles and showing their lifestyles as a model such as in Kemalist social engineering's top-down model. Nilüfer Göle states that the present actors of Islamism are the university students, future intellectuals, self employed professionals and new elites rather than the uneducated masses which are marginal and unsuccessful on reaching their objectives.³¹⁷

According to White, the Islamists use cultural symbols such as veiling in a strategic and deliberative frame in order to achieve a social genuineness. They strived for associating the social behaviors such as veiling and gender discrimination with

³¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 548

³¹⁶ *ibid.*

³¹⁷ *op. cit.*, White, p. 353

urban/modern/educated meaning combination, thus challenging the social hierarchies which related these behaviors with rural/reactionist/uneducated/slum concepts. Thus, this approach has elitized this behavior and provided a connective cultural demonstrator between the Islamist parties and the Islamist movement.

The differentiation between the prevalent Muslim practices and elite Islamist practices expresses the efforts to step out of proletarianism as a result of the identification of cultural differences with class discrimination in Turkey. However, members of the Islamist elite are the least suffering circles of this polarization as they already obtained a social statute in life through their education, occupation or political activities. The real victims of this polarization are the lower class proletarians which still live in the slums of the city. As their income is not enough, they usually are used as political means by the elite Islamists in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamist movements and parties. These Islamist elites give these lower class citizens what they cannot afford to buy and thus force them voting for Islamist parties. As the lower class citizens are in needy conditions, most of the time they perform a self-seeking attitude and search for what is beneficial to them. The assistance can be given them in many ways by the Islamist movements. For instance, it can be assistance of supplies, home appliances, educational or vocational courses, deductions from their taxes and it can even be a full day at the rallies of Islamist parties with all expenses covered such as transportation, food and extra pocket money for spending the day at the meeting. This is the main reason for the lower class society to be attracted to the Islamist parties. Usually this aid is provided through the party funds, companies supporting the Islamist movement or sometimes the government funds. As it is seen, this competition definitely is not fair; in one hand there are the people who pay their taxes and try to survive without assistance while the groups which vote for Islamist parties are rewarded as well as the Islamist elite which use the lower classes.

One of the parties which attracts supporters by the assistance given is AKP. According to the article of Radikal Newspaper, Governorship of Tekirdağ gave 50 Turkish Liras just one day before AKP rally in the city.³¹⁸ Another article from AKP's

³¹⁸ "Tekirdağ'da AKP Mitingi Öncesi Para Dağıtıldı" (Money was Given a Day Before AKP's Tekirdağ Rally), 16.03.2009, Radikal, Acc. 05.07.2013
http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/tekirdagda_akp_mitingi_onesi_para_dagitildi-926433

newsletter states that 20,000 students were financially assisted.³¹⁹ T24 Internet Newspaper states that the coal assistance of AKP which especially peaks before the election periods has reached to 13.6 tons between 2003-2011 periods which was 185.6 % more than 2003 data. 1.9 million packages of coal were distributed by AKP only in 2009.³²⁰ However, another article from Milliyet Newspaper states that MHP office in Turgutlu detected that the coal assistance which was done by the district governorship was distributed through the trucks which belonged to AKP-run municipality and this caused an unfair propaganda as it created the perception as the assistance was done directly by AKP rather than the state. The article states that the MHP organization at the town was furious about the situation and claimed that AKP only cared about the votes they would get as the scandal occurred right before the elections.³²¹ According to Sol Newspaper, the checks for financial aid which were distributed in Batman right before the elections were overdraft. Following the local elections in 2009, the people which went to the banks in order to liquidate their money, were told that the accounts were closed and could not get their money. The newspaper states that AKP was punishing the people because it lost the elections against another party at Batman and the aid was an election bribe of AKP.³²² On the other hand, OdaTV Internet Newspaper states that Zorlu Holding, which is one of the biggest holdings in Turkey, donated 40,000 support packages for Ramadan month to be handed to AKP Women Branch. Total of the aid was 1,844,000 Turkish Liras. Moreover, article criticizes AKP for turning the Ramadan month into a political show by providing iftar³²³ banquets through the assistance of AKP organization itself and it mentions the anxiety about capital groups to be forced to AKP partisanship through stricter controls of Ministry of Finances over the companies which do not share the same ideology with the government. Besides, the article

³¹⁹ “20 Bin Öğrenciye Eğitim Yardımı” (Education Assistance for 20,000 Students), 17.09.2011, AKP Newsletter, Acc. 05.07.2013 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/20-bin-ogrenciye-egitim-yardimi/12998>

³²⁰ “AKP 8 Yılda 13,6 Ton Kömür Dağıttı (AKP Distributed 13.6 Tons of Coal in 8 Years), T24, Acc. 04.07.2013 www.t24.com.tr/haber/akp-8-yilda-136-ton-komur-dagititi/211012

³²¹ “Fotoğraflı Tespit Yapan MHP’den Suç Duyurusu” (Criminal Complaint from MHP that Made Photo-Detection), 03.03.2009, Milliyet, Acc. 04.07.2013 <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/fotografli-tespit-yapan-mhp-den-suc-duyurusu/siyaset/siyasetdetay/03.03.2009/1066612/default.htm>

³²² “AKP Yardımları Karşılıksız Çıktı” (AKP Assistance was Overdraft), 04.04.2009, Sol, Acc. 04.07.2013 <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/akp-yardimlari-karsiliksiz-cikti-haberi-12506>

³²³ See Also: Glossary

underlines that the aid was 60 times of the legal limit which should be 30,710.36 Turkish Liras in maximum according to the Code of Political Parties.³²⁴

As it is seen from the newspaper articles, Islamist elites only remember the rural migrants when they need their votes. This leads to the abuse of religion by taking advantage of the lower classes' needy conditions. Parties which take religion as their official program try to attract people through the Islamist rhetoric.

4.1.2. Political Parties and Politics

A very intensive polarization in Turkish society takes place at the present day. There is a predictable positioning about issues. For instance when somebody speaks about the political situation in the country, they can at least predict what type of an attitude they have to expect from the other side. Because it is supposed that the other side lost their objectivity and equanimity towards the discussed subject, has prejudice while evaluating the situation according to their position and their remark is an outcome of this prejudice and position.

Nobody denies that this tension is not a polarization. However, while everybody thinks that they are the only ones that can make sensible critics; they blame the others with not being objective or being biased. Even this manner is an example, reason and result of the polarization in Turkey.

Naturally the most common spheres that this argument can be noticed are media and politics. There is a political perception which doing politics depends on an arrogant manner with almost no negotiation and persuasion efforts. It is very interesting that the media also is a part of this polarization.

At the end, politics is the process of reconciling different or rival interests and demands in the society. Political parties are the primary elements of this process. It can be said that political parties should reconcile the state with citizens and politics with daily life. Political parties are the organizations which reflect the society's daily needs and demands to the decision making mechanisms, negotiating with the other political

³²⁴ "Bu da Yardım Lobisi" (And This is the Assistance Lobby), 27.07.2013, OdaTV, Acc. 27.07.2013 <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=al-sana-faiz-lobisi-2707131200>

parties and demand groups, striving for finding solutions to these demands and needs in the pos-reconciliation period.

The political parties which are the primary elements of politics demonstrate a top-down structure as a result of westernization efforts. As the system is based on a top-down strategy instead of being formed through demands of the society, parties do not take their source from the needs and demands of the society; on the contrary foundation of a political party depends on organization of a group of people around an ideology. A new political party emerges and exists traditionally under control of the leader and small group of people around the leader instead of cultural and social differences or variation of demands and needs. Followingly, this cadre and political ideas are tried to relate to society's demands and needs. As the system works adversely, the ideological transformation and evolution of cadres does not happen through the natural ways.

However, when the situations like state intervention through the laws, its restriction or even prohibition are articulated to this system parties institutionalize and neglect to produce self-renovation mechanisms. Therefore, parties which embrace the citizens and search for their needs and demands do not arise.

Parties live on and exist through the power and resources of the state. As a result of this perception, political ground focuses on seizing all potential of the state. Political ground evolves on how to seize the state mechanisms and share them rather than the demands of society.

Naturally, this kind of a structure produces an unhealthy political style. Main understanding which dominates the political method does not evolve on understanding different demands and needs, negotiation, persuasion and reconciliation. The rivalry of seizing the power and interest mechanisms causes an aggressive and intolerant political environment. Aggressive environment of the last sixty years does not rise because of the aggressive personalities of the politicians; instead this model necessitates the cadres that can keep up with such kind of a political style.

However, this situation also produces different issues. Moreover, as their top-down organization, this aggressive attitude and style spreads first to their organization, then to their supporters, the society and daily life. Eventually political parties which should be the subjects of compromise become the subjects and reasons of social polarization.

As the simple citizens cannot find a place for themselves in the political life, they start not to trust political parties. All researches made on the subject state that citizens are not happy with general functioning of political system. Citizens believe that parties do not fulfill the responsibility of their role, they only follow up the interests of people that are close to the political party and do not represent their electorates. As a result of this situation, people fall into despair with the political system, ignore the issues, lose motivation to struggle for the common good and even try to resolve their individual issues through unlawful ways. When Study A is analyzed, it is possible to see the evidence of this situation. In graphic A-1, the responses to “Which party can resolve the biggest and most urgent issues of Turkey?” as “new parties are necessary” by 5 % and “these issues remain unresolved” by 4 % of the participants indicate that the society lost its hopes on politics.

According to Graphic A-2, when “Which institution do you trust the most?” question is asked to the simple citizens, the ones provide a political actor form only 10 % of the society and the individuals that do not trust on any institutions form 24 %. Moreover, existence of a social segment that does not trust on any institutions and lost hopes on politics which forms approximately one fourth of the participants is another big issue.

On the other hand, Graphic B-17 shows that 53.13 % of the participants of Study B state that they do not participate in political activities while 43.75 % participate. This shows that the participants are almost divided in half on participating in political activities.

The same question was asked to the subjects who participated in Study C. Subject 2 responded as: “I think I have a lot to do in this area and therefore I perform political activities. I worked on several platforms.” while Subject 1 responded as:

“We always supported CHP as a family, so I was raised with the ideology of Atatürk since my childhood. I did not join political activities that much during the university period, I went to the meetings of CHP for a few times in Ankara. After my graduation, I joined the Atatürkist Thought Association’s activities, but apart from that I was not very into the politics. [...] It was an association, not a political party. But I do not think the association is that neutral; even though they do not have an organic link with CHP they are still linked in a way.”

In the answers given to this question proof of the statement above can be seen. Subject 1 stated that she is not that much interested in politics while Subject 2 states that she makes a part of political platforms. As Subject 2 mentioned before the interview, she

works for AKP Youth Branch in order to defend her opinions. Thus, also another conclusion could be reached about the political attitudes of individuals through analyzing this question. While Subject 1 who has a laic and consequently a relatively left worldview states that she is tired of politics, Subject 2 is very interested in politics. This attitude can interrelate with the actual decline in left politics while religious conservative liberal though has showed a development in the recent years.

Objective of Graphic B-13 is to see if the participants of Study B are satisfied with the current AKP government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the participants are not happy with the government. It is certain that the recent polarization affected government's reputation such as prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan's fierce attitude against people that were concerned about the implementations against laicism, government's strict attitude towards military officers and Ergenekon Case, government's attitude towards Syrian civil war, abatement of action about Madımak Hotel victims, legislation of the code letting imam-hatip graduates to be admitted in the faculties other than theology faculties, arrest of journalists.

It is seen that 36.88 % of the participants define themselves as democrats while 30 % claim that they are socialists according to Graphic B-11. It is strange to see that liberalists only form 15 % of the participants. On the other hand religious conservatives form the smallest cluster with 3.75 % in Study B. When this question is analyzed along with question Graphic B-8, it is seen that there are different perspectives in each political group. According to the statistics we can presume that especially CHP shelters liberal, socialist and democrat groups within it.

When which ideology they support is asked to the participants of Study C, again it is possible to see the polarization between two subjects. Subject 2 responded as "I define myself as a democrat indeed. My parents are a bit conservative in family life, but they are also democrats as a political ideology." while Subject 1 mentioned:

"There was a big impact of my family in determining my ideology. We were supporting CHP and Kemalist ideology. For example when I was at the university I was staying in the university dormitories, at first my father did not want to send me there, because he was concerned that I would veil myself as a result of being affected by the main atmosphere there. He thought the religious fanatics there might influence me and we argued about this several times. These incidents have a major influence on determining my ideology. However, when I joined the association after the university, I realized that I was not Kemalist. I think it is incorrect to sanctify his ideology. Respecting his thought and sanctifying his ideology are different things."

It is seen that Subject 2 considers herself as a democrat even though her family is relatively conservative. However, as it was handled before, not defining themselves as Islamist or conservative but as democrat is a general feature of AKP partisans. This reflects the diversity of party grassroots. On the other hand, Subject 1 mentioned that her ideology was generally determined by her family. So, it can be said that Subject 1's family tried to draw the line she has to obey. But, also considering that Subject 2's family is conservative and herself also embraces conservative values; it can be thought that family has a big influence on defining ideology of the individuals. As a matter of fact, Graphic B-22 proves proposition. However, it is seen that Subject 1 started to dislike the political ideology which was imposed on her after she became an active member in politics.

Consecutively, their political party preference was asked to the participants of Study C. Subject 1 said that she had voted for CHP at the last elections, but did not want to vote in the next as there was no party which she felt close to. On the other hand, Subject 2 was confident about her choice and mentioned that she voted for AKP. Besides, she stated that everybody should be comfortable to speak about their political preference.

As mentioned before, especially during the Cold War period Turkey was gradually transformed into a country which was seen as a base for political Islam model of USA in order to create an isolation line against communism threat. In the light of this information, it is asked if the subjects of Study C think that Turkey is still imposed to be a model for the region countries. Subject 1 mentions that she finds this situation worrisome and adds that she perceives it more as a conspiracy theory; she says that she does not want to think that deep. But, she carries on as in the following:

“Such kind of incidents does not arise beyond the desire of the West. For instance, Mubarak was supported by USA; but at the point that he completed his mission, he was overthrown and manifestations started followingly. For this reason, I suspect the incidents are only for democracy.”

When the same question was directed to Subject 2, she answered as:

“I do not think that external powers have an influence on that, this situation is peculiar to Turkey. Turkey is an example country where the people following different faiths live together in a democratic and laic system. The messages, which our prime-minister gave in his visits to Middle East in the recent past, show that Turkey is ascending as an example country. The struggle of the people in other countries shows that. I absolutely do not think that the external powers have an influence on that, because Turkey is an independent country and it progresses in a good way. Therefore it does not need orientation.”

Subject 1 mentions that she does not think much on conspiracy theories, but she also states that the uprising in Egypt was an incident that was planned by the West. On the other hand, Subject 2 emphasizes that Turkey was definitely not influenced by the external powers and the so called democratization process was peculiar to Turkey.

In this part, politicization process of Turkish society and different attitudes towards political parties were handled. According to the findings that were collected in different researches and short evaluation of the polarization focuses, it is obviously seen that Turkish society suffers a great social and political polarization which gradually radicalize the different poles. In the next part of the thesis, recent political disputes and opinion of the society will be handled.

4.2. POLITICAL DISPUTES

Political disputes are the main reason for the polarization in Turkish society. As the system is based on seizing the government, rivalry of the parties often cause conflicts in society as each party desires to govern according to its own ideology. In this sense, major disputes are the corruption, Ergenekon Case, Shari'a, military intervention and seizure of judiciary system in Turkey. This part will provide an overview of these conflicts.

4.2.1. Public Opinion about Political Disputes

In this part, a short summary of the findings of Study A on public opinion about recent political disputes will be reflected.

- When the general opinion of the participants on preparation of a new constitution is asked, 55.8 % of the participants consider it as a correct and necessary step towards democratization while 44.2 % consider it as a step of the political power towards a civil dictatorship.
- When their opinion is asked about Ergenekon Case, 56.5 % of the participants responded that the government was fighting with the illegal networks while 43.5 % consider that the government was punishing its opposers.

- When their opinion is asked about the tension between the government and the higher judiciary institutions, 53 % of the participants consider that the government was interfering in the juridical affairs while 47 % consider that the government was not interfering.
- While 29.3 % of the participants consider that military coup was the highest threat, 17.1 % consider that religious reactionism was the highest threat. While 44.5 % of the participants consider that they were both threats, according to the 9.1 % none of them were considered as threats.
- The ones that are anxious about establishment of Shari'a rule were 40 %, while the ones that are not anxious are 46.2 %.
- While the idea of military intervention is supported by 28.5 %, 47.1 % of the participants are against an intervention.
- While the 57.1 % of the participants think that political parties could be closed in case of necessity, 30.3 % of the participants are against closure of parties.
- While 55.2 % of the participants believed that many important reforms were done during the AKP term, 23.2 % of the society was thinking the opposite way.
- While 38.1 % of the individuals believe that religious reactionism increased during the AKP term, the individuals who think on the contrary are 42.5 %.

4.2.2. Recent Political Disputes

If the opinions regarding the current political discussions are taken into consideration, it is seen that the society is divided in almost all subjects. Therefore, the reasons and demographic characteristics of this dissolution should be investigated.

As a result of the research, analyzing the responses to some questions through main groups based on gender, age or location may not be enough to explain the reasons of dissolution in the society; however other differences such as being Kurdish or Alevi, veiled or unveiled give clues about the changes in results on some issues. For example Kurdish people are strongly against closure of parties or Alevis are more anxious about the establishment of Shari'a rule. Nevertheless, even those differences do not have a common basis to explain the dissolution in all questions.

On the contrary two basic data are enough to explain all response groups. These data are educational level and political preference, which means those two directly affect the ideas and opinions of people in many subjects.

4.2.2.1. Amendments on Constitution

As it was seen in the previous chapters of the thesis, Islamist and religious conservative circles are the most affected circles by the previous constitutions which bore laic-Kemalist nature. 1982 Constitution was the most repressive constitution ever in Turkish history. Its repressive nature was an outcome of the left-right conflict in 1970's and rising Islamist movements. However, this repressive nature of the constitution which presents various restrictions on the ideology of religious conservative and Islamist society were never welcomed by these circles and gradually became one of the main focuses which triggered polarization in the society.

Changing the articles of 1982 Constitution which bore a repressive nature and limit freedoms was one of the election promises of AKP in 2007 General Elections.³²⁵ However, its initiatives to implement the changes were interrupted by the closure case which was held against the party. Following the decision of Constitutional Court in favor of AKP, its first implementation had been the amendments of constitution.

Thus, President Abdullah Gül submitted the amendment package to the public vote on February 12th, 2010. Main aim of the package was to eliminate the unfair practices of 1982 Constitution. The amendments were first voted at the parliament. While CHP, BDP and MHP stood against the amendments, AKP and SP stood for and the package was approved with 336 votes in favor against 72. Followingly, the amendments were presented to a referendum and were approved through receiving 57.88 % of the votes in favor and 42.12 % against. Referendum was highly supported by the group which called themselves as "Not Enough, but Yes". This slogan gradually became the main rhetoric of AKP's campaign. The slogan was embraced by the circles which had thought that the alterations were not enough and a new constitution was needed or the circles that strived for the elimination of repressive factors in the

³²⁵ "AKP Seçim Beyannamesini Açıkladı" (AKP Announced Its Election Proclamation), 24.06.2007, Haber 7, Acc. 12.08/.2013 <http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/250752-akp-secim-beyannamesini-acikladi>

constitution no matter how which were in favor of the generals that organized the coup. Therefore, it can be said that the amendments gained a very broad social stratum.

However, the constitution was protested inclemently by the laic, traditional conservative and Kurdish left-wing alleging AKP with promoting every alteration as reform while they were consolidating AKP's political power but not emancipating the society. İlker Kılıç states that these so-called implementations were stating the obvious by reimplementing the facts which were already established through international agreements, doctrines and jurisprudences while deluding the society in his article. Moreover, he states that as enjoying freedoms depend on the level of repression of each government, changing the constitution does not mean that the freedoms will definitely be assured.³²⁶

As a matter of fact, many people criticized AKP for hiding its real aim. Apart from the alterations, the package was also providing alterations on the principals that the political parties should respect which clearly was an alteration in favor of AKP. The change on the 69th article of the constitution bereaved the right to execute audit mandate from Constitutional Court which meant the elimination of Constitutional Court's right to present financial cases against political parties. The alterations in this article resolved that a closure case against a political party could be only presented through taking the permission of a commission formed under the parliament.³²⁷

The package also eliminated the sentence below from 68th article of the constitution:

"The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to promote or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime."³²⁸

As it can be seen, this sentence was regulating the enforcements against the acts to the laic and democratic nature of the state. Thus, the political power was given the possibility to act against the laic nature of the state and even to declare a dictatorship.

Also, alterations on the 68th article prevented the closure of the political parties

³²⁶ İlker Kılıç, "İşte Anayasa Paketi'nin Madde Madde Analizi" (Here is the Clause-by-Clause Analysis of the Constitution Package), 22.03.2010, Oda TV, Acc. 05.08.2013 <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=iste-anayasa-paketinin-madde-madde-analizi-2203101200>

³²⁷ "Anayasa Değişiklik Paketi" (Constitution Amendment Pack), Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/anayasa_degisiklik_teklifi.pdf

³²⁸ "Anayasa" (The Constitution), Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf

permanently, deprivation of political parties from financial aid without presenting a closure case, eliminated the paragraph about reestablishing a party which replaces a closed party, decreased the stipulated period of banishment for the members of a closed political party; alterations on 84th article prevented the annulment of deputyship of a parliament member even if the deputy's party gets closed; alterations on 125th article enabled the soldiers which were cashiered from the military due to their anti-laic acts during February 28 period to sue the military for remitter and deprived the legal system of its rights to inspect decisions of the executive power if they are suitable to the constitution. Exclusion of premonition and reprimand penalties of civil servants from the legal inspection was eliminated through the alterations on 129th article; this enabled the civil servants who were dismissed from the civil institutions due to their anti-laic acts to sue the state and return back to their occupation.³²⁹

Alterations on 145th article removed the obstacles in front of judgment of the military officers in the civil courts. This was the article which made judgment of the responsible generals February 28 period and all other times possible. Even though this looks as a progress, objectivity of the legal system is debatable as the alterations on the 146th and 159th articles which politicized the jurisdiction created a biased legal system through increasing the influence of the president of republic on selection process of the members of Constitutional Court and Judges and Prosecutors Higher Council which regulates the basic principles of admission, assignation, relocation and disciplinary action of judges and prosecutors.³³⁰

Moreover, alterations on 159th article were changed in the means to permit the judges and prosecutors to be trialed for their decisions and gave the possibility to sue the state on previous dismissals from profession for anti-laic acts and return back to their profession. Through the abolishment of provisional 15th article judgment of the responsible generals of 1980 Military Coup became possible.³³¹

When all the amendments are considered in relation to each other, it is seen that this constitution package meant more than a reform for Islamists. However, it is also quite worrying for laic circles as the current government is quite far from giving objective decisions as it is acting with the concern of taking the revenge of previous

³²⁹ op. cit. Anayasa Değişikilik...

³³⁰ loc. cit.

³³¹ loc. cit.

incidents. As a matter of fact, immediate investigation and arrestment of the opposing generals that are responsible of February 28, journalists, students and politicians with the allegation of organizing a military coup shows the nonobjectivity of the religious conservatives. Political power's self-seeking attitude has a great impact on polarization of Turkish society. Moreover, AKP deputy Burhan Kuzu stated that another closure case against AKP was in agenda of the Constitutional Court if the amendments on constitution were not done.³³² This statement implicitly indicates the motivation of AKP on implementing the changes hastily.

Also AKP's implementation of the so-called reforms that only concerns itself with a self-seeking attitude since it came into power in 2002 is very thought-provoking. Such kind of events decreases credibility of the political power among laic and traditional conservative circles. AKP gave political promises in 2002 which are still on standby. One of the most important ones was abolishing the election threshold which was also implemented through the military power in 1982 and is the highest rate in Europe with 10 %.³³³ However, the political power acts reluctant on bringing into agenda as it knows that eliminating the threshold would decrease its votes in elections. Some of the other promises which were made but not implemented were transparency on expenses of politicians and political parties, augmentation of parliamentary system³³⁴ and abolishing the Higher Education Council which was established in 1980 Military Coup. On the other hand it made amendments on the constitution, changed education system and implemented alterations on the constitution in order to provide dressing liberty at universities. It is seen that most of the implementations were in favor of the political power.

When Graphic A-3 is analyzed in terms of political party partisanship, it is possible to see polarization of the society based on the polemical revision of constitution. It can be seen that 89 % of AKP supporters considered it as a requirement of democratization, 86 % of CHP and 76 % of MHP supporters mentioned that it was an

³³² "Burhan Kuzu: Anayasa Değişikliği Olmasaydı AKP'ye Kapatma Davası Açılacaktı" (Burhan Kuzu: If Constitutional Amendments were not Implemented Another Closure Case was to be Opened against AKP), 22.08.2013, Zaman, Acc. 28.08.2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_burhan-kuzu-anayasa-degisikligi-olmasaydi-ak-partiye-kapatma-davasi-acilacakti_2122612.html

³³³ "Avrupa'da En Yüksek Seçim Barajı Türkiye'de" (The Highest Electoral Threshold is in Turkey in Europe), 14.08.2011, Milliyet, Acc. 08.08.2013 <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/avrupa-da-en-yukse-secim-baraji-turkiye-de/siyaset/siyasetdetay/14.08.2011/1426614/default.htm>

³³⁴ Mehmet Tezkan, "AKP'nin Vaatleri İnandırıcı Değil" (AKP's Promises are not Creditable), 17.04.2011, Milliyet, Acc. 09.08.2013 <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/akp-nin-vaatleri-inandirici-degil/gundem/gundemyazardetay/18.04.2011/1379053/default.htm>

indication of progress towards a civil dictatorship according to Graphic A-3. While the neutrals and the ones indicate that they would not vote were more moderate and cautious, SP electorates were more approximate to AKP and electorates of other parties were more approximate to CHP and MHP bloc.

4.2.2.2. Corruption in Politics

In the recent years Islamists' name has been commemorated with a series of incidents which were considered as corruption by the laic circles. Some of the The most important of those was Deniz Feneri Case. Deniz Feneri Organization is an Islamic charitable foundation which operates in Turkey and Germany. German authorities detected that 41 million euros of the donations were utilized for non-assistive purposes. Thus, the executive board of the foundation received imprisonment on September 17th, 2007 and its properties were transferred to the German public treasury. Officials from the Turkish branch of the organization stated that both organizations did not have an organic link, thus they set the charges against them aside. Also AKP and Erdoğan were accused in scope of the lawsuit. CHP deputy Ali Kılıç mentioned that Erdoğan's name was also in the bill of indictment of German authorities as the prime suspect of the incident. Moreover, Kılıç claimed that it was also reported that Erdoğan received a part of the money to assist Milli Görüş and other Islamist organizations in Turkey.³³⁵

Another debated topic was the ship that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's son bought. He was criticized and invited to specify the source of his funds. Later, on a talk-show program, Erdoğan stated that the one his son bought was not a ship; it was a "small ship".³³⁶ However, the article on Sözcü newspaper proved that the ship in question was not a "small ship", but a proper ship. Moreover, article states that Erdoğan's son recently bought another ship and invites prime minister's son to explain how he can carry on his business successfully while other companies bankrupt one by one.³³⁷

According to the article of Hürriyet Newspaper dated January 27th, 2006, the then Minister of Finances, Kemal Unakıtan, violated the laws through constructing

³³⁵ "CHP'li Ali Kılıç'tan Yeni Deniz Feneri İddiaları" (New Deniz Feneri Allagations from Ali Kılıç of CHP), 13.05.2009, Radikal, Acc. 08.08.2013

http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/chpli_ali_kilictan_yeni_deniz_feneri_iddialari-935728

³³⁶ Seçim 2007, NTV

³³⁷ "Gemicikler Para Basıyor" (Small Ships Print Money), 03.08.2013, Sözcü, Acc. 09.08.2013 <http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gundem/gemicikler-para-basiyor-347635/>

villas which were higher than the permitted quota for an area and faced with the enforcement of demolition. However, mysteriously the zoning plan was changed, villas were maintained and two members of the municipal council who opposed to the alteration of regulation were dismissed in a month. Article states that the seal which was stamped by the municipal officers was removed three times which was found unlawful by the authorities.³³⁸ Kemal Unakıtan's name was also involved in other corruption incidents such as changing trade quotas to facilitate his son's merchandise and fraudulent sale of a real property to his enterprise.

In 2002 Erdoğan was accused of tax fraud and a lawsuit was presented against him. As a result of the fiscal investigations it was claimed that he had 256,138,000 Turkish liras of unstated difference on his declarations of property between 1998 and 2001. He was trialed with the solicitation of imprisonment of 5 years. Nevertheless, following his premiership the case was mysteriously closed in his favor.³³⁹

According to another article on Yeniçağ Newspaper, AKP government contracted 219 tenders for highway construction to its partisans in the first 13 days of its rulership; privatized and contracted a paper mill, textile factory, fertilizer factory, petrol refinery, port, hotel, a valuable public property to its partisans; contracted the renovation of train stations and insurance of the vehicles of a municipality to its partisans; took no action against 1 quadrillion Turkish liras of fictitious export on textile industry; collaborated with a medical factory on a fraudulent tender; privatized two telecom companies for ridiculous prices and contracted a news channel and newspaper to AKP partisans during its political power since 2002.³⁴⁰ These are said to be a small part of the corruptions in politics. While the fraudulent activities are disturbing enough no matter which ideology the people share, performance of it as a habit by a party which embraces Islamic values is unacceptable.

Keeping the information above in mind, participants of Study C are asked what they think about the critics. Subject 1 responded:

³³⁸ "Unakıtan'ın Kaçak Villaları Kurtarıldı" (Unakıtan's Illegal Villas were Rescued), 27.01.2006, Hürriyet, Acc. 09.08.2013 <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3851921>

³³⁹ "Hazine Soracak: Nereden Buldunuz?" (Undersecretariat of National Treasury will Ask: Where did You Find It?), Milliyet, 26.12.2002, p. 18

³⁴⁰ Selcan Taşçı, "Manşetlerin sakladığı Türkiye Gerçeği: Köşe Bucak Yolsuzluk" (The Reality of Turkey which the Headlines Hide: Fraud Everywhere), 23.05.2013, Yeniçağ, Acc. 09.08.2013 <http://www.yg.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/yazargoster.php?haber=26865>

“Almost all parties do that. But when Islam is used as a political tool, it loses its significance. When the organizations such as Deniz Feneri which are based on Islamic values do corruption, it frustrates me. Recently we started to see the reality and realized that such parties and organizations are actually not that innocent.”

When the same question was asked to Subject 2, her perception on the topic was completely opposite of the Subject 1:

“As any citizen I am also against corruption. It was a higher threat before AKP term and we lived the consequences of that all together. During the term of current government, there are implementations to prevent this. That is why I do not see corruption as a threat anymore. Eventually corruption is something I always stand against, no one should use their positions for interests. This is also something that is related to the personality of the people; it is something not related to the ideology but mentality. People should think about the consequences of their actions, this is a civic responsibility.”

It is seen that two subjects think completely opposite of each other. Subject 1 mentions that she becomes frustrated when the corruption is done especially by the groups which highlight their Islamic values. Even though she did not mention clearly, her consideration on such parties and organizations not being innocent shows she actually thinks that the current government is also in the same position. As a matter of fact, Subject 1 mentioned above that she was also frustrated about the promotion of religious values by AKP.

However, even though Subject 2 shares the same idea with Subject 1 by standing against corruption; she emphasizes that corruption has decreased during the term of AKP. This shows another polarization between the two subjects. While Subject 1 thinks that corruption has increased during the last years, Subject 2 completely thinks the opposite and mentions that corruption decreased as an outcome of the efforts of the government.

4.2.2.3. Ergenekon Case

As AKP government got more confident of itself rightfully for constituting the half of the parliament, it also embarked to make an ideological cleaning by repressing its opponents as other political parties. In this sense, Ergenekon Case rises a sensitive issue in Turkish democracy.

Ergenekon is a so-called armed illegal deep-state network which is claimed to have operated at the end of 1990's and the beginnings of 2000's. The network is alleged with a series of unsolved murders, terrorist acts and preparing a coup d'etat against

AKP government.³⁴¹ Ergenekon notion was mentioned for the first time on a talk show called “40 Dakika” which was broadcasted on a national television channel. Strategist Prof. Erol Mütercimler mentioned that he heard about the organization from one of the responsible generals of 1971 Memorandum which forced the then government to resign and claimed that it was an organization formed of many small underground networks which incorporated military officers, policemen, academicians, students, journalists and politicians.^{342,343}

The first proofs of the organization were acquired through the encounter of secret documents during a police raid that was organized to search for proofs of a fraudulent act in 2001 to the house and workplace of journalist Tuncay Güney who was the news coordinator of “Strateji” magazine.³⁴⁴ “Strateji” was a magazine which was known for its anti-Islamist publications during February 28 period. However, it was mentioned that the magazine was in contact with some deep-state networks by one of the employees of the magazine.³⁴⁵ Following the course of events Güney was detained and six sacks of secret documents which contained information about Ergenekon organization and the so-called coup that was organized against AKP were confiscated by the police. Besides, Güney was accused with associating to Susurluk incident and was tortured to testify.³⁴⁶ Güney took refuge in USA following his release and did not return back despite the warrant issued on his name in 2003.³⁴⁷ Followingly, it was detected that the secret documents of Güney were stolen from the police archives upon a mysterious denunciation; the documents were encountered buried underground at a

³⁴¹ “Sarıköz’la Başlayıp Eldiven’le Bitecek Darbenin 15 adımı” (The 15 Steps of the Coup that Would Start with Sarıköz and End With Eldiven), 27.03.2009, Radikal, Acc. 09.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sarikozla_baslayip_eldivenle_bitecek_darbenin_15_adimi-928228

³⁴² C. Dündar & C. Kazdağlı, 40 Dakika, 07.01.1997, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.candundar.com.tr/_v3/#Did=5983

³⁴³ “Ergenekon is Above General Staff, Mit”, 07.07.2008, Today’s Zaman, Acc. 10.08.2013 <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-146843-.html>

³⁴⁴ S. Gümüşel & S. Düler & A. Demir, “Tuncay Güney Kimdir?” (Who is Tuncay Güney?), 04.11.2008, Newsweek, Ed. 2, Acc. 09.08.2013

<http://web.archive.org/web/20100105033841/http://newsweekturkiye.com/haberler/detay/20348/Tuncay-Guney-kimdir>

³⁴⁵ “Künyedekilerin Hepsi Ergenekon Zanlısı” (Everyone on the Records are Ergenekon Suspect), 20.09.2008, Vatan, Acc. 08.08.2013

http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Kunyedekilerin_hepsi_Ergenekon_zanlisi_199897_1/199897/1/Haber#.UGmOgJgxp8

³⁴⁶ “Gözaltında 9 Gün Ağır İşkence Gördüm” (I was Intensively Tortured Under Custody), 12.03.2008, Yeni Şafak, 09.08.2013 <http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/default.aspx?t=12.03.2008&i=105134>

³⁴⁷ Neziğ Gürol, “Tuncay Güney’in Davası 7 Yıldır Sürüyor” (Tuncay Güney’s Case Continues Since 7 Years), 29.08.2008, Milliyet, Acc. 10.08.2013

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&Kategori=siyaset&ArticleID=984203&Date=29.08.2008&b=Tuncay%20Guneyin%20sonlandirilamayan%20davalari>

factory.³⁴⁸ Güney, other suspects and the incidents were seriously criticized by the Islamist press.³⁴⁹ However, the incidents reminded of a conspiracy as there was not a clear base for the course of events. For example, it was never understood how the secret documents were relocated from the police archives.

Sabah Newspaper declared that Tuncay Güney was a member of the MİT who leaked into secret services of the military and consequently to Ergenekon organization.³⁵⁰ But, MİT disclaimed their relation with Tuncay Güney.³⁵¹ However, later the videos which proved that Güney was an agent were published and revealed his relation with the deep-state.³⁵²

MİT prepared a booklet with supportive documents from different sources about the organization and sent it to Presidency of General Staff as the agency had the impression that a network which targeted the state and the regime was striving for getting organized in frame of its own interests and the findings from different sources were supporting each other.³⁵³ In the meanwhile, MİT retrieved a document during a police raid to the İP office which contained some secret documents which was claimed to show İP's connection with Ergenekon. Besides, the booklet was showing articles from different newspapers that were written about Ergenekon as proofs. The most important of those was journalist Fehmi Kuru's articles dated 30.04.2001 and 01.05.2001 with the pseudonym of Taha Kıvanç. He claimed to have acquired a document which contained information about the organizational scheme of Ergenekon. The retrieved document which started as "The objective of this project is to contribute to the reorganization of Ergenekon which was shaped through Atatürk's principles and operates under the unique defender of Kemalism, Turkish Armed Forces." was mentioning a secret organization that was requested to be refounded.^{354,355} Fehmi Kuru

³⁴⁸ Erkan Acar, "Tuncay Güney'in sorgu Kasetleri Fırından Çıktı" (Tuncay Güney's Interrogation Tapes were Found in a Bakery), 29.01.2009, Zaman, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://zaman.com.tr/gundem_tuncay-guneyin-sorgu-kasetleri-firindan-cikti_809303.html

³⁴⁹ Adem Yavuz Arslan, "İşte Türkiye'yi Sarsacak O Belge" (Here is the Document that Will Shake Turkey), 07.01.2009, Bugün, Acc. 10.08.2013 <http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/iste-turkiyeyi-sarsacak-o-gizli-haberi/50231>

³⁵⁰ Abdurrahman Şimşek, "Tuncay Güney MİT'in İpek'iydi" (Tuncay Güney was MİT's İpek), 26.11.2008, Sabah, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/11/26/haber,F54807C117C24017A278E0394CF26831_silindi.html

³⁵¹ MİT Press Release, 26.11.2008, Acc. 05.08.2013 <http://www.mit.gov.tr/basin39.html>

³⁵² Tolga Akiner, "Eymür Sohbetini Bilecek Kadar Yakın" (He is Close Enough to Know Eymür Conversation), 28.11.2008, Radikal, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/eymur_sohbetini_bilecek_kadar_yakin-910479

³⁵³ "MİT'in Ergenekon'u Teşhis Süreci" (MİT's Identification Process of Ergenekon), 03.08.2008, Radikal, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/mitin_ergenekonu_teshis_sureci-891611

³⁵⁴ Taha Kıvanç, "Hayaller Gerçek Galiba" (Looks Like the Dreams are Real), 30.04.2001, Yeni Şafak, Acc. 10.08.2013 <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2001/NISAN/30/tkivanc.html>

received the first reaction from Aydınlık Newspaper, which is the media organ of İP. Hikmet Çiçek showed his reaction by writing “The campaign to wear out the army with the contribution of CIA, NATO and MİT chefs is continued in all spheres. The so-called reports and files are ignored. Ergenekon falsification is only another step of it.”³⁵⁶ Ergenekon file was also handled in Aksiyon Magazine on May 12th, 2001; Harun Odabaşı claimed that Ergenekon organization was the architect of February 28 memorandum in his article named “Sivil Ergenekon”.³⁵⁷

Nokta Magazine published the journals that were claimed to belong to former navy general Özden Örnek on March 19th, 2008. The magazine claimed that the generals were disturbed by AKP government’s policies and planned a coup d’etat against the government which was not implemented upon disapproval of the then President of General Staff, Hilmi Özkök.³⁵⁸ Upon the article, the headquarters of the magazine was raided through court-martial’s decision on April 13th, 2007 and its computers were seized. Özden Örnek denied the allegations by mentioning that he never wrote journals and presented a case to the editor of the magazine.³⁵⁹ He lost the case, but the court also did not let the case to be extended to search the coup assertions and closed the case.³⁶⁰ The magazine was closed following the events and Harun Odabaşı was denounced as a follower of Gülen Movement by laic circles. Followingly, another document was posted to MİT by a mysterious individual who introduced himself as a military officer and claimed that the documents were retrieved from the computer of the navy general Özer Karabulut which was brought to his office by Özden Örnek. These documents were passed to Prime Minister’s Office without actions. Those documents were the coup journals which set the base for Ergenekon Case.³⁶¹

³⁵⁵ Taha Kıvanç, “Deli Saçması Sanmayın” (Do not Think That It is Raving), 01.05.2001, Yeni Şafak, Acc. 10.08.2013 <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2001/MAYIS/01/tkivanc.html>

³⁵⁶ Hikmet Çiçek, “CIA’nın Ergenekon Yaygarasında Fehmi Kuru Başı Çekti” (Fehmi Kuru Spearheaded in CIA’s Ergenekon Bluster), 06.05.2001, Acc. Aydınlık, 10.08.2013 <http://web.archive.org/web/20010517065315/http://www.aydinlik.com.tr/arsiv/2001/05/06/koru.html>

³⁵⁷ Harun Odabaşı, “Sivil Ergenekon” (Civil Ergenekon), 12.05.2001, Aksiyon, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-7599-26-sivil-ergenekon.html>

³⁵⁸ “2004’te İki Darbe Atlatmışız (We Got Over Two Coups in 2004), 29.03.2007, Zaman, Acc. 11.08.2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_2004te-iki-darbe-atlatmisiz_520349.html

³⁵⁹ “Nokta’da Camdan Bakmak Bile Yasak” (Even Watching Out is Forbidden in Nokta), 13.04.2007, Haber7, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/234223-noktada-camdan-bakmak-bile-yasak>

³⁶⁰ “Nokta’ya Darbe Günlüklerinden Beraat, Soruşturmanın Genişletilmesine Ret” (Exculpation to Nokta for Memorandum Journals, Refusal to the Extension of the Investigation), 12.04.2008, Zaman, Acc. 11.08.2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_noktaya-darbe-gunluklerinden-beraat-sorusturmanin-genislemesine-ret_676119.html

³⁶¹ loc.cit. “MİT’in Ergenekon’u Teşhis Süreci”...

In June of 2007, a denunciation was made to the police force that a big amount of explosives which were provided by a military officer were hidden in a slum at Istanbul. The slum was raided on June 12th, 2007 and inhabitants were taken under custody and the explosives were captured along with some secret documents related to Ergenekon on the computer of the tenant. In the light of the statements of the suspects, a great investigation was started and seven that included soldiers and police officers were taken under custody at the first place.³⁶² One of the suspects, retired soldier Fikret Emek, was caught with ammunition that was stolen from the army resources.³⁶³

Following the events, the operation gradually extended and was merged with different cases that were thought to be related to the organization and several waves of arrests were conducted. 380 suspects were arrested in between 2007 and 2009 including IP officials, military and police officers, rectors and civil officers from different institutions.

The prosecutors alleged the organization with “weakening state authority domestically and internationally through aiming a weak state image that struggles with domestic ethnical conflicts and fake terrorist organizations by triggering constant domestic conflict, chaos, conflict with neighbors and opposing EU and international laws; striving for controlling all political powers which oppose their secret objectives through different methods; forming desired political powers through leading the country to an ungovernable state which the terrorist organization could orientate easier and overthrowing executive, juridical powers and seize the state governance through their ideological objectives.” in their bill of indictment.³⁶⁴

The suspects were accused with intention of overthrowing the AKP government in 2003-2004 period and preparation of coup d’etat plans to this end. Nokta Magazine’s article and Taraf Newspaper’s article dated July 7th, 2008 which shared some documents that were claimed to belong to Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği’s president Şener Eruygur’s

³⁶² “Ergenekon İddianamesi, Danıştay Saldırısını Ergenekon Gerçekleştirdi” (Ergenekon Indictment, Ergenekon Conducted the Council of State Attack), 26.07.2008, Radikal, Acc. 11.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ergenekon_iddianamesi_danistay_saldirisini_ergenekon_gerceklestirdi-890294

³⁶³ “Ergenekon’da İlk Hapis Cezası Fikret Emek’e” (The First Imprisonment is to Fikret Emek), 29.02.2009, Zaman, 11.08.2013, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem/ergenekonda-ilk-hapis-cezasi-fikret-emeke_819550.html

³⁶⁴ “Cumhuriyet Mitingleri Sözde Toplumsal Refleks” (Republic Rallies are So-Called Social Reflexes), 06.08.2009, Milliyet, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Guncel/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1125379>

computer.³⁶⁵ However, Taraf Newspaper could not define the source of its allegations. Following this incident, the newspaper was alleged with being financed by Gülen Movement by the laic circles.³⁶⁶ One other proof was shown as the documents that were erased from Cumhuriyet Newspaper's Ankara representative Mustafa Balbay's computer but were retrieved through the investigation of the hard-disk. Balbay rejected that the documents belonged to him and claimed that different documents were montaged; processed and new comments were added by a mysterious hand.³⁶⁷ The cases were merged with Ergenekon Case and the suspects that were alleged with the plans were arrested.

Another case that was merged with Ergenekon Case was about the murder of a lawyer from the Council of State on May 17th, 2006. It was claimed that the murderer yelled as "God is mighty, we are God's soldiers" while triggering³⁶⁸ but later some Islamist Zaman Newspaper denied it and criticized the society with connecting everything to Islam.³⁶⁹ Decedent's funeral was turned into a protest against AKP government and Islamism.³⁷⁰ This incident was very thought-provoking as it was organized upon Council of State's decision against assignment of a teacher who was using turban as a principal. As a matter of fact, Islamist Vakit Newspaper printed Council of State members' photos upon their rejection of the case. Vakit was alleged with showing the target for the murder.³⁷¹ However, two days after the incident President Abdullah Gül announced that the murderer was instigated by a former military officer, Muzaffer Tekin following the acquirement of telephone conversations of two. Thus, the case was merged to Ergenekon and two generals and the murderer were arrested. Also the responsible of the security company who was claimed to obfuscate the evidences was trialed.

³⁶⁵ Bünyamin Yıl, "3. Darbe Planı Eldiven" (3rd Coup Plan is Eldiven), 08.07.2008, Milliyet, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/9380318.asp?m=1>

³⁶⁶ Ecevit Kılıç, "Gülen'le İlişki Gösterin Gazeteyi O Saat Kapatırım" (Prove Me a Relationship with Gülen and I Close the Newspaper that Minute), 21.07.2008, Sabah, Acc. 12.08.2013 <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/07/21/haber,FC2C1F6EAB424C09B3CCF29C947E9E31.html>

³⁶⁷ "Balbay: Notlar Montajlı ve İşlenmiş" (Balbay: The Documents are Montaged and Processed), 24.03.2009, Radikal, 11.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/balbay_notlar_montajli_ve_islenmis-927745

³⁶⁸ "Allah'ın Askeriyim Dedi Vurdu" (He Said that He was God's Soldier and Shot), 18.05.2006, Hürriyet, Acc. 10.08.2013 <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4432607&tarih=2006-05-18>

³⁶⁹ "Çölaşan'a Bir Yalanlama da Danıştay Başkanından" (Another Disclaim to Çölaşan is from Former President of Council of State), 18.06.2011, Zaman, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_colasana-bir-yananlama-da-eski-danistay-baskanindan_1148289.html

³⁷⁰ "Anıtkabir'de Protesto" (Protest in Anıtkabir), 18.05.2006, BBC Turkish, Acc. 10.08.2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2006/05/060518_turkey_protests.shtml

³⁷¹ "Vakit Hedef Göstermişti" (Vakit showed Target), 18.05.2006, Milliyet, Acc. 09.08.2013 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/18/guncel/axgun02.html>

One of the most polemical cases that was merged with Ergenekon Case was ÇYDD Case with the alledging its eight executive board members with being the member of Ergenekon organization, providing secret documents related to state security and violating the right of privacy.³⁷² It was claimed that one another leg of the Ergenekon organization was the “Ata Houses” of ÇYDD which were claimed to be private houses for the naval academy students to stay and brainwashed in order to be raised with Kemalist principles. According to the bill of indictment the girls that the organization would pick up were planned to pair up with the naval academy students and keep them under control.³⁷³ On the other hand, officials from the organization were explaining the purpose of the houses as “Ata Houses is a dormitory project for the girls who do not have means to support themselves which will enable the girls to have important roles in the future of Turkey; embrace laic, Kemalist, democratic and constitutional features of the state; complete their education without getting under influence of Islamist fascism, religious reactionist understanding and Islamist tariqahs and organizations in the first years of their university life.”³⁷⁴ The allegation against the organization was based on the deleted documents on the computers of a branch of the organization. The members of the organization rejected the claims; mentioned that they had never seen the documents, the claims were against the philosophy of the organization and they should have been placed by a secret hand. Moreover, another scandal arose in April 2012; it was detected that the prosecution never sent four folders of indictment to the court during the lawsuit that was seen since 2010. The situation withdrew attention as the court was handling the trial with missing documents and the incident was protested by the lawyers. As a matter of fact, the hard disk was sent to an independent consulting company in USA and it was detected that the computer was turned off on April 10th, 2009 at 20:48; the documents were uploaded to the hard disk from a different computer after that time the same day and deleted followingly while the police raid to ÇYDD office was conducted three days after the incident. The company also detected that date of the computer which the documents were uploaded was

³⁷² “İşte ÇYDD ve ÇEV Yöneticileri ile İlgili İddianamede Öne Çıkanlar” (Here are the Highlights of the Indictment about ÇYDD and ÇEV Executives), 13.12.2010, Zaman, Acc. 11.08.2013 http://zaman.com.tr/gundem_iste-cydd-ve-cev-yoneticileri-ile-ilgili-iddianamede-one-cikanlar_1064856.html

³⁷³ “Nazlı Ilıcak, “Belge 1: Ata Evleri ve Kırçıçek” (Document 1: Ata Houses and Kırçıçek), 29.04.2009, Sabah, Acc. 11.08.2013 http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/ilicak/2009/04/29/Belge_1_At_a_Evleri_ve_Kircicek

³⁷⁴ “ÇYDD İddianamesi: Ata Evleri Projesi ve İstenen Cezalar” (ÇYDD Indictment, Ata Houses Project and Requested Penalties), 14.12.2010, Bianet, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/126608-cydd-iddianamesi-ata-evleri-projesi-ve-istenen-cezalar>

changed to show as if the documents were uploaded months before the incident. Lawyer of ÇYDD stated that the report of the consulting company proved that how easy it was to create fake documents and the documents were uploaded to the computer by a secret hand. Considering that the digital documents hold an important place in the cases which sat on country's agenda and other similar corruption was detected in also the other cases showed that it was an organized digital attack.³⁷⁵ Thus, the suspects were absolved, but these findings seriously damaged the legitimacy of Ergenekon Case. Nevertheless, the biased attitude of the prosecution is clearly seen from the incident.

Ergenekon organization was also alleged with several assassination plans against the influential clerics, an action plan to a shopping mall³⁷⁶, planning the murder of four Christians in Malatya³⁷⁷, selling weapons to the murderer of the Council of State incident, threatening Zekeriya Öz, the prosecutor of Ergenekon Case and attacking to Cumhuriyet Newspaper headquarters. Sixteen other cases were merged to Ergenekon Case which made it the greatest organized crime case in Turkish history. A total of 78 people were sentenced to imprisonment.³⁷⁸

As a second step of the Ergenekon, government also initiated another investigation against the military officers that were said to plan a coup against AKP. The operation was called Balyoz; however it did not bear much attention as most of the officers were already under arrest. It is said that the number of the people who are trialed in both Ergenekon and Balyoz have reached to 743.

Even though the allegations cannot be completely ignored as the existence of deep-state was known since 1990's, the evidences that were acquired are criticized not to be clear and their validity to be debatable. As a matter of fact, many evidences acquired are claimed to be falsified through a mysterious hand by the suspects. Investigation process and the methods that were used while collecting the evidences are thought-provoking. Prosecution cannot show its informants with the pretext to hear them as secret witnesses and cannot explain the incoherency of some allegations.

³⁷⁵ "Suç Unsuru Veriler ÇYDD Bilgisayarına Baskından 3 Gün Önce Yüklenmiş" (The Crime Factor Data was Uploaded to ÇYDD Computer 3 Days Before the Police Raid), 04.09.2013, Radikal, Acc. 04.09.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/cydd_bilgisayarina_baskindan_3_gun_once_veri_nakledilmis-1149267

³⁷⁶ Fatih Vural, "Suikast Planları Ayrıntılı Anlatıldı" (Assassination Plans Were Told in Detail), 21.08.2009, Zaman, Acc. 12.08.2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem-suikast-planlari-ayrintili-anlatildi_882878.html

³⁷⁷ Bahar Kılıçgedik & Remzi Budancir & Serkan Bingöl, "Katliamı Ordunun Gizli Örgütü Yaptı" (Army's Secret Service Committed the Massacre), 24.06.2012, Taraf, Acc. 11.08.2013 <http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/katliami-ordunun-gizli-orgutu-yapti.htm>

³⁷⁸ "İşte Ergenekon Davası'nda Verilen Cezalar" (Here are the Penalties that Were Given on Ergenekon Case), 05.08.2013, Hürriyet, Acc. 05.08.2013 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/24461529.asp>

Moreover, connections of the attorney general who started the case were revealed with Gülen Movement recently. Therefore this case still carries its mystery and it is widely believed that 78 people were imprisoned with fake evidences by the laic circles. Recently it was detected that the evidences that were found in Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği's computer were corrupted by someone through the alterations made in the date and time of the documents.³⁷⁹ Therefore, even if the suspects were imprisoned, it still is a current issue and it does not seem to fall off the agenda until the prosecution can enlighten the mysterious events. This case also plays a significant role in polarization of the society as laic circles see it as a threat for democracy; religious conservatives think that it is a step for democratization.

When Ergenkon Case is taken into consideration, 87 % of the AKP electorates mentioned that government was fighting against the illegal networks while 83 % of CHP voters thought that the government was punishing its opposers according to Graphic A-4. Majority of neutrals and SP electorates also shared the opinion that government was fighting against the illegal networks.

4.2.2.4. Other Disputes

If the tension between the government and judiciary institutions is considered, it is seen that 80 % of AKP electorates mentioned that government was not interfering in juridical affairs while 88 % of CHP and 77 % of MHP electorates were in the opposite opinion according to Graphic A-5.

The threat of a military coup seems to be the highest threat according to 71 % of SP partisans and 46 % of AKP partisans while it was the highest for 12 % of CHP supporters. On the other hand, religious reactionism seems to be the highest threat for 41 % of CHP partisans while it was the highest only for 6 % of AKP partisans and 3 % of SP partisans according to Graphic A-7.

The individuals that were more anxious about the establishment of Shari'a rule were CHP electorates while the partisans of SP and AKP formed the least concerned group about that. According to Graphic A-8, only 25 % of AKP partisans and 11 % of SP partisans were anxious about the establishment of Shari'a rule while 73 % of CHP

³⁷⁹ loc. cit. "Suç Unsuru Veriler ÇYDD Bilgisayarına Baskından 3 Gün Önce Yüklenmiş"...

partisans considered Shari'a as a threat. In overall statistics 41 % of participants considered Shari'a as a threat.

Majority of the individuals who supported that political parties should be closed when necessary were CHP and MHP partisans while the majority of AKP partisans were against this opinion. According to Graphic A-9, 47 % of AKP partisans who participated in Study A agreed that parties should be closed when necessary while 71 % of CHP partisans agreed. However, it is very interesting to see that 64 % of Islamist SP partisans agreed that political parties should be closed when necessary considering the previously closed Islamist parties which were the pioneers of SP such as FP and RP.

Majority of the individuals who supported that military could seize the political power when necessary were CHP and MHP partisans while the majority of AKP electorates were against this proposition. According to the statistics in Graphic A-10, 51 % of CHP partisans approved the proposition while only 27 % of AKP and 29 % of SP partisans agreed.

4.2.3. An Evaluation of Politicization

When actual politics is considered, dissolution depending on the political party preferences and a common attitude among the party electorates can be seen. This may be considered as normal if we think that each individual has a worldview and they can adopt a similar attitude on similar issues.

When electorate attitude is taken into consideration, it is widely accepted that society disunites on axes such as right/left, laic/anti-laic, authoritarian/democratic etc. and make their preferences according to that. Another model which is also widely accepted is the electorate's economic perception and expectations play an important role on their political preferences.

Generally it is accepted that age, gender, education, income, basic demographical features and values define individuals' course of action and political preferences. Also there is the opinion that behaviors and preferences develop as a result of a consideration and comprehension process in this acknowledgement.

Each of these models explains the formation of preferences on some choices until a certain point. All those approaches pre-accept that the electorate behaves

rationally. But, we know that emotions, anxieties, perceptions and expectations also play a role in electorate's behavior as well as the rational intelligence and evaluations at the present day.

Whereas, it is known that either life or our thoughts do not develop this way. Our preferences and thoughts form through the interaction of our minds, emotions and social conditions. Therefore, the way these elements interact with each other is very important.

One other point is our experiments and the lessons we learn from these experiments. The social conditions of the day, emotional complexities affect our preferences and this can cause construing the same incident differently each time depending on our changing experiences. Therefore, the people cannot be manipulated easily. Their preference develops as a result of the interaction of their mind with their emotions and perceptions.

Now it will be investigated if people's expectations and perceptions change according to these political attitudes and if the same electorate cluster shows behaviors and attitudes towards the same direction as a bloc.

4.2.4. Expectations from Life and Perceptions

A general dissatisfaction is observed when the responses to a group of questions are taken into account. According to Study A, three-fifths of the participants think that the life standards got worse in Turkey in general and one-third of the participants think that the future of the country is not bright. The ones which think that the state of affairs is getting worse constitute the half of the participants.

According to Study A, the propositions that show the rates of the participants which responded as "yes" on Graphic A-11 can be divided in two and satisfaction of the individuals can be evaluated through the questions asked.

As a result of this analyze it is seen that while young people's satisfaction from individual life is the highest, they are the ones who are the most pessimist about social life. University graduates' dissatisfaction is above the average according to the statistics. As education level increases, satisfaction from social life decreases while satisfaction from individual life increases. On the other hand, while satisfaction from

individual life is the highest among students and high-level employees, their satisfaction from the social life decreases. The most dissatisfied group from both individual life and social life arise as the blue-collar workers.

Also the followers of Alevi faith are among the lowest rank about satisfaction. The ones define themselves as religious has a higher satisfaction index compared to the others. The ones live in slums are the most dissatisfied segment of the country. On the other hand, the people live in luxury condos and apartments are relatively more satisfied.

The results on Graphic A-12 show that there is diversity on expectations from life and perceptions depending on the political preference. It is seen that the most satisfied group is AKP partisans and CHP partisans have the lowest rank on individual satisfaction. Interestingly AKP supporters arise as the segment that has highest rank both in individual life and personal life.

According to Study A, when an overall ranking is done according to the satisfaction scores of each demographic cluster, the alignment of the ones at the bottom and the ones at the top indicates an interesting situation. Existence of three clusters within each of the five clusters which are formed according to the political preferences and categorized between the most satisfied and the most dissatisfied on Graphic A-12 points out that the diversity on political preferences affects the perception of satisfaction from life and form variations depending on political preferences not only on current issues but also on perceptions if Graphic A-13 is studied.

4.3. CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLUSTERS TO POLARIZATION

Now, the type of polarization will be investigated through handling the nine questions which were asked to the participants of Study A and analyzing if the participants made their preference on the same direction.

- Political reactionism increased during AKP government.
- Many important and useful reforms/innovations/legal alterations were done in some spheres during AKP term.
- I am anxious about establishment of Shari'a rule.

- Is military coup or religious reactionism a higher threat for Turkey?
- Military can seize power when necessary.
- Political parties should be closed when necessary.
- Which of the following answers explain your opinion on the debates about Ergenekon Case better?
- Which of the following sentences explain your opinion on the debates about judiciary and government relation better?
- Which of the following sentences is true in your opinion about the debates on constitutional amendments?

A political index has been created by evaluation of the answers of nine questions altogether. An increase on the scores of this index indicates that the opinions in favor of AKP have increased and a decrease on the scores indicates that the opinions to the detriment of AKP have increased. In other words, if all nine answers are in favor of AKP, the score will be 9 and if all questions are to the detriment of AKP, the score will be 0. Thus, it will be possible to see if a political polarization is in question or not by determining if there is accumulation in 0 and 9 or not.

Study A shows that when the evaluation is done based on the main demographic features of the participants, there is no polarization. However, when an analysis based on cultural identities is done, the statistics on Graphic A-14 show that there is a serious accumulation. According to the statistics, Alevi participants display an attitude to the detriment of AKP while Kurdish citizens display an attitude in favor of AKP. This situation proves that how influential are the identities in decision making of the Turkish society.

Moreover, it is possible to see the situation which arises if an analysis based on political preferences of the participants is done on Graphic A-15. According to Graphic A-15, CHP and MHP electorates and AKP electorates form opposite blocks. According to Study A, the findings based on Graphic A-15 are the proof of the polarization.

In the next part an answer will be sought if the polarization is an outcome of the preferences on political parties or if it is produced by people's lifestyles; if the party in power is the only responsible for polarization; if the conflict in the daily life is caused by politics or if the politics live on this conflict and if the situation could be resolved through the changes in the attitudes of politicians.

4.3.1. Social Clusters

A cluster analysis was made according to the answers that were taken about the social life in Study A. This analysis method serves for grouping the cases that are similar to each other in a data set and create different clusters. Grouping the participants created three clusters that are different from each other but has many in common. When these clusters are studied, it is possible to see that they correspond to different opinions and values in Turkish society. These clusters can be named as Moderns, Traditional Conservatives and Religious Conservatives.

4.3.1.1. Moderns

This cluster represents 30.8 % of the society. While the approximate education score is 7.8 years in Turkey, the ones in this cluster are formed of a more educated segment with 8.8 years of education. Moreover they predominantly were born in the western regions. It is seen that pensioners, private sector employees and students are slightly higher than the average of Turkey in this cluster. Another feature that attracts attention of this cluster is the higher percentage of people that live in luxury condos and apartments than the ones that live in traditional houses or slums.

While the percentage of unveiled women in Turkey is 27 %, 21 % among traditional conservatives and 14 % among religious conservatives; the fact that 52 % of the people in this cluster do not veil is remarkable. The ones wear turbans or burkas form only 2 % of the cluster.

In moderns cluster, which draws a similar profile to the distribution based on country regarding the ethnical identity, sect profile indicates a difference. 12 % of the cluster states that they are Alevis. As a matter of fact, 84 % of the participants who stated that they are Alevis take place in this cluster. In the meanwhile the ones in this cluster have been those who fulfill the religious requirements the least.

4.3.1.2. Traditional Conservatives

32.8 % of the society takes place in this cluster. In the traditional conservatives cluster, education score is the closest to the country average of 7.8 years with 7.5 years. Farmers and artisans are above Turkey's average while public officers and high level employees are under the average in this cluster.

Considering veiling, religiousness and monthly income, this cluster is very similar to overall Turkey. It is ethnically homogenous; 95 % of the people in this cluster define themselves as Turkish while country average is 87 %.

57 % of this cluster lives in traditional individual houses and the members of this cluster are the ones which lives in rural areas the most with 23 % while 30 % lives in apartments at urban districts. Therefore, this cluster draws a different profile compared to the country average and shows that it also has a traditional structure geographically.

4.3.1.3. Religious Conservatives

36.5 % of the society constitutes this cluster. The one-thirds of this cluster, whose education score is the lowest with 7.2 years, was born in eastern regions which is the highest rank among the clusters. While a quarter of this cluster lives in Istanbul, 14 % of it is located in Southeastern Anatolia.

While artisans and farmers are slightly higher, it can be seen that the students are less. Monthly income is almost the same with the average of Turkey. The veiled women constitute the highest percentage among all clusters with 74 % while only 14 % of the cluster is not veiled.

Percentage of the Kurdish population arises as 18 % in this cluster while the ratio is 12 % on Turkey average. 65 % of the people who define themselves as Kurdish are categorized under 65 %. On the other hand, Turks are distributed equally in clusters.

The ones who define themselves as the most religious have identified themselves as “a religious person that tries to meet all requirements of religion” or “meeting all requirements of religion” or Islamist in other words.

4.3.2. Political Agenda and Polarization

Based on the findings of Study A, the profiles of these clusters would be understood clearer based on the perception of the participants on recent political developments. They would be expected to reflect their values while evaluating these developments. However, their strictness in attitudes will provide the information on the depth of polarization.

The profiles of these clusters can be understood through analyzing how their members perceive the current political developments. There are the answers of individuals from these clusters in the Graphics A-16, A-17, A-18 and A-19.

In all four questions, it is seen that moderns and religious conservatives provided almost completely opposite answers while traditional conservatives assumed a more moderate attitude.

While 71 % of moderns believe that government punishes its opposers through this case, 84 % of religious conservatives defend that government's goal is to fight with illegal networks. Correspondingly, when the government's relation with the judiciary institutions is taken into consideration, 80 % of moderns claim that government restrains prosecutors and judges while 77 % of religious conservatives think that government does not interfere with the judiciary affairs. While 88 % of religious conservatives support the amendments on the constitution, 73 % of the moderns are against the amendments. Religious conservatives consider military coup and moderns consider religious reactionism as a higher threat, but indication of the military coup as a higher threat by 17 % more by the religious conservatives compared to what the moderns have said for religious reactionism being a threat is remarkable.

A more different picture is observed when questions regarding AKP and democratic values, which include long term evaluations, are analyzed on the basis of three different clusters.

In all five questions on Graphics A-20, A-21, A-22, A-23 and A-24, it is seen that moderns and religious conservatives gave almost completely opposite answers. Even though the traditional conservatives approach moderately, they are the strictest group about military's seizure of power and political parties' closure when necessary.

While 72 % of moderns agree that religious reactionism has increased during AKP term, only 40 % of traditional conservatives and 8 % of religious conservatives share this opinion. The participants who think that important reforms were made during AKP term are 28 % of moderns, 49 % of traditional conservatives and 83 % of religious conservatives. The ones that are anxious about the establishment of Shari'a rule are 70 % of moderns, 46 % of traditional conservatives and 11 % of religious conservatives.

Study C has important findings on satisfaction from the current AKP government. It is asked if the subjects were satisfied about the implementations of current AKP government. Subject 1 mentions that AKP is doing a good job, but she adds "However, promotion of religious values at the term of AKP government makes me uncomfortable. While religion was never discussed at my home before, it became a daily subject recently." On the other hand, Subject 2 states:

"I am very satisfied about its implementations; that is why I voted for it. I am especially satisfied with their positive attitude towards innovative ideas, efforts to solve problems and progress in domestic and international politics. Only the rapid transformations in Turkey's agenda and bad reactions against AKP for these implementations were challenging, it would be better if implementations were done gradually."

Here, the difference between the two perceptions is obvious. It is clear that Subject 1 appreciates the implementations, but she is also uncomfortable with the prominence of religion in the political agenda while Subject 2 is very satisfied with the implementations. Depending on the answers, it can be said that this question directly corresponds to the findings of Graphic A-21.

The participants who share the opinion that military can seize the power when necessary are 53 % of traditional conservatives, 48 % of moderns and 18 % of religious conservatives. 75 % of traditional conservatives, 64 % of moderns and 35 % of religious conservatives share the opinion that parties can be closed when necessary.

As it is seen, there are serious differences between the three social clusters regarding the opinions and ideas on current politics; in this case it should be investigated if there is a bloc behavior that affects the perceptions and opinions of these social clusters.

The political index that was created by evaluation of answers of the nine questions was explained at the beginning of this part. As it was mentioned, a rise in the score of AKP points out an increase on the opinions in favor of AKP.

In the light of this information, as it is seen on Graphic A-25, there is a polarization tendency between all three social clusters on current politics. There is a very different answer weave between moderns, traditional conservatives and religious conservatives from each other on nine questions regarding current politics. This graphic shows us that there are social bases of the polarization. In this case, it should be determined if the differentiations in social life create this polarization and which type of values bear polarization potential. Therefore, the next part will study what kind of a differentiation there is on the values which were asked in the questions of Study A and some habits and preferences of daily life.

4.4. BASES OF SOCIAL POLARIZATION

The analyses of Study A which were done until here point out that the differentiation on opinions and thoughts upon current politics indicate a political and social polarization. It is important to comprehend how deep is this political and social polarization and how much of the members of these clusters are radicalized irreversibly in order to perceive the political atmosphere.

It is natural that there are different social clusters that think differently, share different values and lifestyles. But strict ideological contrast of these clusters to each other, reluctance of living in a common space and mutual impatience shows that there is a serious and dangerous polarization in the society. If the public debates and political agenda are followed, it can be seen that polarization is multidimensional.

4.4.1. An Overview on Different Identities

When different identities are taken into account in the Turkish society, the most problematic issues arise on the bases of Alevism and religious faith. In this part of the thesis, affects of the polarization based on different identities will be analyzed.

One of the identities which is exposed to discrimination the most is the Alevi society. Alevis are a religious group which combines Anatolian folk Shi'ism and Sufism.³⁸⁰ They form approximately 15 % of the population in Turkey. Although it

³⁸⁰ "Alevi", 30.06.2013, Wikipedia, Acc. 26.07.2013 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alevi>

derives from the same roots with Arab Alawites, they have too little in common. Alevis insist on their difference from Sunni Islam and they always manifested this dissimilarity through their social and political marginalization within Ottoman and Turkish societies, rituals, social practices and worldview strongly shaped by Twelver Shiite mythology, Sufism, as well as various non-Islamic traditions throughout the history.³⁸¹

Although Alevi sect is told to be the real Turkish Muslimhood and is seen as assurance of laicism by some intellectuals, Alevis are generally seen as aberrant by the Sunni majority in Turkey. Therefore, it was never considered as a determiner in Turkish politics. Every year some politicians join Alevi festivals and give solidarity messages, but those messages are generally neglected in time. However, statements of some Turkish politicians at the election time in 1998 with the anxiety of obtaining Alevi votes raised Sunni-Alevi tension and deepened disintegration of the society. Turkish state, which accepted Sunni Islam as the main valid religion in politics along its history, made an unexpected turn and praised Alevism for the first time in 1998. While this move was seen as the result of liberalization in politics by some circles, it actually marked Alevism's acceptance as an alternative religious trend in Turkish politics against Sunni Islam's excel and endeavor for creating a new type of national Islam. Although this was a good progress for Alevi rights, it was definitely a democracy breach and was against basics of laicism as it was praising a value of the society against others.

In this case, political subjects forgot that they also represent the Sunni society and discriminated them. Despite the past 15 years, it is possible to say that Turkish society is still being led with the same political mentality and politicians do not see any inconvenience on polarizing the society through stating their opinion on such topics that should be studied and discussed by the historians, theologians and anthropologists which are really experienced on this subject. Discussing such kind of subjects and discriminating specific religious values is totally against the ideals of a laic state as laicism aims the division of religion and state affairs.

It is correct that there are different perceptions of religion, if societies all around the world are researched, it can clearly be seen that religious traditions vary and are practiced differently in each country. After all, Muslimhood means a more complex, practical, live form of Islam religion that became culture in time according to the needs

³⁸¹ Markus Dressler, *Religio-Secular Metamorphoses: The Re-Making of Turkish Alevism*, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, June 2008, Vol. 76, Is. 2, p.p. 280–311

of different societies while Islam means only the religion itself. There are many types of Muslimhood while there is only one Islam. Islam is only and holy while Muslimhood is worldly and diverse.³⁸² Under these circumstances it would be more correct to say that there is a Turkish Muslimhood rather than an only Turkish Islam. As the roots of Alevism were formed within Turkish culture and history, it can indeed be considered as a type of Turkish Muslimhood, along with Sunni Islam.

Graphic A-26 shows that those who consider that state should support different religious faiths form the three-fourths (11.1 % ‘absolutely yes’, 64.1 % ‘yes’) of the participants. Moreover, 67.8 % of the society agrees that state should support Alevis to live their culture and religion freely. While the participants are generally positive towards having a daughter/son-in-law from a different sect, the society is more tolerant towards having a veiled daughter-in-law than having a daughter/son-in-law from a different sect. While 32.7 % of the respondents are not tolerant towards a different sect, 19.4 % are not tolerant towards having a veiled daughter-in-law.

If these questions are analyzed based on different demographic features in order to understand different attitudes, gender and age do not show any difference. In other words, women and men, young and old answer these questions with very small variations while Alevi and Kurdish participants demonstrate a more tolerant and liberal attitude. Other two important elements which make a difference and attract attention are education level and political party preference. As expected, tolerance increases as education level increases.

Graphic A-27 shows the difference between the answers of participants from different education levels compared to the country averages. Zero axis represents country average, “minus” side represents the participants which responded these propositions as “incorrect”; “plus” side demonstrates the ones responded as “correct”. The main finding of the graphic is the rise of tolerance level as the education level rises.

Graphic A-28 demonstrates the differences according to the political partisanship the same way. While CHP partisans are relatively tolerant, MHP partisans and more strictly AKP partisans demonstrate a more conservative profile.

As different perception of religious faith constitutes one of the main elements of polarization; participants of Study C were asked what they think about the people who

³⁸² op. cit. Ocak, p. 162

do not practice religion and identify themselves as Muslims. Subject 1 responds this question as:

“If you would speak about this to a fanatic person, they would probably claim that you need to meet the obligations if you are Muslim. In my opinion this is all about the inner system of the individuals, you should live as you feel. Even if Islamic values are imposed by force, if forced person is not happy with practicing religion, then it has no meaning. If the people want, they can adopt the religious way of life, but they should not force others. I am against the neighborhood pressure.”

Subsequently, the same question is asked to Subject 2 and her answer is as in the following:

“People’s religious orientations should not interest anyone else as long as they do not interfere with the others’ liberties. Personally I do not consider this while approaching people. I think meeting religious requirements is something between the person and their God, but people should not hurt each other’s feelings. Recently there are not that much, but still there are people insulting veiled women or in the opposite, the women wear revealing dresses. I think those should not happen. The most important thing is to respect people because they are human.”

When their opinions are taken into account, it is seen that both participants agree that nobody should force the other. However, Subject 1’s perception about the radical Islamists is remarkable. When this point of view is thought together with the findings in Chapter 3³⁸³, it is easy to understand what worries her about the totalitarian tendencies of fanatics.

Upon the answers above, it is asked if they feel restrained from other political groups in the society corresponding to the anxiety of Subject 1. Subject 2 responds this question as “There were some circles that strived for disintegrating the society and restrict the freedom of opinion in the past, but I believe these circles could not hang on during AKP term; now I do not feel any pressure.” while Subject 1 states:

“I felt my family pushed me to be Kemalist. For example, my family supports CHP and they still blench when their opinion about Kurds is asked; I also was grown up with this idea. Now I feel the pressure about Islamic values from the society. I think these constraints are an outcome of the political system.”

Once more again the opposite perceptions of both subjects are visible in their answers. Subject 2 mentions that she felt restrained by some circles which strived for disintegrating the society. However, if this answer is analyzed carefully by taking the political opinion of Subject 2 and the events previously handled in Chapter 3 such as February 28 period and closure case of AKP, it is clearly seen that the circles which

³⁸³ See Above: Lack of Democracy in Turkey and Totalitarian Tendencies

Subject 2 mentions are the laic circles that were worried about prominence of Islamic values. In other words, the military, laic journalists and other laic circles are in target of this response. On the other hand, Subject 1 defends that there are issues significant to each term. She mentions that while she has felt restrained by her family about different ethnicities before, at the present day she feels restrained by the Islamist groups who want to impose a monotype Islam understanding on the society.

4.4.2. State Governance

According to Study A, interesting findings arise on the questions about state administration. Only 2 % of the participants are against democracy. Graphic A-29 shows that 66.6 % of the participants responded ‘yes’ to “country should be governed by democracy in any condition” proposition while 25.7 % of the participants think that this proposition is absolutely correct. However, in the meanwhile 38.5 % of the participants agree that “military can seize the government when necessary” while 57.1 % think that “political parties should be closed when necessary”.

When these three findings are considered altogether, it is seen that some of the values that can be called as democratic get gradually politicized under current conditions of the country and become ideas more than values. As a matter of fact, the variations in these questions are directly connected to the answers related to “political preference”. CHP and MHP electorates approve the seizure of the government by military and closure of political parties with a considerably higher score compared to the country average.

According to the statistics in Graphic A-29, 55.2 % of the participants think that important reforms were made while 38.1 % think that religious reactionism was increased when the questions intend to evaluate AKP term are taken into account.

When the difference between these two questions is taken into consideration, it is seen that as the education level, quality of habitat and level of income rise, percentage of the participants who think that religious reactionism got increased at AKP term increases accordingly. When political preferences are taken into consideration, it is naturally observed that AKP and the opposite bloc have completely opposite opinions.

The participants that are anxious about establishment of Shari'a rule are 40.6 % of the participants while the percentage of the participants who are anxious about the impossibility of their child to get the desired education is 65.8 %. The most significant element that explains the different opinions in responses is the preferences on political parties.

Graphic A-30 shows the difference of answers from the country average based on party partisanship. Zero axis represents the country average, negative side shows the participants who responded 'no' to these propositions with a higher rate than the country average and positive side shows the participants who responded 'yes' with a higher rate than the country average. The main indication of the graphic is how the AKP, CHP and MHP electorates differentiate as a bloc.

This question was asked to see if the participants are satisfied with the current AKP government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the participants are not happy with the government. It is certain that the last events affected government's reputation such as prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan's fierce attitude against people that were concerned about the implements against laicism, government's ambition to take revenge from the military and trials on former military officials, government's attitude towards Syrian civil war, abatement of action about Madimak Hotel victims, legislation of the code letting imam-hatip graduates to be admitted in the faculties other than theology faculties, arrest of journalists, legislation of the code letting the trade of forestry lands, conceal of the case about 25 victims of an explosion in a military base, terrorism and economical conditions.

4.4.3. Debates on Religion and Laicism

Study A presents that a division into half is observed on the responds to questions which are related to religion and laicism. When the findings of the study are considered, Graphic A-31 indicates that 53.4 % of the participants think that religious education should be compulsory at schools while 30.1 % are against this proposition. On the other hand, rate of the respondents which agree that females in primary and secondary education should not veil themselves is 49.6 %. 49.1 % of participants have a

positive approach towards veiling liberty of public officers while 39.3 % has a negative approach.

In the light of the above mentioned findings, their opinion about veiling in public space is asked to the subjects of Study C. Subject 1 responds this question as:

“It is a religious symbol. I was not used to see that many people with religious outfit before. Because I am a former CHP supporter, I have a different state of mind and that is why this situation really affected me. I even started to dream of covered women. I believe veiling should be a personal choice. There are two important things; first of all constitution should be studied in order to determine limits of freedom and secondly the practices in the western countries should be reviewed. For instance we can give an example; think of a veiled psychologist, her patient might want to consult an issue about sexuality; psychologist’s orientation according to her religious values can lead the patient in a wrong way. If the psychologist does not use her position to impose her thoughts, then it is OK; but certainty of this or objectivity of the education that is given by a veiled teacher is polemical. I cannot be sure how this would orient a child.”

Response of Subject 2 to the same question is as in the following:

“Turban or headscarf; you know there was a meaning conflict about that which was created by the groups whom suggested the political Islam definition; but for me it is absolutely not a political symbol. Prayer rug or bead can be religious materials but headscarf is a dressing style for the women to conceal their charm. I am not against headscarf, because in the end the public area is a civilian area, people should be more tolerant towards that. I do not feel uncomfortable about the symbols that individuals bear as long as they do not make others uncomfortable.”

Polarization between two subjects is again visible on their responses to this question. While Subject 1 answers in a negative way, Subject 2 answers positively. Subject 1 gives remarkable examples on the topic about a psychologist and a teacher to support her idea. If this is analyzed deeper, the inferences of Subject 1 really make sense as not everybody would feel comfortable with the evidence of religious values in public space and in the last analysis; turban is a style which carries the religious identity of a person to the public space. In spite of that, Subject 2 mentions that veiling is a right and everybody should be free to use it. However Subject 2 does not mention the possible social outcomes of the situation. But, it is also true that banning it would not help for the resolution of the issues regarding it.

According to the Graphic A-32, when the demographic clusters which explain the different attitudes in these questions are considered, it is seen that responds in laic character increase as education level rises.

However, the most important indicator stands out as political preference also in these questions. This time, AKP and MHP forms a bloc in these hypotheses while CHP stands alone in the opposite side.

In Graphics A-32 and A-33, positive and negative differentiations are seen compared to the country average. In Graphic A-32, CHP electorate differentiates from the country average through responding negatively to three hypotheses about laicism while the other parties demonstrated positive attitude.

On the other hand, according to the findings of Study B, it is seen on Graphic B-15 while 58.13 % of the participants think that using religious symbols is inappropriate in public space, 32.50 % are not against it. When this graphic is analyzed along with Graphic B-8, it can be presumed that also some CHP electorates tolerate veiling in public space.

Graphic B-10 is about opinions of the participants about laicism and secularism. Even though laicism and secularism are accepted to be the same in English, there is a slight meaning distinction between them in Turkish. Secularism means the separation of state and religious affairs from each other. In secularism, state does not have a policy towards religion which assures freedom of religious activities, it is equally distant from all faiths and it does not have an institution for organizing religious activities, instead all faiths have their chambers to organize their activities. This system is more likely the one that currently USA accepts. On the other hand laicism is a system originates from France. Laicism also means distinction of state and religious affairs, but slightly in the advantage of the state. In other words, state can keep religion under pressure in a laic system and shape it according to its needs. In laicism religion is under state's control and eventually become a political tool which allows only the religious activities that the state desires, it has an unofficial religious policy such as Sunni Islam in Turkey and religious institutions are under administration of an institution such as Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey. This system was a part of Turkish political system during its entire history. Even though the distribution is balanced in this graphic, those who believe that laicism is a better system are the 54.38 % of participants. This shows that the majority is anxious about the prominence of religious values and wants a strict control over religion.

Graphic B-9 shows that 79.38 % of the participants believe in Islam. However, it is very interesting to see 15 % of the participants define themselves as non-believers. According to Graphic B-21, 45 % of the participants of Study B state that they practice

religion partially while 38.75 % do not practice at all. Only 16.25 % of the participants mention that they practice religion.

Considering the findings of Graphics B-9 and B-21, participants of Study C are asked if they practice religion. Subject 1 answers as:

“This is also another thing that I question. I try to meet some of the requirements from time to time. I believe in Islam, but if you ask what kind of a Muslim I am, I can say that I filtered the religious values and built up a belief system by myself. I am not a very religious person in terms of obligations, but I like to see faithful people. Faith is a good thing. I also follow a faith, but I believe everyone should be free on what to believe.”

Subject 2 answers to the same question as:

“I try to meet religious requirements as much as I can, but of course I cannot claim that I do everything perfectly. It is a bit difficult for a person to say where they see themselves in terms of religion, I think only God can decide that. As currently we are in the month of Ramadan, fasting is required and I try to perform as much as my health allows me. I also try to meet the other requirements depending on my timetable, but we are not in this world only for religion; social life and business life are also important.”

When the answers are analyzed, it is seen that Subject 1 answers the question in a laic nature by saying that she adapted the religion according to her worldview while Subject 2 does not make concessions to the integrity of Islam. Even so, Subject 2 presents a moderate nature by mentioning that religion is not the only objective in life.

As the objective of this thesis is to see the depth of polarization in society, if they think that Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life is asked to the subjects of Study C. Subject 1 answers the question as “Actually I think it does. I can feel there are the separatist acts, but I do not know how to explain it precisely.” while Subject 2 responds as in the following:

“I believe both segments should not avoid speaking about the current situation of Turkish society. The reluctant individuals should probably be hesitating as a result of their lack of knowledge. However, now there is rather a relieved ambiance in Turkey; that is why everyone is free to discuss their thoughts. Objective of the circles who introduced political Islam twenty years ago was to establish a ground for conflicts and distract the current harmony. Because conservative people were shown as religious extremists and this way impossibility of execution of a democratic system tried to be proven by some circles; this is a result of the struggle for political power. This is not the case at the present day, but this separatist perspective was attempted to be imposed in the past. Right now there are not separatist thoughts; everyone can discuss their opinions freely.”

It is seen that while Subject 1 thinks that there is a polarization and feels uncomfortable about it, Subject 2 mentions that this can be only resolved by reconciliation of both segments of society. However, Subject 2 once more blames the concerned circles about the prominence of Islam in social life. As her thoughts about reflection of conservative

people as extremists cannot be completely ignored as it is known that the conservative circles were marginalized by some circles that wanted to use the current controversy for their political interests, it is a fact that the current political situation is the same with twenty years ago as the current government and AKP supporters gradually otherized the other segments of the society and blamed them with being communist or deviant.

4.4.4. Debates on Political Islam

Graphic B-12 analyzes what the participants of Study B think about political Islam. Therefore, all answers are designed to give a clear understanding of what they vote for. Even though, this question might have been perceived a little biased or offensive by some circles due to its nature, it was necessary in order to understand participants' perception on political Islam. The most important finding is the perception of participants about politicians. 40 % of the participants claim that political Islam is a system which politicians implemented in order to orient the society. This means that majority of the participants do not trust politicians and they think political Islam is a false definition which was imposed by them in order to orient people for their interest. 21.88 % of the participants think that political Islam is a system which was developed by the Western societies. This should also be considered along with USA's moderate Islam project for Middle East which caused rapid transformations in many countries. 13.75 % of the participants think that it is a secular set of ordinances which are implemented in a democratic system by a conservative party. This mostly states the current situation in Turkey considering AKP's conservative nature and the changes which they implemented in the democratic system during the last 11 years. 12.50 % of the participants think that it is basically a system that follows Shari'a rules such as in Iran. The least participants with 11.88 % think that political Islam is a local solidarity network that was implemented by the Islamist movement in order to transform the masses and give them a voice in national area while this should have been the most accurate answer under normal circumstances. Because when RP term is analyzed in 1990's it is clearly seen that party organization was really being the voice of conservative people by providing them the opportunity to be represented, educate themselves and work in solidarity organizations. As this term really has significance for

political Islam and as it was maybe the first time the religious conservatives were able to show themselves, this could be considered as a more accurate answer. However, as it is seen that the majority agree that it is a false system which was implemented by the politicians.

Based on the information above, opinions of the participants of Study C are asked about political Islam. Subject 1 answers this question as in the following:

I would say it is an idea that the West imposed or it is a method of politicians to abuse religious values. There is a global tendency towards right. Actually, usage of Islam as a political tool in Turkey is reasonable as Turkey has a Muslim majority. I think it is a set of rules that are implemented by a conservative party.

When the same question is asked to Subject 2, she responds as:

I am against the statement of political Islam, because I do not believe the existence of such kind of a concept. This is a long subject that should be discussed; I think political Islam is a statement that was suggested by orientalist, people that does not want to see the success that conservative understanding sustains under democracy and people do not want to acknowledge this order to raise tension. I am against political Islam.

Subject 1 considers political Islam as a system that is imposed by the West and a tool that is used by the politicians to orient people. Besides, she connects the emergence of political Islam to the global politics in the world agenda. On the other hand, Subject 2 mentions she believes that it is a statement which was suggested by orientalist. Upon that it is asked if it was a term suggested by some interest groups. Subject 2 responds this question as:

It is not exactly what I wanted to say. This is an assertion that arose in the recent past when Turkey is taken into consideration. When we think of the political parties in power and the conditions of the period, I believe political Islam is a statement which was suggested by the circles that ignore the advance of conservatism to raise tension in the society.

Thus, she once more implies that this system was implemented by the concerned laic circles which did not want to see Islam's harmony with democracy and wanted to disintegrate the society.

Followingly, subjects of study C are asked if they see political Islam as a threat for Turkey. Subject 2 answers "Right now it is not capable of generating a threat for Turkey. Such kinds of statements were made in the past, as democracy culture advances and the system settles people see that Turkey will sustain a democratic system; so political Islam is far from being a threat." while Subject 1 answers as in the following:

I am suspicious on it. I do not like the prominence of Islamic values. For example when I think about establishment of mosques at the universities, prohibition of abortion, etc., I

think the Islamic values are promoted and this worries me because there are also people that do not follow any faith. Of course the conservatives also have rights; it is important that they live according to their beliefs but in this sense prohibiting abortion is pointless for non-believers. I am not against veiled people, but their freedom ends where mine starts. However, most religious conservative people do not agree on that. Nevertheless, I support the secularist model like in the USA which has an equal distance to all religions, but not the laic model in Turkey which basically has control over religion.

The answers given to this question also shows the polarization between two subjects. While Subject 2 thinks that political Islam is far from presenting a threat, Subject 1 mentions that she is uncomfortable with rise of political Islam because of the totalitarianism of Islamists/religious conservatives. Upon the answer of Subject 2, it is also asked what she thinks about the Islamist solidarity network. She mentions that until now, the conservative people were not that much visible, this actually had been an opportunity for them to come together and defend their ideas.

Graphic B-16 shows that 70 % of the participants think that Islamism constitutes a threat for Turkey while 22.50 % does not agree that hypothesis. Again, when this question is paired with question number 8, we can presume that some CHP electorates either do not think Islamism is a threat or they are unsure about it. Moreover, Graphic B-19 shows that 84.38 % of the participants of Study B think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish society.

In the light of the above mentioned information, this time subjects of Study C are asked what do they think about Shari'a. Subject 1 responds to this question as "I think Shari'a is the last step in transformation to an Islamist state. It is not possible to speak about an Islamist state without Shari'a rules. For instance Sudan; it is an Islam republic which is governed through Shari'a. I hope such a thing would not happen in Turkey." while subject 2 responds as "I do not envisage anything about an Islamic state; therefore I do not see the need of a state which is ruled through Shari'a. This is not an option in Turkey anymore; as we see the citizens of countries which are ruled by an Islamist order also want to live their faith in a democratic system. I think the epoch of such extreme thoughts has ended." It is seen that both subjects are against Shari'a concept.

Followingly, their opinion about Islamist parties in political system is asked to the subjects of Study C. Subject 1 answers that all kinds of opinions should be represented in the parliament while Subject 2 answers as in the following:

“For example, SP promotes religious values but we still cannot claim that it is an Islamist party; I also do not think they have a different agenda about the political system. In other countries Islamist parties might have emerged because of the conditions in their society but they have nothing to compare with the parties in Turkey. As religious faith is an individual space, a person’s religious belief only interests oneself. In an epoch that the states based on religion disappear one by one, I do not think that Islamist parties are necessary. Nevertheless, I believe that various parties to defend various opinions should take place in the political system. Besides, also the political and social environment of the country should also be evaluated. It is important to know how and what do the Christian parties represent in the countries they are located and what they promise to their supporters. That is why this should be evaluated more comprehensively.”

It is seen that while Subject 1 is tolerant about representation of any idea at the parliament, Subject 2 mentions that she does not think Islamist parties are necessary, but also defends that different opinions should be represented at the parliament. However, answer of Subject 2 regarding that religion is a personal space is remarkable. Also Subject 2’s perception about SP shows her different understanding of Islamism.

Upon these answers, their opinion was asked about why Islamism started to attract that much interest in the last years. Subject 1 answers this question as:

“When the Republic of Turkey was formed, a more homogenous nationalist structure was desired. For this reason also Kurdish people felt the same pressure that Islamists felt; progress of an Islamist ideology was not desired. CHP ignored that the country has a Muslim majority and there is a group which consider Islamic values as important. Actually Islamist community felt excluded, because they felt their rights were neglected. The reason of their current organization is to reclaim their rights back.”

When the same question is asked to Subject 2, she responds as in the following:

“It would be more accurate to interpret this as conservative people, not as political Islam. First of all I do not think AKP is an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party which is also stated by the party organization. A trust was built between AKP and the people; therefore it was elected three terms in a row. Ten years ago everything was more complicated, more different; the economical situation was extremely challenging that Kemal Derviş was invited from USA and even he was not successful. AKP made a great progress concerning rights and freedom and implemented its election promises. That is why AKP attracts that much attention.”

Subject 1 thinks that the reason of the rise of political Islam is the decline in Kemalist ideology while Subject 2 defends that it is the achievements of AKP. However, Subject 2 underlines that AKP is not an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party. This evaluation reflects the same state of mind with Yalçın Akdoğan as it was mentioned above.

4.4.5. Social Habits and Lifestyles

When responses to the questions about daily life are taken into account, findings show that the activities and preferences that are considered to be modern based on the sociology of industrial society are actually lower than expected in the society. Almost all demographic differentiations cause different behaviors in these spheres according to the results. According to Graphic A-34, the participants that have never eaten out are 21.1 % while the ones ate out before are 19.1 %. It is seen that the participants which go to cinema or theater occasionally are 24.1 % while the ones which never go are 37.6 %. The participants never celebrate New Year are 49.5 % while the ones celebrate occasionally are 14.3 %; the ones never apply make-up are 36.6 % while the ones apply occasionally are 19 %.

The rate of enjoying these activities is directly proportional with education and income level when Graphic A-35 is taken into account. The actuality increases while passing from the rural to metropolis, but the rate decreases to the rural levels among the participants that live in the slums. Graphic A-35 shows the differences based on country averages on negative and positive aspects. The differences are seen clearer depending on the age and education level, rural/urban/metropolis distinction and conditions of the settlement on the graphic.

According to Graphic B-22, 44.38 % of the participants of Study B believe that social environment has the highest influence on lifestyle. While family takes place in the second place with 30.63 %, 12.50 % of participants mentioned that economy affects lifestyle. A few of participants think that media, school and friends can affect lifestyle while no one agrees that migration is a determiner of lifestyle.

Upon the findings above, subjects of Study C are asked about their opinion on what is influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle. Subject 1 answers the question as:

“I think the people are influenced by the society and their family. If I should give an example from my family, I see my mother’s side tends to Islamic values recently. For example while my mother was consuming alcohol in the past, she started to practice religion and stopped consuming alcohol. Besides, one of my friends from the university who was not using a headscarf suddenly decided to cover her head and completely changed her life style; another friend decided to veil after a traffic accident. Apart from that, of course family influences people’s decisions. In my circle of acquaintances I see a tendency to the right wing, but I do not know what the exact reason is.”

Subject 2’s answer to the same question is as in the following:

“If we keep the people that do not let the women in their household to go out, as this is related to the mentality of people rather than religion itself, seeing more veiled women in the daily life could be considered as an outcome of abolishing the strict rules in public space against the conservative women. Those kinds of restrictions are vexatious as headscarf is not a style only Muslim women prefer. People that follow different faiths all around the world use it without encountering strict restrictions. I do not think the number of veiled women increased, but I think they are more visible in the social life after the abolishment of restrictions.”

Subject 1 mentions that the family and the society are influential on spreading the Islamic lifestyle. On the other hand, Subject 2 mentions that Islamic lifestyle has not spread; instead the people who have embraced Islamic values became visible after the abolishment of restrictions. Subject 2's thoughts about the restricting the women are also remarkable. She mentions that repressing the women is not particular to religion, but the mentality.

4.4.6. Polarization Axes

When the questions analyzed above are grouped and the responses that social clusters have given to this group of questions are studied, very important finding arise about differentiation and polarization in the society.

Axis scores changing between 0 and 100 are provided to each of the participants depending on their responses and calculated the average scores of the three social clusters on all three axes in Study A. Graphic A-36 indicates the average global score of all respondents with three clusters indicating average of each individual.

As it is seen in the graphic, while the laicism and tolerance scores of moderns are remarkably high, their score on status quo axes is above both 50 and Turkey average. This cluster represents the society which is reasonably open minded and modern, embraces a laic lifestyle, but has an attitude towards keeping the status-quo through military coup or closure of political parties against some threats they perceive.

Traditional conservatives take the rearmost position on tolerance axis, middle on laicism axis and foremost position on status-quo axes. In another words it can be said that they do not have a specific problem with laicism, basically they are against changes in status-quo and provision of freedoms to different identities because of overprotecting their traditions.

The third cluster, which is named as religious conservatives, demonstrates an attitude that does not pay attention to status-quo, does not stand against the actions which could cause transformations in politics and defend freedoms of different identities; but the subjects of this cluster display an attitude against the laic lifestyle.

The social clusters and the axis which were subject to polarization were handled above. However, how much the members of these clusters are radicalized and agglomerated to the extremes of the axes is a more important question. First of all, when distribution of the participants' scores is taken into account on laicism, tolerance and status-quo axes; a normal distribution is seen at all three. The vertical axes at Graphic A-37 correspond to the distribution percentages of respondents and the population density at each score. Graphic A-37 shows distribution of averages in all three axes by acknowledging the society as monotype. A normal distribution at laicism axes is seen. Despite the differentiation of the society on tolerance axis, there is a slight tendency towards tolerance. Bell-curve excels on status-quo axis.

However when these bell-curves are presented for each cluster, some clusters relatively incline to one side of the axes as it could be expected. If Graphic A-38 is taken into account, the differences and polarization between clusters can clearly be seen. As a smooth Turkey distribution is seen on laicism axis, it is seen that each cluster shows a bell-curve like distribution, but they gather in different groups from country average if it is analyzed in three clusters. While almost entire group of religious conservatives accumulate to the anti-laic side of the axis, traditional conservatives group accumulates to the middle and moderns group accumulates to the laic axes of the graphic. It is possible to indicate that all three groups have different attitudes towards laicism.

Keeping the information above in mind, opinion of the subjects of Study C is asked. Subject 1 answers the question as in the following:

"I think AKP follows a policy which is based on seizing the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Most of the conservatives say they are secularists not laics, at this point I think presence of the presidency should be questioned. We do not know the future program of AKP, maybe merging Presidency of Religious Affairs to a ministry is in their agenda. Then there is a possibility for the president to use this entity according to the needs. Thus, AKP can orient the religion and state affairs as they wish. If they want to transform to an Islam state, this would also be a step for it. If this is the case, they can start to follow an Islamist policy through assigning a caliphate. In this case it would be an entity to serve for the ones in the power. I think the state should not have a policy on religion."

On the other hand, Subject 2 mentions:

“We always hear about laicism and secularism, the people are more conscious on that recently. Turkey is a laic state at present. When we investigate secularism seems to be a more flexible concept, eventually while laicism is a political concept, secularism is more sociological; that is why people might see secularism more suitable as it is flexible; but until the recent past, laicism was perceived differently, because of the suppression of laic system, they were standing against it. But during AKP term, laic system has settled better; because there is no intervention to the faith, they are more comfortable. Therefore, I do not see any issues about laicism and I hope the orientalist are also convinced about the new laicism perception.”

Once more a polarization between two subjects is seen in these answers. Subject 1 claims that AKP is following a policy in order to seize the control of Presidency of Religious Affairs to dictate its own religion policy; therefore she finds secularism a more sensible idea as it would not let the state to have an official religion policy. On the other hand, Subject 2 also emphasizes that secularism is a suitable system. However, she adds that concept of laicism has changed in the last years and it does not have the same repressive nature as before. These answers clearly show that the concept of laicism indeed is trying to be changed in the recent years by the current government. But, this is a quite dangerous attempt as it would damage integrity of the country in long term. It is once more clear that Subject 1 is uncomfortable with the developments as she has a laic perception while religious conservative Subject 2 interprets the developments in a positive way. This shows that both sides perceive the developments according to their political preferences.

The bell-curve at tolerance axis on Graphic A-39 inclines more to the positive side of the axis. In other words, it is tolerant to different identities in society and their freedom to live as they desire. But, when it is investigated through dividing it based on clusters, it is seen that moderns and religious conservatives show a similar character to the country average; correspondingly traditional conservatives are closed to repressive and different identities. On the other hand, inexistence of concentrations in neither end of the axis and peak of the axis relatively near the middle shows that the radicalization is not that deep yet as the other axes while the difference in this axis still bears a polarization risk. Graphic B-18 also shows that the polarization about tolerance is not that deep yet. According to Graphic B-18, 91.25 % of the participants say that they can be friends with people from different opinions. This means that the participants are mainly discontent about political situation rather than the social situation in the country.

On the other hand, Graphic B-24 shows that 57.50 % of participants do not think that the society is tolerant towards different opinions while 23.13 % thinks it is and 19.38 % do not have a certain idea on that. This means that more than half of the participants do not feel comfortable in social life.

In order to understand how the tolerance is perceived by the society, opinions of the subjects of Study C are asked what they think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards each other. Subject 1 states “For example in Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı (Society Volunteers Foundation) liberal and conservative people are working together and give messages of unity, these people work side by side; but of course I do not know how integrated they are. It is about people’s point of view, if they tolerate they can live together.” while Subject 2 responds as in the following:

“I think the people shall approach each other humanly, differences are not important. If a person approaches impolitely to me because of my political view while I approach them humanly, I would get frustrated. I think the people should not be prejudiced. This is what I strive for, I have friends from different faiths around me, but I respect their choices. I think this should not affect interpersonal relationships.”

According to the findings, there is a general perception that if people tolerate each other, it is possible to live together. However, it is also a fact that both segments have extremists. Therefore, reconciliation of these extremist circles is the key element on reassuring the social reconciliation. Both segments should leave their totalitarian tendencies apart and understand each other in order to reach a peaceful conclusion. Politicians also have responsibility to initiate the social dialogue by overcoming their differences and start to work for reconciliation. As it was handled before, Islamists and religious conservatives has always blamed laic circles for their failures and when they seized the majority, they declared their legitimacy and begun a social engineering to form an Islamic society. However, it is very insincere to force the people to fit in one mold and speak about the freedoms. This is completely the same thing what was done in the first years of the republican regime which the Islamists roughly criticize. Current AKP government has a tendency to blame and suppress who are not sharing the same ideology with them which constitutes an obstacle in front of the reconciliation of the society. Therefore, political parties should stop conducting a biased policy and urgently address the polarization of society.

Lastly, if the status-quo axis on Graphic A-40 is analyzed, it is seen that moderns and traditional conservatives stand slightly at more positive side of the axis, correspondingly the majority of religious conservatives stand above the country average, this way they form a very contrast profile to the other two clusters, with other words we can say that religious conservatives are more tolerant to some political transformations.

Graphics A-37, A-38 and A-40 show that there are differentiations in values on laicism, tolerance and political transformation subjects in social lifestyle clusters.

On the other hand, Graphic A-23 presents that 71.88 % of the participants of Study B feel that they are restrained by the participants while only 23.13 % say that they feel completely free. This means more than half of the participants feel constrained by the others.

The analysis about social clusters show that there is a difference between lifestyles of the society and this differentiation bears a potential to get rougher. But again analyses show that the current polarization is formed by the political preferences, debates that come into question through AKP and opinion about AKP. Then, the situation is related to values represented by AKP, negotiation policy it follows towards its addressee and the attitude of AKP's counterpart parties. But still the matter is based on politics, political actors and political style.

Moreover, this is the outcome of political ground, a society that changes with its agendas, styles and daily life. Therefore first the evolving life should be taken into consideration calmly and the society which transformed in the last thirty years, its expectations, demands, anxieties and frustrations should be analyzed. We can only then evaluate the political actors and styles in the society.

Nevertheless, the society is not monolithic and the society is not monotype. Therefore the monotypic citizen concept and the modernism perception at the last century should also be questioned.

Ultimately, poles are elements, clusters and citizens of the same society. The ones we differentiate are eventually our companions.

4.5. SOCIAL UPRISING AND HUMAN RIGHTS

As a result of the gradual polarizing in the society, the government's repressive practices are being protested by the groups which are especially formed of Kemalist laic circles. In this part, some of these protests will be handled on the basis of freedom of opinion, human rights and social uprising.

4.5.1. Freedom of Opinion

According to Graphic B-20, 52.50 % of the participants do not think that the media supports liberal thought. This perception should be related to the government's strict policies on media corporations, actions against freedom of opinion, arrest of journalists and suspicious confiscation of some media corporations and their transfer to the companies known as close to the government. But considering % 47.51 of the participants are either natural or think that media assists liberal thoughts, we can say that the respondents are divided into half about the role of media.

Graphic B-14 shows that 85 % of the participants agree that Islamic approach in politics does not assure freedoms. This proves that participants see Islam as an autocratic element in politics.

In the light of the findings above, subjects of Study C were asked if they think media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts. Subject 1 thinks that media plays a role on spreading liberal thoughts, but she believes that media is not independent in Turkey. Followingly, Subject 1 is asked if she is tolerant to liberal thoughts and answers:

"I support liberal thoughts. I am working in human rights area, but I worry about the definition of freedom. The boundaries of freedom are disputable. There is constitution which all subjects including the state itself should respect. Prominence of Islam worries me; that is why I ask myself about the boundaries of freedom. In this sense I share the anxiety of the majority of laic society."

It is seen that Subject 1 mentions that she is worried about the definition of freedom.

It seems that the subject is not satisfied with prominence of Islam.

When Subject 2 was asked if she thinks the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts, she answers as in the following:

"Indeed. Now, door-to-door promotion is outdated, internet and the TV has replaced it; that is why media plays an important role on spreading liberal thoughts. Also social media

encourages people to state their ideas freely. Media is also important in Turkey for the same reasons; we have seen that media caused great transformations on the opinions of people, but of course it should be used consciously. Because if media gets under influence of an authority and tries to orient people in an obsessive manner, it becomes misleading. But media gets more liberal each day in Turkey which is pleasing.”

When the two answers are compared, again a polarization stands out. While Subject 1 believes that media is not independent in Turkey, Subject 2 states that media is getting more independent each day in Turkey. It is again seen that both subjects have given their answers under influence of their political thought.

However, the proofs show that Turkey is still very backward on the independence of journalists. According to the recent reports there are still 76 journalists in prison for opposing to the government. Most of them were arrested under Ergenekon Case.

4.5.2. Women Rights

Moderate Islamists which are not fundamentals attribute importance to the women and see them as individuals. Women’s opportunity to have a voice in today’s Islamist organizations shows that. For example AKP has a women’s branch and they formed a women’s rights commission in the parliament.

Islamists’ obsession is to separate genders in society rather than imprisoning women at home.³⁸⁴ Sometimes, attempts of implementing such rules in Turkish society come into question and they get negative reactions. Islamist SP’s “pink metrobus” proposition in 2012 was one of such projects. SP collected 60,000 signatures from the ladies that were wishing to travel in safety and directed a proposition to the mayor of Istanbul, Kadir Topbaş. This demand occupied country’s agenda for some time and was rejected by the mayor due to negative reactions from the society.³⁸⁵

The status of women is another issue. Some women wear European-style clothes, work outside their home, go to hotels, discos, and beach resorts, and share housework with their husbands. Some women use the scarf traditionally and obey their husbands’ or fathers’ rules. They spend most of their time on housework and taking care

³⁸⁴ op. cit. Roy, 81-82

³⁸⁵ “Pembe Metobüs İmzaları Tamam” (The signatures are Done for the Pink Metrobus), 12.06.2012, Milliyet, 20.07.2013 <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/pembe-metrobus-imzalari-tamam/gundem/gundemdetay/12.06.2012/1552793/default.htm>

of their children. Other women are conservative Muslims and wear burqas, but their numbers are relatively low. According to the constitution, males and females have equal rights and gender discrimination is prohibited. Since now, one woman prime minister, many women ministers, and many women in took place in Turkish parliament³⁸⁶.

Considering the women's role in society subjects of Study C are asked about their opinion on the role of women in Islam. Subject 1 responds as:

“Actually now Islamic feminism has started, now we see that veiled women also have a voice, they run their own businesses and join political activities. Even though the importance of women is increasing, it is possible to say that women still lag behind especially in rural areas of Muslim countries while they have the same rights with men in urban life.”

Subject 2's response on this question is:

“Heaven is under mothers' feet.” idiom means a lot. A politician, a beggar or a soldier are all begotten by a mother; that is why women are very important in Islam. It is also written in the Farewell Sermon of Mohammed that the women were entrusted to men by God; this is also very elucidative. Unfortunately there are still places where women are neglected because they are weaker, such as Afghanistan; it is not possible to speak about women rights there. This is because of the oppressive regimes but in Islam as a religion, it is not possible to say the women are ignored. I suspect the faith of those who mistreat women; because in our religion no one should limit the freedom of others and men should pay attention to women. Some men's desire about suppression of women is an issue related to lack of education. I think the men who mistreat women are either uneducated or mentally unbalanced. Nevertheless, place of women is very important in Turkish society; women have a voice in important platforms. For example while the number of women deputies was 48 in the past, this number has increased to 78 at the present day in Turkish parliament; this is a very good progress. Moreover, the implementations on women rights are very successful; shelter is given to the women suffering from maltreatment, financial aid is given for the women that lost their husbands. Considering that women also take place in important tasks at the present day, we can say that importance given to the women is thriving. One of the other alluring sides of AKP is its respect to women and youth. I hope the number of maltreating people to women will decrease soon.”

When the results are analyzed it is seen both subjects agree that the importance of women gradually increased in the last years. Islamic feminism observation of Subject 1 is remarkable. On the other hand, Subject 2 thinks that women were always important in Islam, but as superstitions became prominent as a result of arbitrary practices on religion, it was perceived in an incorrect way. However, even though Subject 2 mentions that there are good implementations and AKP gives importance to the women, there are still incidents that women get exposed to and result under the circumstances of the male-dominated society.

³⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 678

4.5.3. Social Uprising and Results of Social Polarization

Results of the polarization led to an uprising against the state recently. Two most important of those were the Republic Protests in 2007 and Gezi Park Protests in 2013.

The Republic Protests were the peaceful mass rallies that were organized before the presidential elections in 2007 against the presidency candidature of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or another person that had National Opinion background. Erdoğan's opposers accuse him with having a secret agenda, which he denies.

Millions of people had participated in the meetings which were organized in April and May of 2007 in principal cities of Turkey and emphasized their concern for laicism. The first protests were organized two weeks before the elections in Ankara on 14th of April, fifth and the last one was organized in Izmir on 13th of May. Protesters carried banners of Atatürk and shouted anti-Islamist slogans in order to show their ambition to protect the laic and Kemalist nature of Turkey. The most significant slogan shouted was "Turkey is laic, it will remain laic forever".³⁸⁷

BBC mentions a protester expressed that she was scared about the developments and did not want an Islamic regime in Turkey. She carried on indicating that she was keen on protecting the laic state and that is why she was there.³⁸⁸ Even though some reforms were made by AKP, its attempts such as criminalizing adultery and abortion, restricting consumption of alcoholic beverages and appointing the people from Islamist ideology to key locations of the civil institutions caused an inconvenience for the laic society.

The then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer warned that the Islamism threat was the highest ever in Turkish history a day before the first rally in Ankara. CHP and other opposition parties requested a snap election and the president to be assigned by the new party, but they were not successful on convincing AKP and AKP was very insistent on not announcing its candidate till the last minute.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁷ "Huge Rally for Turkish Secularism", 29.04.2007, BBC, Acc. 18.08.2013
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6604643.stm>

³⁸⁸ loc. cit.

³⁸⁹ loc. cit.

On April 12th, 2007 the then President of General Staff expressed his thoughts by saying “I hope the election of a president who is committed to republican values, unitary form of the laic democratic state not only in words but also in action.”³⁹⁰

Police raided the headquarters of the Nokta Magazine on April 13th, 2007 and seized the computers of the newspaper. The raid happened after the magazine published the journals that were claimed to belong to the president of Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, retired general Şener Eruygur, which comprised coup d’etat plans against AKP government and alleged Turkish Armed Forces with being connected to the powers that initiated the Republic Protests in order to create a social conflict and seeing these conflicts as psychological wars against the political power.³⁹¹ Moreover, the general coordinator of the magazine wrote in his article that today there was not a direct threat of a coup d’etat, but it would be naivety to believe that the organized social protests were completely civil. Speaker of the parliament, Bülent Arınç, called the protests as provocation, but this was perceived as a contra-propaganda by some.³⁹² Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also criticized the protester with being mounted troops which were not aware of what was going on and exaggerating their number.³⁹³ While the protests were seen as a democratic right by some deputies, some others criticized them with being pro-coup. Some pro-AKP journalists accused the protests with being a scenario of Ergenekon and the participants as pro-Ergenekon.

However, in conclusion AKP won the elections with a higher rate than the previous and Abdullah Gül from AKP was elected as the president. The election results were evaluated as the protests were not embraced by a wide segment of the population.

The other incident was the Gezi Park Protest which just started from a group of people that rose against decision of the government to build a shopping mall to the principal park in the city despite court decision against project.³⁹⁴ It also drew opposition as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wanted to build the new shopping

³⁹⁰ “Büyükanıt’tan Cumhurbaşkanı Tarifi” (Characterization of the President from Büyükanıt), 13.04.2007, Ntvmsnbc, Acc. 18.08.2013 <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405388.asp>

³⁹¹ Ali Bayramoğlu, “Alper Görmüş, Nokta ve Ergenekon Güncesi” (Alper Görmüş, Nokta and Ergenekon Journal), 16.05.2011, Aksiyon, Is. 981, Acc. 18.08.2013

http://www.aksyon.com.tr/aksyon/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=29414

³⁹² “Arınç: Mitinge Katılacaklar İyi Düşünmeli” (The Ones that Plan to Participate in the Protests should Consider Good), 12.04.2007, Ntvmsnbc, Acc. 17.08.2013 <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405365.asp>

³⁹³ “Bindirilmiş Kıtalar Burada” (Mounted Troops are Here), 30.04.2007, Radikal, Acc. 17.08.2013 <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=219895>

³⁹⁴ Elif İnce, “Kışlaya Onay Yok” (There is No Approval to the Barracks), 17.01.2013, Radikal, Acc. 17.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/kislanya_onay_yok-1117393

mall in the shape of an old military barracks that was demolished in 1940's from the same place and hosted a reactionist uprising during the last period of Ottoman Empire. In September 16th, 2011, Taksim Pedestrianization Project was ratified by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.³⁹⁵ However, the fact that this project was envisioning construction of a building on the current park area dragged too much negative attention from public and NGO's. As a result, NGO called Taksim Solidarity Network was formed and organized several activities to raise their voices. Excavations at the park started on October 4th, 2012.³⁹⁶ In April 2013, Gezi Park Festival was organized for dragging attention to the situation. Following the entrance of excavation machines in the park on May 27th, 2013, news spread quickly through social media and some activists went to the park to prevent excavation work of municipality. Protesters tried to stop the machines and were successful for the moment; however they faced police's strong intervention.³⁹⁷ Following the incident, people started to flow into the park and stayed there overnight to protect trees for a possible second attack of the municipality. On 29th of May the police attacked the protesters at the park at 5 o'clock in the morning. Prime minister emphasized that they were decisive about building the mall despite strong opposition from the public. On 30th of May, police made a second attack which ascended incidents to a higher level, but retracted eventually leaving the park to the protesters on 1st of June.³⁹⁸ Protests came to an end after the police raid to the park on June 15th, 2013 where all camping equipments were seized by the police. Following the incident, protests carried on a weak nature ceasing by the end of August.³⁹⁹ However, since that time, protests carry on a partial and inconstant basis.

Even though Gezi Park excavations was the prominent reason for the protests, AKP's regulations regarding abortion, alcohol consumption, internet usage, press freedom and bold speeches about Atatürk have also been the factors that escalated the

³⁹⁵ Fatma Aksu, "Taksim'in Üstü Altına İniyor" (Taksim is Getting Upside Down), 04.02.2012, Hürriyet, Acc. 16.07.2013 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19843363.asp>

³⁹⁶ Elif İnce, "Gezi için Gong Vuruldu" (The Gong is Rang), 04.10.2012, Radikal, Acc. 17.08.2013 http://www.radikal.com.tr/cevre/gezi_parki_icin_gong_vuruldu-1102697

³⁹⁷ Ali Ufuk Arıkan, "Boyun Eğmeyenlerin Büyük Direnişi" (The Great Resistance of Non-Surrenderers), 06.06.2013, Sol, Acc. 16.08.2013 <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/boyun-egmeyenlerin-buyuk-direnisi-iste-gun-gun-gezi-parki-direnisi-haberi-74230>

³⁹⁸ "Polis, Taksim Meydanı'ndan Ayrıldı" (Police Has Left Taksim Square), 01.06.2013, Milliyet, Acc. 19.08.2013 <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/flas-haber-polis-taksim/gundem/detay/1717225/default.htm>

³⁹⁹ *Gezi Park Protests*, London: Amnesty International Press, 2013, p. 54

situation.⁴⁰⁰ According to the sources of Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2.5 million people participated in the protests in 79 provinces of Turkey and many others supported the activists through social media which turned into protests against the AKP government.⁴⁰¹ 6 civilians and a police officer lost their lives while 8163 people were injured in the course of events.⁴⁰² Police was criticized for using excessive force against protesters by responding with teargas and water cannons.

⁴⁰⁰ Sibel Utku Bila, "Turkey Pulse", 13.01.2013, Almonitor, Acc. 15.08.2013 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/turkey-censorship-steinbeck.html#>

⁴⁰¹ Tolga Şardan, "2,5 Milyon İnsan 79 İlde Sokağa İndi" (2.5 Million People Got Out to the Streets in 79 Counties), 23.06.2013, Milliyet, Acc. 19.08.2013 <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/2-5-milyon-insan-79-ilde-sokaga/gundem/detay/1726600/default.htm>

⁴⁰² "Ethem Sarısülük'ün Ölüm Nedeni Kurşun" (Ethem Sarısülük's Cause of Death is a Bullet), 15.06.2013, Ntvmsnbc, Acc. 17.08.2013

CONCLUSIONS

Turkish Islam interpretation in historical course is quite problematic in many dimensions. The actual and historical dimensions of these problems should be handled in a way that is clarified on the ideological perceptions and attitudes. The current scientific and intellectual atmosphere in Turkey, should raise serious opinions on how the Islam was perceived by the Turks since now and how it will be perceived in the future. This only will be possible through conducting objective scientific researches at educational institutions. Such kind of a scientific study seems to be as a must for enabling the Turkish people to live in peace.

The Islamism in Abdülhamid 2nd period was a sheer reaction against Ottoman Islam and that is why it is a modernist ideology in its roots. Therefore, it should be classified under modernist ideologies in the Turkish history despite its anti-western attitude. On the other hand, Ottoman Islam is an issue that would provide practical and scientific advantages and should be evaluated in terms of the past and the future of Islam in Turkey together with Turkish political and intellectual history. Ottoman historians should involve themselves on this subject.

Islamic world should avoid denying the West in order to assure the social compromise. They have to do this in the future even if they do not do it at the present day. As a matter of fact, the efforts of the current political power which comes from a modernist Islam tradition to make Turkey, that was established over the Ottoman legacy, a member of EU is a fact that should be investigated very well. Manifestation of a country which bears a Muslim majority with a union that can be characterized as a Christian political union is a very important and historical milestone for the Islamic world that was observed for the first time in history. This is also an event to be analyzed by putting religious reactionist-modernist rhetoric not only by the Islamist Turkish intellectuals, but also laic intellectuals.

Therefore, what should be done to provide this is to take evolution and dynamics of the Western world, Islamic world and Turkey into consideration and take an attitude according to that. It is possible to understand the concerns of the Islamist intellectuals who lived in the 19th and the beginnings of 20th centuries as being the people who lived the consequences of Western imperialism; but there is no need for carrying on such kind

of an attitude at the present day. Yet, Islam had realized its cultural moves in its classical period by not hanging up on the surrounding cultures but by absorbing them. It has the same capacity at the present day, and also the West which considers the Islam world as consisting of only some terrorist circles that show themselves as the groups that act in the name of Islam can also recognize the Islamic world with its real identity and benefit from Islam's wealth in case this can be realized. In other words, both cultures are dependent on each other. A dialogue between Islamist intellectuals that aim to resolve current issues and glorify the humanity rather than running behind a project such as an intercultural dialogue between religions which is unclear and can mean many positive or negative meanings and aims clearly to transform Islam to an understanding similar with Christianity by moderating and overpowering it would definitely be a more realistic approach.

Thus, handling Islamic thought in terms of universal dimension would be for Turkey's advantage while focusing on domestic issues and issues of Islamic world which would lead the way for the Western world to recognize the values of Islamic world. It would be more advantageous if Western intellectuals could put their Islamophobia aside that increased following the September 11 incidents and abandon their otherizing attitude against the Islamic world.

September 11 incidents did not only cause a Muslim hostility in the West, but also a serious interest and learning effort towards the Islamic world. Thus, this event would contribute to extend the tendency of acknowledging tolerance and diversity also to the groups which were historically otherized by the West. It will be more difficult to turn the authentic identity into a tool of imposition through exaggerating the importance of different identities. The identity politics such as Islamism that marked the recent past are still up-to-date. Acting with an Islamic sensibility based on human rights and freedoms is not something that will get disappeared as long as there are the Muslim communities in the world. Even though the same thing is also valid for the different identities, at the present day these identities were successful in finding themselves a place in the global politics. However, Islamist identity still remains as the opposite culture in the basis of clash of civilizations. While Islamism was already seen as an extremist opposite civilization, September 11 incidents has strengthened this perception even more and transformed the Islamic world to the disadvantageous civilization of the

bipolar world. On the other hand, it can be said that this polarization is not a clash of civilizations but a part of an extensive hegemony project which is tried to be legitimized through the terrorism subtext. Even though there might be also circles that would settle with the clash of civilizations thesis, the liberal tendencies would rise as it happens in Turkey at the present day and the perception that Islam bears liberal features would be accepted in time.

Islamists oppose to the modern state because of its central economical and political organization model. This attitude is also a feature of the other modern ideologies that defend the civil society. It was supposed that modern state would bring wealth to the society in the past and the major element of the social welfare state was the nation. But following the rise of globalization, trust towards the state declined, national unity lost its significance, a search for alternative identities has started and Islamism could fit itself very good in the center of this argument.

It would not be incorrect to claim that Islam is being reproduced as a periphery popular opposing culture as a reaction and alternative against the laic westernist identity of the center at the present day. The social circles which form grassroots of the right wing conservative parties are commonly these circles which embrace this identity. The Islamic rhetoric of these parties which frequently are interpreted as swerving from laicism or using religion as a political tool, verbalize the expectations of the circles which should normally be answered by the government even though the requests are not shared by the party cadres and are verbalized only with the concern of obtaining political power.

Along with this, the 2nd and 3rd generations who migrated to the principle urban areas, show efforts to be arbiters of the future of Turkey by taking part in many spheres of public space such as economy, politics, bureaucracy, higher education and getting organized in politics and economics. This sociological fact which is perceived as religious reactionism by the laic circles is nothing more than refilling the place of Islam which was by-passed during the westernization process. This silent majority which was forced to settle with what the republic offered during the single-party period; look decisive on raising their voice, stepping out of the mosque and demand their cultural rights. This majority has left the mosque and entered all in sectors of the public space. The struggle between these circles and the laic elite is the struggle for not relinquishing

the rights which the Islamists gained. If this struggle would not fall into the trap of fanaticism and corruption, it is clear that it will make an important contribution to democratization.

It is obvious that the opposing society started to reproduce the popular Islamic culture at the present day. However, it is a fact that this culture is considerably less quality than the Ottoman period. Turkish Muslimhood presently demonstrates its villager identity in every sphere. However, the recent developments show that the quality of popular Islam increases gradually parallel to the economical, political and intellectual development of urbanizing Muslim society.

At the present day, there is still a society that wants to keep Islam out of scope in the modernization programs intended for the future of Turkey. The mistake of the Kemalist elite lies herein. Even though Kemalism became successful in the period it emerged, it could not keep this success and lost its sustainability in the changing global conditions. Kemalism rightfully kept Islam responsible of what devastated Ottoman Empire became; founded the republic which adopted positive values by terminating Islam's political, social and cultural existence and declared itself as the official ideology. However its precluding attitude against Islam's conservative manner, transformed into an ideological struggle that necessitates the reconciliation of both sides. At the end of this struggle it will be possible to see a Turkey that absorbed democratic values.

Turkish Muslimhood exhibits an attitude which could still not settle accounts with its past and became yoked to it because of not having enough rational knowledge on it, and still searches for a consolation in the golden era of Islam which it sanctified through several tales. The inferiority complex that it felt towards the technological and social superiority of the West, have transformed into hostility against it. These attitudes make Turkish Muslimhood utopian and unoriginal. In case of coming over its complex, Turkish Muslimhood can reflect a very healthy, tolerant and original Islam image to the Western world by using its historical and strategic advantages. But, in order to do this, it has to accept that Islam is a religion which was also sent to be lived in a materialistic world and provide a rational worldview.

There is also the role of lack of knowledge on Islam along with the ideological impositions at the base of the Kemalism-Islam conflict in Turkey which predominantly

bears a Muslim identity. It is often seen that this lack of knowledge creates gaps also on scientific and intellectual life together with political life. It became ordinary to see that these gaps often cause serious situations that periodically rise after 1950's and can endanger the social compromise in the debates which are based on Islam, are held among political circles and media and are devoid of a scientific base, in ideological publications and the incidents in the recent past. Islam which is debated between Kemalist and Islamist intellectuals on ideological and reactionist platforms in Turkey usually aggregate on some conflictive topics such as Shari'a that prevents to see the big picture and this proves how both sides are incompetent on what they debate on. The current radical laic and radical Islamist ideologies prevent the state, politicians and intellectuals to steer for enlightenment. Islam's master by all segments of the society, but especially the politicians, intellectuals and bureaucrats, is extremely necessary and urgent. Otherwise the dichotomies and conflicts that are caused by them will never come to an end.

The incorrect historical perception which was formed as an outcome of the accumulation that congregated under the effect of political and social crises during the centuries since the foundation of Islam is the greatest diffraction in the evolution course of the Islamic societies because of the social conscious conflict it has created. This incorrect perception arises as the most basic factor which affects all spheres of the social and political life. This incorrect historical perspective comes in the first place of the reasons which make some people to see Islam as a personal passive belief, some others as a habit which is limited with worshipping and some others to perceive as a political ideology. What causes the societies to be confused about Islam's place in social life and in the globalizing world is this lack of perspective. As this lack of knowledge carries on, a deformed Islam understanding holds Islamic world as a captive. Thus, formation of a healthy historical perspective would make an important contribution in resolution of the social and political problems caused by this incorrect historical perception. In this sense, investigations should be done in order to understand the real message that Prophet Mohammed gave 1400 years ago and interpret the message according to the conditions of the present day. This investigation which should be done by the Islamic scientists rather than the ordinary Muslim society would enable the society to see what type of distortions that was applied to the real message along the centuries.

Islamism should not be perceived only as the rise of Islamic values. Even though this is a part of the decline of modernism, Islamism should be handled as a tool of legitimizing the political struggle. This determination is accurate both for 19th century Ottoman and 20th century Turkish Islamism. 19th century Islamism was an outcome of the legitimization pursuit of Ottoman Empire against the social conflicts of the period. Following this period, nationalism was the rising ideology and Islam's political character remained to be seen as a legitimization tool. At the present day Islamism rose once more to legitimize a post-nationalist identity politics.

19th century Islamist reformism reidentified Islam in order to transform it according to the needs of the modern society. However, this interference resulted with a total elimination of Islam from the social and cultural life. Islamist reformism was a reconciliation movement which led to nationalism and acknowledgement of nation-state. The usage of Islamist ideology as a political mobilization tool at the present day was an outcome of the modernist political approach and formation of the nation-state. However, when the modern social welfare state model of the West declined, Islam was once more seen as an alternative legitimacy tool.

The social base of political Islam in Turkey is a vertical bloc which nestles different socio-economic categories. While the intentions of these different segments vary from each other, the main point that they are united is anti-Kemalism and the desire to arise as an alternative to it. Thus, RP became successful on gathering these different clusters under the same roof and arising as a strong opposition movement against the status-quo. It is possible to group RP's social base in three clusters: the SME's whose interests were conflicting with the large industries in the principal cities, rural originated, university graduate periphery elements of the professional middle class that bore a conservative characteristic and recently urbanized periphery elements of the workers class who were marginalized because of the lack of employment guarantee.

Each of these groups developed in numbers and in terms of social and economical power. This kind of opposing ideologies gained strength as a result of decline of the social welfare state model as a result of globalization and postmodernism. Thus, decrease of the protective policies has made the repressive side of the nation state more visible and opened the way for the critics against Kemalism. As the global capital strengthened the capital class and professionals in the periphery, Islamist movement

arose with its radical rhetoric against westernization project and successfully promoted itself as the architect of this process to the circles whose dependency decreased to westernization project in 1990's.

Growth of RP was an unexpected event for the Kemalists as Islamism was identified with traditionalism and religious reactionism according to modernist theory, but instead of disappearing it rose directly proportional to the rise of capitalism in Turkey and gained strength especially in the urban areas. The perspective which supposed RP's ideology as religious reactionist was missing the perspective that its radicalism was representing the need of change in the country. RP undertook the objective to protect the civil society against the state and had an alternative attitude in many subjects. It successfully played upon the disappointment of that westernization project, which was already not feasible, caused. It was convincing that RP provided radical alternatives but the method it followed in order to draw more electorates to the party by claiming that it was the real protector of laic values was very incredible. RP's successes showed how much the laic political powers were incompetent to meet the demands of the society.

It is usually believed that how much the society participates in the political process that less it radicalizes. But in Turkey, apparently the repression brought moderation. A political tendency that promoted itself as an alternative to the central politics, ended up with sharing the same repressive values with the others. It is challenging to understand how a party can be democratic in an undemocratic system. Turkish political life shows that being in for an election has a moderator effect on non-central movements. Islamist parties were considerably successful in election competitions. This shows that Islamist parties can only be as democratic as the current political system enables it as sharing the same cultural environment with all other political elements.

Political culture of Turkey is shared by all elements in the society including the Islamists. RP was also a part of the same political system. While other parties were being closed RP stood idly by their closure and thus it also was not supported in its closure process despite almost begging to the other parties. Therefore, Islamist movement tried to embrace a more democratic attitude after RP's closure, but it failed

to show its sincerity by not supporting the democratic demonstrations against the state-mafia cooperation.

RP's strategy was not based on democracy but on seizing the state administration. RP and FP approached the political rights subject in an opportunist and discriminative attitude. They both wanted the rights for their grassroots and thus failed to form a common language in order to contribute extension of democratic rights; instead, they focused on seizing the governmental institution through political games.

Even though it was extensively promoted that Islam and democracy were compatible by RP, it failed to contribute the development of democratic values as it followed a biased policy. In order to evaluate how democratic was RP, the lack of democratic awareness in Turkish political culture should be evaluated rather than Islam's own values.

Increasing cultural otherization and discriminative approach that became evident in each sphere of social life polarizes the society by marginalizing them in laic-anti-laic, urban-rural, modern-traditional, liberal-conservative and westernist-Islamist axes gradually taking the shape of a class conflict.⁴⁰³ These dichotomies orient the state politics, bureaucracy and education according to the tendency of political powers and flare up conflicts from time to time.

At that point, state blames the foreign focuses for the identity crisis that it cannot resolve and demonstrates a self-contradictory. This situation causes the state to lose prestige inside and outside its borders and is the prognosticator of a blocked system.

Turkey, which gained its independence out of an invaded empire, set off claiming to form a new and classless society. But placement of Kemalism, which denied its past and established its system on laicism, to the space that fell vacant from Islam by itself caused Kemalism to be perceived almost as a new religion. Thus, Kemalist elite cadres assumed that Islam could easily get removed out of people's lives forever after reducing it to a conscientious level.

As a matter of fact, Kemalism eliminated Islam from state politics and legal system by leaving only the areas of social ethics, faith and worship which were also

⁴⁰³ op. cit., Ocak, p. 145

strictly taken under state control.⁴⁰⁴ This resulted with the continuation of conflicts increasingly especially after 1960's.

Author Ahmet Yaşar Ocak states that Turkey made some mistakes in its politics which eventually were effective on the mentioned dichotomy:

- Turkey assumed that it could transform the multi-ethnic society that was living in Anatolia for a long time to a classless and united nation that did not allow ethnical distinction. Nevertheless, the ethnical and class conflicts started at 1960 and intensified at 1980's showed that this was not accomplished. Ironically Turkish politicians kept foreign powers responsible of the situation instead of accepting their fault.
- Turkey did not think that some of its neighbors, which were parts of an empire that it ruled once upon a time, could have complex against itself and this situation could become an issue in the future. Instead Turkey ignored the past and preferred to base its future politics on peace in the homeland and the world. It made all the arrangements to be a part of the West because it was seeing its future there. But many issues emerged in the republican period such as Cyprus conflict, Armenian conflict and crisis with Bulgaria showed that Turkey was mistaken about its expectations and it was necessary to confront and resolve these issues.
- Turkey thought communism would never come to an end and disregarded the reality that it has cognates in the Central Asia. But it faced the truth with the collapse of communism.
- Thus, Turkey was mistaken about the world it inhabited and was puzzled with the emergence of issues one after another. Incompetency of politicians caused them to lose control of the situation and paved the way for foreign intervention even in smallest issues.
- Turkey's first issue was Cyprus issue in 1960 and it still could not get resolved.
- Armenian issue came into the agenda in 1973 and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused the responsibility by claiming that it was Ottoman Empire's issue. But eventually Turkey had to take the responsibility which remained unresolved since then.

⁴⁰⁴ Ahmet İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı (Depression of Turkish Society)*, İstanbul: Birikim, 1990, p.p. 114-117

- The Kurdish issue broke out in 1984 and it still occupies the agenda. The political power usually evaded this issue by ridiculous arguments and tried to provide a resolution through several military interventions.
- In 1996, this time an issue concerning the religious beliefs of Alevis broke out and with the set of Madımak Hotel on fire by the Islamists, the conflict between Alevis and Sunnis was carried to a new dimension. Also in this issue, the political circles did not show a notable existence.⁴⁰⁵

Turkey was deprived of a scientific perspective because of the politicians that did not have enough knowledge and strategic skills during these conflicts. On the contrary, it was seen how knowledgeable the West was. Unfortunately this point of view still continues. Because the state could not resolve issues with scientific methods, issues dragged the state into their trajectory.⁴⁰⁶

In this context, Kemalism-Islamism conflict blocks Turkey off from developing. This conflict that influences every aspect of life resembles a conflict of two religions. This problem should be resolved as soon as possible before confronting more conflicts. In this frame Atatürk's personality should be separated from the Kemalist ideology and the practices during the single-party period following Atatürk's death should be handled. This situation should be avoided from turning to an unnecessary Atatürk hostility. Both Islamists and laics should criticize opinions of each other respectfully and should not violate the freedom of opinion.

In order to resolve the current situation, high culture (Kemalist, laic, modern, urban) circles should remember that Kemalism is not a religion to compete with Islam; accept that it should exist along with Islam and it can be criticized. Likewise, low culture (Islamist, anti-laic, traditional, rural) circles should accept that faith in Islam and Islam state are different and should understand how much the states which used Islam as an ideology suffered recently. Beside all those, serious scientific researches about both ideologies should be supported and people's access to objective resources should be provided by the elimination of corrupted information.

⁴⁰⁵ op. cit., Ocak, p. 150

⁴⁰⁶ ibid., 152

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ANNEXES

GLOSSARY

Abant Platform: It is a platform that was founded in 1998 and it is supported by the Association of Journalists and Writers. It was named after Abant, a place renowned for its lake between Bolu mountains in Turkey. Its agenda can include any actual and cultural subjects that would bring a solution to any kind of questions in the society. It is a national platform, however it also has international organizations on its agenda. Intellectuals organize meetings to discuss global and national issues and brainstorm on their resolutions.

Abdullah Gül: (born 29 October 1950) He is the 11th and current President of Turkey, serving since 28 August 2007. He previously served for four months as Prime Minister from 2002 to 2003, and as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2003 to 2007. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's nomination of Gül as a presidential candidate drew strong and highly vocal opposition from ardent supporters of secularism in Turkey. In May 2007, Gül's first bid for presidency was blocked by the Constitutional Court, due to concern over views Gül expressed during his Welfare Party years. However, following the parliamentary elections in July of the same year, which were won by the Justice and Development Party with 46.6% of the popular vote, he was eventually elected President on 28 August 2007 and becoming the first president of Islamist background in the modern history of Turkey.

Abdurrahman Dilipak: (Born 1949) He is Radical Islamic author and columnist for the radical Islamic newspaper Yeni Akid.

Abdülhamit the 2nd: (22 September 1842 – 10 February 1918) He was the 99th caliph of Islam and the 34th sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He was the last Sultan to exert effective control over the Ottoman Empire. He oversaw a period of decline in the power and extent of the Empire, ruling from 31 August 1876 until he was deposed on 27 April 1909.

Ahmet Yaşar Ocak: (Born 1952) Historian and author. Professor, Department of History at Hacettepe University.

Ali Bardakoğlu: (Born 1952) He is the former president of Presidency of Religious Affairs and as such the highest Islamic authority in Turkey. He is well known in Turkey and Europe as a moderate Islamic leader. He met with Pope Benedict XVI on November 28, 2006 in Ankara to help further interfaith dialog between Catholics and Muslims.

Ali Bulaç: (Born 1951), Sociologist, theologian, journalist, writer and Islamic author. he graduated from Istanbul's Higher Islamic Institute in 1975 and from the Department of Sociology at the Istanbul University's Faculty of Literature in 1980. he wrote a translation in Turkish of the Qur'an, He is renowned for his researches on Contemporary Islamic world, problems of opinions and social changes and innovations. In the books he wrote, he expresses the attitudes that muslim people need to adopt in the modern world.

Ali Yaşar Sarıbay: (Born 1952) Political scientist and sociologist. Professor of Political and Social Sciences at Uludağ University.

ANAP: The Motherland Party, (Turkish: Anavatan Partisi, abbreviated as ANAVATAN (formerly ANAP) is a political party in Turkey. It was founded in 1983 by Turgut Özal.[1] It was merged to Democratic Party in October 2009. In September 2011, the party was re-established. Its president is İbrahim Çelebi. The ANAP was considered a centre-right nationalist party which supported restrictions on the role that government can play in the economy, which favoured private capital and enterprise, and which allowed for some public expressions of religion. In the National Assembly on 6 November 1983, the Populist Party and the Motherland party were allowed to run for office. The ANAP won 212 of the 450 available seats and Turgut Özal, the leader of the party, became the Prime Minister. The ANAP maintained a majority in the government of Turkey from 1983 until 1991. Turgut Özal held the position of Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989, then President from 1989 to 1993.

AKP: The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), known in Turkey by its Turkish acronym, AKP, was formed by a group of reformist politicians with roots in the Islamic movement. Its most prominent leaders are Abdullah Gül and Tayyip R. Erdoğan. Founded in 2001 by members of a number of existing parties, the party won a landslide victory in the 2002 election, winning over two-thirds of parliamentary seats.

Alevism: Alevism (Alevîlik) is a religious group combining Anatolian folk Shi'ism with Sufi elements such as those of the Bektashi tariqa, with some schools drawing influence from Tengrism and/or Zoroastrianism. Believers live almost entirely in Turkey, with minorities in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Crimea, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Tatarstan, Vojvodina, and the Turkish Diaspora. Alevism is also a group identity which is variously interpreted as cultural (emphasizing special traditions of poetry, music and dance), humanistic and/or political - whether leftist or Kemalist.

AP: The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) was a Turkish political party prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. A descendant of the Democrat Party, the AP was dominated by Süleyman Demirel, who served six times as prime minister, and was in office at the time of the military coup on September 12, 1980. Along with all other political parties in Turkey, the justice Party was suppressed in the immediate aftermath of the coup. It was subsequently reestablished as the True Path Party in 1983. Justice Party was moderate right-wing party. It advocated Kemalist principles and Western-style democracy and economic system. It strongly supported membership in NATO and close relations with the United States.

Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: (1878 – March 23, 1960), commonly known as Bediüzzaman (Badi' al-Zaman), which means "The Wonder of the Age" was a Sunni Muslim theologian who wrote the Risale-i Nur Collection, a body of Qur'anic commentary exceeding six thousand pages. Believing that modern science and logic was the way of the future, he advocated teaching religious sciences in secular schools and modern sciences in religious schools. Nursi inspired a faith movement that has played a vital role in the revival of Islam in Turkey and now numbers several millions of followers world wide.

Bülent Ecevit: (28 May 1925 – 5 November 2006) was a Turkish politician, poet, writer, scholar, and journalist, who was the leader of Republican People's Party (CHP), later of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and five-time Prime Minister of Turkey. Following the 1980 coup led by General Kenan Evren , Ecevit was incarcerated and suspended from active politics for life along with the other political leaders of the time. A referendum in 1987 lifted his ban from politics, and he became the chairman of the Democratic Left Party (Turkish: Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP). Ecevit's government undertook a number of reforms aimed at stabilizing the Turkish economy in preparation for accession negotiations with the European Union. He also translated the great ancient Sanskrit poem.

Cemal Gürsel: (1895–1966), He was a Turkish army officer, and the fourth President of Turkey. He fought in World War I and in most of the military campaigns during the war of independence (1920-1923). Gürsel remained in the army and in 1958 became commander of Turkish ground forces. A popular army figure, he led the coup of May, 1960, which overthrew Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (see also Turkey). Gürsel resisted attempts to continue military rule and was elected president of the republic in 1961. Because of illness, he was succeeded as president by Cevdet Sunay in Mar., 1966, and died in September.

CHP: The Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) is a Kemalist, social liberal and social democratic political party in Turkey. It is the oldest political party of Turkey and is currently Main Opposition in the Grand National Assembly. The Republican People's Party describes itself as "a modern social-democratic party, which is faithful to founding principles and values of the Republic of Turkey. Also the party is cited as "the founding party of modern Turkey". During the interim "multi-party periods" in between the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, CHP is regarded as being social-democratic (member of the Socialist International),[9] state nationalistic and secular/laicist. The party's logo consists of the Six Arrows, which represent the foundational principles of Kemalist Ideology: republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, laïcité, and revolutionism.

CHP, along with all other political parties of the time, was closed down for a brief period by the military coup of 1980. An inheritor party which still participates in Turkish democratic life, was established in 1984, as the Democratic Left Party by the former leader of CHP, Bülent Ecevit. CHP was finally reestablished with its original name on 9 September 1992, with the participation of a majority of its previous members of the pre-1980 period.

At the elections held on June 12, 2011, CHP was able to increase the number & the percentage of voters to 11,155,972 & 25,98% respectively. Analysts attributed the increase to a change both in leadership after Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu became the leader as well as focusing on the social issues during the elections campaign.

Compulsory Religious Education: Intended for the restoration of the Imam Hatip schools, the compulsory religious education was constituted within the 4+4+4 educational system.

Clientelism: The favoring of one person or group over others with equal claims; partiality.

ÇYDD: The Association for Supporting Contemporary Life (est.1989) is a non-governmental organization, working voluntarily with its competencies and experience, aiming to protect Atatürk's principles and revolutions, to reach contemporary society via contemporary education for contemporary people and to carry Turkey above the contemporary civilization level.

DP: The Democratic Party (Turkish : Demokrat Parti , DP for short) was a Turkish moderately right wing political party, and the country's third legal opposition party, after the Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) established by Ali Fethi Okyar in 1930, and the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) established by Nuri Demirağ in 1945. Founded and led by Celal Bayar , it was the first of the opposition parties to rise to power, de-seating the Republican People's Party during the national elections of 1950 and ending Turkey's one party era.

DSP: Democratic Left Party (Turkish: Demokratik Sol Parti - DSP) is a Turkishpolitical party founded on November 14, 1985, by Rağsan Ecevit. It was a minor party until it won 76 parliamentary seats in the December 1995 elections.

DYP: Right Path Party (Turkish: Doğru Yol Partisi or DYP) is a centre-right, conservative Turkish political party, established by Suleyman Demirel in 1983. It succeeded thehistorical Democratic Party and the Justice Party - two parties with similar ideologies which were closed by military coup regimes. There have been four DYP governments since its foundation; one led by Demirel, the other three by Turkey's first woman prime minister, Tansu Çiller. Remained outside the parliament in 2007 and the next elections.

Fellow Countrymanship: Citizens collectively. It defines the relation between citizens of the same nation. It is mostly used to define the feeling of belonging to the same geographical location with other citizens of one's nation.

FP: Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) is founded in 1998. Short-lived successor to the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in Turkey. Became the leading opposition party. Led by Recai Kutan. Proclaimed a softer Islamic profile than Refah, emphasizing Turkey's Islamic traditions and culture; this change was symbolized by the appointment of three non-Islamist, non-hijab-wearing women to the party's executive board. Favored full integration with the West to ensure civilian rule and democracy in Turkey. Fared well in the 1998 municipal elections and proved successful in providing social services. Came in third in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Accused of being an illegal Islamic organization and was banned in 2001, making it the sixteenth political party to be outlawed in Turkey since 1983.

Graham Fuller: He is an American author and political analyst who specialized in Islamic extremism. He was formerly vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council who also served as Station Chief in Kabuk for the CIA. He is the author of a number of books, including *The Future of Political Islam*

Haldun Gülalp: Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yıldız Technical University

İP: Workers' Party (Turkish: İşçi Partisi) is political party in Turkey led by Doğu Perinçek. They are known as "Aydınlıklar" (Clarifiers) due to their daily newspaper "Aydınlık" (Clarity) that has a circulation of 63.000. Workers' Party is established in 1992. The İP traditionally combined Maoist rhetoric with a hardline Kemalism. They admire the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (who is considered a "left-wing bourgeois democratic revolutionary" by most of the party members) as much as they admire Marxist revolutionary leaders such as Lenin, Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro. According to them, separatism became a tool of US imperialism in breaking national markets in the Third World in post- Cold War conditions.

İmam-Hatip Schools: İmam Hatip school (Turkish: İmam Hatip Lisesi, 'hatip' coming from Arabic 'khatib', meaning the one who delivers the "khutba" (Friday sermon) is a secondary education institution. As the name suggests, they were originally founded in lieu of a vocational school to train government employed imams; after madrasas in Turkey were abolished by the Unification of Education Act (Turkish: Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) as a part of Atatürk's reforms.

İskender Paşa Community: This community depends on the Halidiye branch of the Naqshbandi Tariqah and it started when its leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku was assigned as an imam in the mosque called Iskender Pasha. Today this Sufistic movement is still alive under the leadership of Muharrem Nurettin Cosan.

Some of the important politicians that were followers of this movement are Necmettin Erbakan, Turgut Özal, Recai Kutan, Korkut Özal, Cevat Ayhan, Ahmet Tekdal, Akif Güle, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Temel Karamollaoğlu, Nevzat Yalçıntaş.

İsmet İnönü: (24 September 1884 – 25 December 1973) was a Turkish Army General, the Prime Minister, and second President of Turkey. In 1938, the Republican People's Party gave him the title of "Millî Şef" (National Chief). When the 1934 Surname Law was adopted, Mustafa Kemal gave him a surname delivered from İnönü, where he commanded the forces of Army of Grand National Assembly as the Minister of the Chief of the General Staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reis Vekili) during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. After the War of Independence was won, İsmet Pasha was appointed as the chief negotiator of the Turkish delegation, both for the Armistice of Mudanya and for the Treaty of Lausanne. He became famous for his resolve and stubbornness in defending Turkey's demands while conceding very little to the other side at the negotiating table. After the death of Atatürk, İnönü was viewed as the most appropriate candidate to succeed him, and was elected the second President of the Republic of Turkey and enjoyed the official title of "Millî Şef", i.e. "National Chief". As prime minister (1923–24, 1925–37) he ably seconded the reforms of Atatürk, whom he succeeded (1938) as president of the republic. İnönü instituted free general elections for the first time in 1950; his party was defeated, and he was succeeded by Celal Bayar. After a military coup (1960; see Turkey) and the promulgation of a new constitution, İnönü's Republican People's party won a parliamentary plurality in the elections of 1961.

İsmet Özel: (Born 19 September, 1944) is a Turkish poet and scholar. Özel's songs of freedom derived its content from socialism but their structure and symbolism reflected the tastes of the Second New Generation movement in Turkish poetry. In the 1970s, Özel developed a mystic and Islamist view which shocked his leftist audience.

Kadir Topbaş: (Born 8 January 1945) He is a Turkish architect, right-wing regional politician and the current mayor of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality in Turkey. He entered politics as member of the religious oriented Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) and became mayor of Beyoğlu district in İstanbul, where he lives. In the 2004 regional elections, Kadir Topbaş ran for the post of mayor of İstanbul from the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) and won.

Kemalism: Kemalism, also known as Atatürkism (Turkish: Kemalizm, Atatürkçülük, Atatürkçü düşünce), or the Six Arrows (Turkish: Altı ok), is the founding ideology of Turkey. Kemalism defines a sweeping political, social, cultural and religious reforms in which all Turkish citizens were declared equal without reference to religion in creating a secular, national, unitary state from Ottoman Empire (empire of Faith). Kemalism is emerged in part from within the tradition of Comtean scientific positivism in the Turkish context, it creates the political futures according to human, rather than divine design, so it embodies "secular" and "modern" properties in the fulfillment of many political goals (individual freedom, citizen equality, rational and accountable education and governing structures) of the European modernity in Muslim context. It is the political ideology established by the first president and the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Kenan Evren: (Born 17 July 1917) He was the seventh President of Turkey from 1980 to 1989. He assumed the post by leading the 1980 military coup. He professed great admiration for the founder of Turkey, Kemal Atatürk , however he shut down many institutions founded by Atatürk and is often accused of deforming the country's legal system against Atatürk's principles. During his military regime, many people were tortured and executed due to their political beliefs. After Bülent Ecevit's death, he expressed remorse over the arrest of political leaders after the 12 September coup.[8] but defended the coup itself and the 35 executions.[12] Civilian resentment exists, and there have been demands for his being called to account, following the Ergenekon investigation.

Laicism: French secularity, in French, laïcité is a concept denoting the absence of religious involvement in government affairs as well as absence of government involvement in religious affairs. In Turkey, a strong stance of secularism has held sway since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Turkish revolution in the early 20th century. On March 3, 1924 Turkey removed the caliphate system and all religious influence from the state. Sunni Islam, the majority

religion, is now controlled by the Turkish government through the Department of Religious Affairs, and is state-funded while other religions or sects have independence on religious affairs. Islamic views which are deemed political are censored in accordance with the principle of secularism.

Mesut Yılmaz: (Born 6 November 1947) He is a Turkish politician. He was the leader of the Motherland Party (Turkish: Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) from 1991 to 2002, and served three times as Prime Minister of Turkey. His first two prime-ministerial terms lasted just months (in 1991 and 1996), while the third ran from June 1997 to January 1999. The first was brought to an end by defeat in the 1991 elections, the latter two by the breakdown of Yılmaz's coalition governments.

MHP: The Nationalist Movement Party (also translated as 'Nationalist Action Party') (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, abbreviated to MHP), is a far-right political party in Turkey. In 1965, nationalist politician Alparslan Türkeş gained control of the conservative rural Republican Villagers National Party and on 8–9 February 1969, Türkeş changed the name of the party to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The party later was reformed in 1983 under the name of the Conservative Party. After 1985, however, the name was changed to the Nationalist Task Party then back again to its former name in 1992. In the 2011 elections, the party is headed by Devlet Bahçeli and has 52 deputies.

Military Coup of 1960: The coup of May, 27th (Turkish: 27 Mayıs Darbesi) was the first coup d'état in Turkey, staged by a group of Turkish military officers acting outside the Staff Chiefs' chain of command, against the democratically elected government of the Democrat Party on 27 May 1960. The junta forced 235 generals and more than 3000 other commissioned officers to retirement; purged more than 500 judges and public prosecutors, and 1400 university faculty members; put the chief of the General Staff, the president, the prime minister and other members of the administration under arrest, followed by the appointment of the chief of the Army Staff, general Cemal Gürsel, as president, prime minister and the minister of defense.

MNP: National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) was an Islamist political party in Turkey, which adopted the National View (Millî Görüş) ideology. It was founded on 26 January 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. It was closed down on 20 May 1971 by the authorities on the grounds, that it violated the Constitution, specifically the articles dealing with secularism. It was succeeded by the National Salvation Party (MSP) established in October 1972.

MSP: The National Salvation Party (Turkish: Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP) was an Islamist political party in Turkey founded on 11 October 1972 as the successor of the banned National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi, MNP). The party was led by Necmettin Erbakan. The party grew more popular, in 1973 elections it gained 11.8% of votes and was granted 48 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in 1977 elections it gained 8.56% of votes and won 24 seats. In 1974 it formed the coalition government with the secularist Republican People's Party (CHP) of Bülent Ecevit. MSP was closed down after the 1980 military coup. It was succeeded by the Welfare Party (RP), which was founded in 1983.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881 Thessaloniki – 10 November 1938 İstanbul) was the founder and first President of the Republic of Turkey. He was a division commander during the Battle of Gallipoli in 1915 and was instrumental in preventing the partition of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace through his political and military leadership in the Turkish War of Independence. The successful anti-imperialist resistance drove out the various Allied occupying forces, and ultimately led to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Atatürk then instituted reforms in the political, economic and cultural aspects of life in Turkey, which led to the creation of a democratic secular nation-state guided by educational and scientific progress. Atatürk is internationally known as an outstanding statesman, soldier, commander, reformer, and nation-builder who introduced many reforms with the aim of founding a new secular democratic and modern republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As a visionary, revolutionary figure, and political thinker, he strove to set Turkey on a path from which Turks today vow not to stray (this path included a series of political, legal, cultural, social and economic reforms, such as the emancipation of women, change in dress and alphabet). Atatürk's legacy and principles are deeply embedded in the Turkish national consciousness, while the results of his reform and modernization movement are firmly rooted in all realms and dimensions of life in Turkey.

Mustafa Özel: (Born 1956) Columnist and Professor of Management at İstanbul Şehir University.

MÜSİAD: MÜSİAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), an Islamically-oriented business association, is a group which must be studied within the context of both the business associations that constitute an essential element of civil society and the Islamic movements in Turkey. Founded in 1990.

National View: Millî Görüş (literally English: National Vision). In 1969 the Turkish Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan published a manifesto that he gave the title Millî Görüş. That emphasizes the moral and spiritual strength of Islamic faith (Iman) and explains the Muslim world's decline as a result of its imitation of Western values (such as secularism) and inappropriate use of Western technology.

Naqshbandi Tariqah: Naqshbandi (an-Naqshbandiyyah, Nakşibendi, Naksibendi, Naksbandi) is the major spiritual order of Sunni Islam Sufism. It is the only Sufi way that traces its spiritual lineage to the Islamic prophet Muhammad, through Abu Bakr, the first Caliph and Muhammad's companion. Some Naqshbandi orders trace their lineage through Ali, Muhammad's cousin, son-in-law and the fourth Caliph, in keeping with most other Sufi paths.

Necmettin Erbakan: (29 October 1926 – 27 February 2011) Influential Islamist politician who became Turkish prime minister from 1996 until 1997. He was pressured by the military to step down as prime minister and later banned from politics by the constitutional court. He was found guilty of financial irregularities in spending of party funds.

Nur Community: Nurism, is an islamic movement that started in the beginning of 20th century, depending on the thoughts and philosophy of Said Nursi which he mentioned in Risale-i Nur. Said Nursi defined his followers as Nur Disciples and Nurists.

Nureddin Yıldız: (Born 1952) Radical Islamic author.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: (Born 26 February 1954) He is the 25th and current Prime Minister of Turkey, in office since 2003. He is also the chairman of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which holds a majority of the seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He was served as Mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998. He was established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001.

RP: The Welfare Party(Refah Partisi, RP) was an Islamist political party in Turkey (1984 – 1998). After the reopening of political life in 1983, the third pro-Islamic party, Refah Partisi (RP), was established in March 1984 under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal. Following a referendum the same year, the restitution of political rights to party leaders was accepted. This encouraged Erbakan, who once more assumed the leadership of RP. Erbakan became prime minister in 1996. However, his controversial visits to Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran led the military to exert pressure for the resignation of the RP coalition government in June 1997. The Constitutional Court banned the party in February 1998 on grounds of antiseccular policies.

Samuel P. Huntington: (April 18, 1927 - December 24,2008) He was a political scientist renowned for his analysis of the relationship between the military and the civil government, defending that the central political actors of the 21st century will be civilizations, not the nation-states.

SME: Small and medium enterprises or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, small and medium-sized businesses, The abbreviation "SME" is used in the European Union and by international organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Small enterprises outnumber large companies by a wide margin and also employ many more people. SMEs are also said to be responsible for driving innovation and competition in many economic sectors.

SP: The Felicity Party (Turkish: Saadet Partisi) is a Turkish political party founded in 2001. It is mainly supported by conservative Muslims in Turkey.

It was founded on 20 July 2001 after the Virtue Party (FP) was banned by the Constitutional Court. While the party's reformist wing formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the hardliners founded the Felicity Party. Although an Islamist party, its policy platform covers the whole span of political issues in Turkey. The Felicity Party's policy platform is based strongly around Erbakan's ideas and philosophy.

Süleyman Demirel: (Born 1 November 1924) He is a Turkish politician who served as Prime Minister of Turkey seven times. Following the military coup of September 12, 1980, he was banned from involvement in active politics for ten years. The September 6, 1987 referendum returned Demirel to active politics. Despite being banned from active politics for seven years, Demirel managed to form seven governments during his political career that spans three decades. He was the ninth President of Turkey from 1993 to 2000.

The Constitutional Court of Turkey: The Constitutional Court of Turkey (Turkish: Anayasa Mahkemesi) is the highest legal body for constitutional review in Turkey. It "examines the constitutionality, in respect of both form and substance, of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly" (Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution). When necessary, it also functions as the Supreme Criminal Court (Turkish: Yüce Divan) to hear any cases raised about the President of the Republic, members of the Council of Ministers, or presidents and members of the high courts.

The Greater Middle East Project: The Greater Middle East is a political term coined by the Bush administration to denote various countries, pertaining to the Muslim world, specifically Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Various Central Asian countries are sometimes also included. Some speakers may use the term to denote areas with significant Muslim majorities, but this usage is not universal. The Greater Middle East is sometimes referred to as "The New Middle East", or "The Great Middle East Project"

The Gülen Movement: The Gülen movement is a transnational religious and social movement led by Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. The movement has attracted supporters and critics in Turkey, Central Asia and increasingly in other parts of the World. The movement is active in education (with private schools in over 140 countries) and interfaith dialogue; and has substantial investments in media, finance, and for-profit health clinics. The movement has been described as a "pacifist, modern-minded Islam, often praised as a contrast to more extreme Salafism." The movement has no official name but it is usually called simply as Hizmet (The Service) by its followers and is known euphemistically as Cemaat (The Community / Assembly) to the broader public in Turkey.

The Imperial Edict of Reorganization: The Hatt-ı Sharif (Hatt-ı Şerif) of the Gülhane (Imperial Edict of the Rose House) or Tanzimât Fermânı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) was an 1839 proclamation by Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid I that launched the Tanzimât period of reforms and reorganization. The proclamation was issued at the behest of reformist Grand Vizier Mustafa Reshid Pasha. It promised reforms such as the abolition of tax farming, reform of conscription, and guarantee of rights to all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion or ethnic group. The goal of the decree was to help modernize the empire militarily and socially so that it could compete with the Great Powers of Europe. It also was hoped the reforms would win over the disaffected parts of the empire, especially in the Ottoman controlled parts of Europe, which were largely Christian.

The Edict of Gülhane was never fully implemented. At the end of the Crimean War, the Western powers pressured Turkey to undertake further reforms, mainly to deprive the Russians, with whom peace negotiations were then under way, of any further pretense for intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The result of these pressures was the proclamation of the Hattı Humaym (Imperial Rescript) of 18 February 1856.

The Imperial Reform Edict: Islâhat Fermânı (Ottoman Turkish: Islâhat Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu) (The Imperial Islâhat Firmân, The Imperial Reform Edict, or The Rescript of Reform) was a February 18, 1856 edict of the Ottoman government and part of the Tanzimat reforms. The decree from Sultan Abdülmecid I promised equality in education, government appointments, and administration of justice to all regardless of creed.

The Ministry of National Education: The Ministry of National Education (Turkish: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı) is a government ministry of the Republic of Turkey, responsible for the supervision of public and private educational system, agreements and authorizations under a national curriculum.

The National Security Council: The National Security Council (Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) comprises the Chief of Staff, select members of the Council of Ministers, and the President of the Republic (who is also the Commander-in-chief). Like the national security councils of other countries, the MGK develops the national security policy.

The Sivas Massacre: The Sivas massacre (Turkish: Sivas Katliamı, Madımak Katliamı) refers to the events of July 2, 1993 which resulted in the killing of 35 people, mostly Alevi intellectuals, and two hotel employees. Two people from the mob also died. The victims, who had gathered for a cultural festival in Sivas, Turkey, were killed when a mob of Salafists set fire to the hotel where the Alevi group had assembled.

The Susurluk Scandal: The Susurluk scandal was a scandal involving the close relationship between the Turkish government, the armed forces, and organized crime. The scandal surfaced with a car crash on 3 November 1996, near Susurluk, in the province of Balıkesir. The victims included the deputy chief of the Istanbul Police Department, a Member of Parliament who led a powerful Kurdish clan, and the leader of the Grey Wolves (who was a contract killer on Interpol's red list).

The Turkish War of Independence: The Turkish War of Independence (Turkish: İstiklâl Harbi, literally meaning "Independence War" or Kurtuluş Savaşı, literally meaning "Liberation War;" May 19, 1919 – July 24, 1923) was a war waged by Turkish nationalists against the Allies, after the country was occupied following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I. The Turkish National Movement (Kuva-yi Milliye) in Anatolia culminated in the formation of a new Grand National Assembly (GNA) by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues. After the end of the Turkish-Armenian, Franco-Turkish, Greco-Turkish wars, the Treaty of Sèvres was abandoned and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in July 1923. The Allies left Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey decided the establishment of a Republic in Turkey which was declared on October 29, 1923. With the establishment of the Turkish National Movement, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the sultanate, the Ottoman era and the Empire came to an end, and with Atatürk's reforms the Turks created a modern, secular nation-state on the political front.

The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey: The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Turkish: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB for short) is a confederation of all local chambers of commerce, industry and maritime as well as commodity exchanges in Turkey. The union was founded on March 8, 1950 as an umbrella organization in Ankara as the country's highest legal entity representing the private sector.

The Young Ottomans (Neo-Ottomans): The Young Ottomans (Turkish: Genç Osmanlılar) were a secret society established in 1865 by a group of Ottoman Turkish intellectuals dissatisfied with the Tanzimat reforms. Young Ottomans sought to transform the Ottoman society by preserving the empire, revitalizing Islam and modernizing along the European traditions. Among the prominent members of this society were writers and publicists İbrahim Şinasi, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi, Ziya Pasha and Agah Efendi.

TSK: The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) (Turkish: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK)) are the military forces of the Republic of Turkey. They consist of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and naval infantry), and the Air Force. The Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard, both of which have law enforcement and military functions, operate as components of the internal security forces in peacetime, and are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. In wartime, they are subordinate to the Army and Navy. The President of Turkey is the military's overall head.

Turgut Özal: (13 October 1927 – 17 April 1993) He was Prime Minister of Turkey (1983–1989) and President of Turkey (1989–1993). As Prime Minister, he transformed the economy of Turkey by paving the way for the privatization of many state enterprises. Under the military regime of 1980–1983, Turgut Özal began to direct Turkey's economy toward the free market. That process was accelerated after he became prime minister in 1983 and president in 1989. By the time of his death in 1993, Turkey's economy and society had been transformed almost beyond recognition. Özal was appointed Demirel's economic adviser in November 1979 and given the task of implementing a packet of tough monetary measures. The program, a radical departure from earlier policies, was designed to create a new economy based on exports rather than the home market. The lira was devalued 30 percent on top of the 43 percent devaluation in 1979, prices were allowed to rise sharply; and wages were tightly controlled, leading to a wave of strikes. The "law of the market" was to prevail so that only the large and efficient enterprises would survive and be competitive. He died of a heart attack in Istanbul in 1993.


Turkism: Pan-Turkism is a movement that emerged in 1880s among the Turkic intellectuals of the Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire, with the aim of cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association (Turkish: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD) is the top business association of Turkey. Founded in 1971, TUSIAD is an independent, non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting public welfare through private enterprise. TUSIAD supports independent research and policy discussions on important social and economic issues in Turkey and abroad.


STUDY A

POLARIZATION IN POLITICS AND THE SOCIETY


Graphic A-1: Which party can resolve the greatest and most urgent problems of Turkey?




Graphic A-2: Which institution do you trust the most?




Graphic A-3: Constitutional Reforms on Debate




Graphic A-4: The Debates on Ergenekon Case




Graphic A-5: Relation between the Government and Higher Judiciary Institutions




Graphic A-6: What do you think about the protests of Tekel workers?




Graphic A-7: Top Threat for Turkey




Graphic A-8: Anxiety about Establishment of Shari'a Rule




Graphic A-9: Political Parties should Be Closed when Necessary




Graphic A-10: Military can Seize the Political Power when Necessary




Graphic A-11: Expectations from Life and Perceptions




Graphic A-12: Expectations and Perceptions of Life Based on Political Party Preference




Graphic A-13: The Most Dissatisfied and the Most Satisfied




Graphic A-14: Polarization Based on Ethnic Identities




Graphic A-15: Polarization Based on Political Preferences




Graphic A-16: What do you think about the Ergenekon Case?




Graphic A-17: *What do you think about the relation of government with judiciary institutions?*




Graphic A-18: *What do you think about constitutional amendments?*




Graphic A-19: *Is military coup or religious reactionism a higher threat?*




Graphic A-20: *Religious reactionism increased in AKP term.*




Graphic A-21: Very Important Reforms were Made on Some Subjects during AKP Term.




Graphic A-22: Military can seize the power when necessary.




Graphic A-23: Political parties can be closed when necessary.




Graphic A-24: I am anxious about the establishment of Shari'a rule.




Graphic A-25: Polarization Based on Political Identities




Graphic A-26: Opinions about Different Identities



Graphic A-27: Attitude towards Different Identities Based on Education Level




Graphic A-28: Attitude towards Different Identities Based on Political Partisanship




Graphic A-29: Governance

■ Absolutely Yes ■ Yes



Graphic A-30: Attitude Based on Political Adherence in Comparison to Country Average



Graphic A-31: Laicism

■ Absolutely Yes ■ Yes

Female public employees may veil themselves.




Females in primary and secondary schools may veil themselves.




Religion classes should be compulsory for everyone.




Graphic A-32: Attitude towards Laicism Based on Education




Graphic A-33: Attitude towards Laicism Based on Political Preference




Graphic A-34: Daily Habits




Graphic A-35: Comparison of Social Life based on Habitat, Education and Age




Graphic A-36: Polarization Axes in Clusters




Graphic A-37: Polarization Based on Laicism, Tolerance and Status Quo Axes




Graphic A-38: Polarization Based on Laicism Axis



Graphic A-39: Polarization Based on Tolerance Axis




Graphic A-40: Polarization Based on Status Quo Axis




STUDY B

POLITICAL OPINION


Graphic B-1: *How old are you?*




Graphic B-2: *Gender*




Graphic B-3: *Occupation*




Graphic B-4: Education Level




Graphic B-5: Study




Graphic B-6: Type of School




Graphic B-7: Where do you live?




Graphic B-8: Which party did you vote at the last elections?




Graphic B-9: Which religious faith do you follow?




Graphic B-10: Which of the opinions that organizes religion and state relation do you support?




Graphic B-11: Which political opinion do you support?



Graphic B-12: What does political Islam mean to you?




Graphic B-13: *Are you satisfied with the current government?*




■ Yes ■ No ■ Neutral

Graphic B-14: *Do you think Islamic approach in politics assure freedoms?*




■ Yes ■ No ■ Neutral

Graphic B-15: *Do you think usage of religious symbols in the public space is appropriate?*




■ Yes ■ No ■ Neutral


Graphic B-16: *Do you think that Islamism constitutes a threat for Turkey?*




Graphic B-17: *Have you ever participated in political activities?*




Graphic B-18: *Do you be friends with the people you do not share the same political opinion?*




Graphic B-19: *Do you think Islam causes conflict in Turkish society?*




Graphic B-20 *Do you think that media assists liberal thought?*




Graphic B-21: *Do you practice religion?*



Graphic B-22: Which of the following elements do you think influence lifestyle more?




Graphic B-23: Do you think that your freedom is restricted by the society?



■ Yes ■ No ■ Neutral

Graphic B-24: Do you think the society is tolerant?



■ Yes ■ No ■ Neutral

Survey Report for Assessment of Political Opinion

Basic Information about Survey

The survey consists of 24 multiple choice questions on various topics related to demographic features of the participants and political Islam. All data was collected and processed by www.esurveyspro.com. Even though basic statistical data of the participants was collected and processed, unfortunately I was unable to prepare a crosstab report as my free account did not allow me to retrieve such kind of information. Considering the survey was conducted between 13.07.2012 and 02.08.2012, some data may have altered due to the social changes in Turkey during the last one year. The response option of survey was set to anonymous multiple answers in order to protect participant's privacy and provide convenience for those who respond in a multi-user environment. Survey was responded by 160 people that allow us to analyze the Turkish society roughly through a 10 % standard deviation if solely the quantity of participants is taken into consideration. The survey was prepared and run only in Turkish at the beginning; English legends were added after the survey was closed. All questions were designed as mandatory; therefore none of the 24 questions were skipped by participants.

As this report was submitted through social media and emails, the prerequisites to respond were having access to a computer, having internet connection, owning account on social media or having email address as well as being literate. Besides, participants who shared their opinion were mainly the group which is dissatisfied with the political environment in Turkey and mainly the people that identify themselves as laic social democrats whose political preference is predominantly CHP. Therefore we cannot consider this report as 100 % accurate to the reality of Turkish society.

I believe it is also important to state that before I discovered this website, I attempted to organize this survey in paper format based on one-on-one meetings. However approximately only 20 % of the people which I requested a one-on-one meeting accepted my request. As there was not enough data to use from the meetings that I could make, I decided that an online poll could be more trustworthy. Therefore, from this incident we can assume that 80 % of the participants in a small seaside holiday village that consists of 83 housings and approximately 166 individuals (if we suppose that each house has 2 inhabitants) in northwestern Turkey where the majority of population are holidaymakers from different regions preferred not to share their political opinion with an alien. Moreover, their attitude also may be related to their reluctance for discussing politics during their holiday season.

Analysis Based on Responses

1. In the first question we are able to collect demographical data based on the age of participants. We can see the majority of the responses come from the people between 45 and 59. This range forms the 43.13 % of the participants. The second group is the young individuals under 29 which form 35 % of the participants. While the participants between 30 and 44 form 15.63 %, the participants above 60 % are only 6.25 %. We can see that the most concerned segments about political Islam are the young people under 29 and middle aged people between 45 and 59.
2. Majority of the participants are male which form 65 % of our participants.
3. Majority of the participants are employees and form 41.25 %. Pensioners follow employees by 23.75 % and students by 16.25 %. The lowest groups are self-employed people, unemployed and employers. Under those circumstances it is seen that employees are the most dissatisfied group from the current political situation.

4. The higher education graduates are above board participants with 93.13 % while only 6.88 % are high school graduates which means that the participants are highly educated elite circles. It is interesting to see there are no participants who did not complete 8 years of compulsory curriculum.
5. 47.50 % of the participants have completed a course on social sciences while 26.25 % completed sciences and 18.13 % completed vocational education. It is remarkable to see that there is only 1 person that completed a religious curriculum among 160 people. This question was important to see how many of the participants were graduated from the laic schools.
6. Majority of the participants have attended a state school with a 91.88 % score, while only 6.88 % attended private school and 1.25 % did not attend either. This means that the majority attended the same monotype state schools with a strict laic education.
7. 83.13 % of the participants participated in the survey from metropolises such as Istanbul, Izmir or Ankara while only 1.25 % participated from villages and towns. According to the statistics, the participant group is highly urbanized.
8. As we see in the statistics, the majority is formed by social democrat CHP. We can count several reasons for the predominance of social democrats;
 - Education level – Based on several other reports, we can see that the majority of people who define themselves as social democrats are educated, elite circles. Therefore they are open about sharing their opinions in such platforms.
 - Satisfaction – As the majority of social democrats consider political Islam as a threat, they usually tend to actively participate to online polls in order to emphasize their dissatisfaction.
 - Avidity – Generally conservative people tend to hide their political opinion in such kind of polls because of their distrust. The reason of this distrust can be the oppressive political atmosphere throughout the entire Turkish history. Since childhood, the participants is programmed for not to discuss politics in public space. Besides, considering AKP is a conservative party; conservative circles may not see the benefit of participating in such kind of a survey as they do not have anything to complain about.
 - Circles – As the survey was conducted through social media and emails, the responders consisted of my circles and their circles. Therefore, diversity of the responders was restricted.

Besides this information, we can see that other parties form 10 % of the responders while 9.38 % voted for other parties, 9.38 % voted for MHP and only 5.63 % was voted for AKP.
9. We see that 79.38 % of the participants believe in Islam. However, it is very interesting to see 15 % of the participants are non-believers.
10. Graphic B-10 is about opinions of the participants about laicism and secularism. Even though laicism and secularism are accepted to be the same in English, there is a slight meaning distinction between them in Turkish. Secularism means the separation of state and religious affairs from each other. In secularism, state does not have a policy towards religion which assures freedom of religious activities, it is equally distant from all faiths and it does not have an institution for organizing religious activities, instead all faiths have their chambers to organize their activities. This system is more likely the one that currently USA accepts. On the other hand laicism is a system originates from France. Laicism also means distinction of state and religious affairs, but slightly in the advantage of the state. In other words, state can keep religion under pressure in a laic system and shape it according to its needs. In laicism religion is under state's control and eventually become a political tool which allows only the religious activities that the state desires, it has an unofficial religious policy such as Sunni Islam in Turkey and religious institutions are under

administration of an institution such as Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey. This system was a part of Turkish political system during its entire history.. Even though the distribution is balanced in this graphic, those who believe that laicism is a better system are the 54.38 % of participants. This shows that the majority is anxious about the prominence of religious values and wants a strict control over religion.

11. It is seen that 36.88 % of the participants define themselves as democrats while 30 % claim that they are socialists according to Graphic B-11. It is strange to see that liberalists only form 15 % of the participants. On the other hand religious conservatives form the smallest cluster with 3.75 % probably because of the previous evaluations made. When this question is analyzed along with question number 8, is seen that there are different perspectives in each political group. According to the statistics it can be presumed that especially CHP shelters liberal, socialist and democrat groups within it.
12. Graphic B-12 analyzes what the participants of Study B think about political Islam. Therefore, all answers are designed to give a clear understanding of what they vote for. Even though, this question might have been perceived a little biased or offensive by some circles due to its nature, it was necessary in order to understand participants' perception on political Islam. The most important finding is the perception of participants about politicians. 40 % of the participants claim that political Islam is a system which politicians implemented in order to orient the society. This means that majority of the participants do not trust politicians and they think political Islam is a false definition which was imposed by them in order to orient people for their interest. 21.88 % of the participants think that political Islam is a system which was developed by the Western societies. This should also be considered along with USA's moderate Islam project for Middle East which caused rapid transformations in many countries. 13.75 % of the participants think that it is a secular set of ordinances which are implemented in a democratic system by a conservative party. This mostly states the current situation in Turkey considering AKP's conservative nature and the changes which they implemented in the democratic system during the last 11 years. 12.50 % of the participants think that it is basically a system that follows Shari'a rules such as in Iran. The least participants with 11.88 % think that political Islam is a local solidarity network that was implemented by the Islamist movement in order to transform the masses and give them a voice in national area while this should have been the most accurate answer under normal circumstances. Because when RP term is analyzed in 1990's it is clearly seen that party organization was really being the voice of conservative people by providing them the opportunity to be represented, educate themselves and work in solidarity organizations. As this term really has significance for political Islam and as it was maybe the first time the religious conservatives were able to show themselves, this could be considered as a more accurate answer. However, as it is seen that the majority agree that it is a false system which was implemented by the politicians.
13. Objective of Graphic B-13 is to see if the participants of Study B are satisfied with the current AKP government. As we see from the graphic, 84.38 % of the participants are not happy with the government. It is certain that the recent polarization affected government's reputation such as prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan's fierce attitude against people that were concerned about the implementations against laicism, government's towards military officials and Ergenekon Case, government's attitude towards Syrian civil war, abatement of action about Madımak Hotel victims, legislation of the code letting imam-hatip graduates to be admitted in the faculties other than theology faculties, arrest of journalists, legislation of the code letting the trade of forestry lands and economical conditions.
14. Graphic B-14 shows that 85 % of the participants agree that Islamic approach in politics does not assure freedoms. This proves that participants see Islam as an autocratic element in politics.

15. It is seen on Graphic B-15 while 58.13 % of the participants think that using religious symbols is inappropriate in public space, 32.50 % are not against it. When this graphic is analyzed along with Graphic B-8, it can be presumed that also some CHP electorates tolerate veiling in public space.
16. Graphic B-16 shows that 70 % of the participants think that Islamism constitutes a threat for Turkey while 22.50 % does not agree that hypothesis. Again, when this question is paired with question number 8, we can presume that some CHP electorates either do not think Islamism is a threat or they are unsure about it. Moreover, Graphic B-16 shows that 84.38 % of the participants of Study B think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish society.
17. Graphic B-17 shows that 53.13 % of the participants of Study B state that they do not participate in political activities while 43.75 % participate. This shows that the participants are almost divided in half on participating in political activities.
18. Graphic B-18 also shows that the polarization about tolerance is not that deep yet. According to Graphic B-18, 91.25 % of the participants say that they can be friends with people from different opinions. This means that the participants are mainly discontent about political situation rather than the social situation in the country.
19. Graphic B-19 shows that 84.38 % of the participants of Study B think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish society.
20. According to Graphic B-20, 52.50 % of the participants do not think that the media supports liberal thought. This perception should be related to the government's strict policies on media corporations, actions against freedom of opinion, arrest of journalists and suspicious confiscation of some media corporations and their transfer to the companies known as close to the government. But considering % 47.51 of the participants are either natural or think that media assists liberal thoughts, we can say that the respondents are divided into half about the role of media.
21. According to Graphic B-21, 45 % of the participants of Study B state that they practice religion partially while 38.75 % do not practice at all. Only 16.25 % of the participants mention that they practice religion.
22. According to Graphic B-22, 44.38 % of the participants of Study B believe that social environment has the highest influence on lifestyle. While family takes place in the second place with 30.63 %, 12.50 % of participants mentioned that economy affects lifestyle. A few of participants think that media, school and friends can affect lifestyle while no one agrees that migration is a determiner of lifestyle.
23. On the other hand, Graphic A-23 presents that 71.88 % of the participants of Study B feel that they are restrained by the participants while only 23.13 % say that they feel completely free. This means more than half of the participants feel constrained by the others.
24. Graphic B-24 shows that 57.50 % of participants do not think that the society is tolerant towards different opinions while 23.13 % thinks it is and 19.38 % do not have a certain idea on that. This means that more than half of the participants do not feel comfortable in social life.

Analysis Summary

Majority of the participants in the survey consist of middle aged, urban, democrat, Muslim males between 45 and 59 who are graduated from a public higher education institution on social sciences and work as employees. Almost three quarters of the participants are CHP electorates that are not satisfied with the current AKP government. Majority believe that religion should be under control of the state. A major part of the participants consider that political Islam is a system that politicians implemented in order to orient the participants in their interest. More than

three fourths of participants do not think that Islam in politics does not assure freedoms while more than half of the participants do not want to see religious items in public space. A major part of the participants think that Islamism is a threat for Turkey. Majority have never participated in political activities. Almost all participants say that they make friends from different opinions, but in the meanwhile they think that Islam causes conflict in Turkish participants. Half of the participants think that media does not assist liberal thought. Majority partially practices their religion, thinks that their freedom is restricted by the participants which is not tolerant. A major part of the participants think that social environment is the most important factor in influencing lifestyle.

STUDY C

SUBJECT 1

Interviewer: Today's topic is political Islam and I will get your opinions on it.

Participant: Of course.

Interviewer: First of all I would like to know your name if you do not mind.

Participant: Ş.

Interviewer: How old are you Ş.?

Participant: 26

Interviewer: What is your occupation?

Participant: I am currently studying. I am assigned in a master's program.

Interviewer: At which institution?

Participant: At Istanbul University in Istanbul Researches Department.

Interviewer: What is your research about?

Participant: I write a thesis about immigration.

Interviewer: Which university did you graduate from?

Participant: From International Relations Department of Uludağ University.

Interviewer: Which kind of schools did you attend first?

Participant: I went to state schools.

Interviewer: Did you ever attend a private school or an imam-hatip school?

Participant: I have always studied at public schools, but at high school I attended an English-weighted high school.

Interviewer: Where did you attend to school?

Participant: I went to school in Istanbul.

Interviewer: In which city were you born?

Participant: I was born in Istanbul.

Interviewer: Where are you originally from?

Participant: My mother is from Hopa, Artvin; my father's father is from Greece but my father was born in Istanbul.

Interviewer: You said your mother is from Hopa; do you have any Georgian ancestry?

Participant: They are not Georgian, but they came from Georgia through population exchange after the establishment of Turkey.

Interviewer: Do you join political activities?

Participant: We always supported CHP as a family, so I was raised with the ideology of Atatürk since my childhood. I did not join political activities that much during the university period, I went to the meetings of CHP for a few times in Ankara. After my graduation, I joined the Atatürkist Thought Association's activities, but apart from that I was not very into the politics.

Interviewer: Did you join to the youth branch of any party?

Participant: No, after the university I just worked in the youth branch of the Atatürkist Thought Association. It was an association, was not a political party. But I do not think the association is that neutral; even though they do not have an organic link with CHP they are still linked in a way.

Interviewer: Which political ideology do you support?

Participant: There was a big impact of my family in determining my ideology. We were supporting CHP and Kemalist ideology. For example when I was at the university I was staying in the university dormitories, at first my father did not want to send me there, because he was concerned that I would veil myself as a result of being affected by the main atmosphere there. He thought the religious fanatics there might influence me and we argued about this several times. These incidents have a major influence on determining my ideology. However, when I joined the association after the university, I realized that I was not Kemalist. I think it is incorrect to sanctify his ideology. Respecting his thought and sanctifying his ideology are different things.

Interviewer: Which party did you vote at elections?

Participant: I voted for CHP at the last elections, but next time I will not participate in elections.

Interviewer: Are you tolerant to liberal thoughts?

Participant: I support liberal thoughts. I am working in human rights area, but I worry about the definition of freedom. The boundaries of freedom are disputable. There is constitution which all subjects including the state itself should respect. Prominence of Islam worries me; that is why I ask myself about the boundaries of freedom. In this sense I share the anxiety of the majority of laic society.

Interviewer: Where do you see yourself in the sense of religious belief, do you practice religion?

Participant: This is also another thing that I question. I try to meet some of the requirements from time to time. I believe in Islam, but if you ask what kind of a Muslim I am, I can say that I filtered the religious values and built up a belief system by myself. I am not a very religious person in terms of obligations, but I like to see faithful people. Faith is a good thing. I also follow a faith, but I believe everyone should be free on what to believe.

Interviewer: What do you think about political Islam; how would you define it?

Participant: I would say it is an idea that the West imposed or it is a method of politicians to abuse religious values. There is a global tendency towards right. Actually, usage of Islam as a political tool in Turkey is reasonable as Turkey has a Muslim majority. I think it is a set of rules that are implemented by a conservative party.

Interviewer: What do you think about the solidarity network that is supported by the conservative society?

Participant: Until now, the conservative people were not that much visible, this actually was an opportunity for them to come together and defend their ideas.

Interviewer: Do you think political Islam presents a threat?

Participant: I am suspicious on it. I do not like the prominence of Islamic values. For example when I think about establishment of mosques at the universities, prohibition of abortion, etc., I think the Islamic values are promoted and this worries me because there are also people that do not follow any faith. Of course the conservatives also have rights; it is important that they live according to their beliefs but in this sense prohibiting abortion is pointless for non-believers. I am not against veiled people, but their freedom ends where mine starts. However, most religious conservative people do not agree on that. Nevertheless, I support the secularist model like in the USA which has an equal distance to all religions, but not the laic model in Turkey which basically has control over religion.

Interviewer: Do you think that Turkey is imposed to be a model for the region by external powers?

Participant: I think this is more like a conspiracy theory; I do not want to think this deep.

Interviewer: What do you think about Arab Spring; do you think it was a civil uprising?

Participant: Such kind of incidents do not arise beyond the desire of the West. For instance, Mubarak was supported by USA; but at the point that he completed his mission, he was overthrown and manifestations started followingly. For this reason, I suspect the incidents are only for democracy.

Interviewer: What do you think about the practices of the current government; are you content?

Participant: I think they do a good job. But on the other hand promotion of religious values at the term of AKP government makes me uncomfortable. While religion was never discussed at my home before, it became a daily subject recently.

Interviewer: What do you think about the people fitting the Islamic values according to themselves such as the ladies covering their hair but wearing a revealing dress?

Participant: After a point, religious values transformed into political tools and values lost their significance. Promotion of religious values by a political party is bothersome.

Interviewer: What do you think about religious communities?

Participant: I am against communities; I think associations are more creditable.

Interviewer: What do you think about veiling at public space?

Participant: It is a religious symbol. I was not used to see that many people with religious outfit before. Because I am a former CHP supporter, I have a different state of mind and that is why this really affected me. I even started to dream of covered women. I believe veiling should be a personal choice. There are two important things; first of all constitution should be studied in order to determine limits of freedom and secondly the practices in the western countries should be reviewed. For instance we can give an example; think of a veiled psychologist, her patient might want to consult an issue about sexuality; psychologist's orientation according to her religious values can lead the patient in a wrong way. If the psychologist does not use her position to impose her thoughts, then it is OK; but certainty of this or objectivity of the education that is given by a veiled teacher is polemical. I cannot be sure how this would orient a child.

Interviewer: What do you think about Shari'a?

Participant: I think Shari'a is the last step in transformation to an Islamist state. It is not possible to speak about an Islamist state without Shari'a rules. For instance Sudan; it is an Islam republic which is governed through Shari'a. I hope such a thing would not happen in Turkey.

Interviewer: What do you think about secularism or laicism?

Participant: I think AKP follows a policy which is based on seizing the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Most of the conservatives say they are secularists not laics, at this point I think presence of the presidency should be questioned. We do not know the future program of AKP, maybe merging Presidency of Religious Affairs to a ministry is in their agenda. Then there is a possibility for the president to use this entity according to the needs. Thus, AKP can orient the religion and state affairs as they wish. If they want to transform to an Islam state, this would also be a step for it. If this is the case, they can start to follow an Islamist policy through assigning a caliphate. In this case it would be an entity to serve for the ones in the power. I think the state should not have a policy on religion.

Interviewer: What do you think on corruption in politics?

Participant: Almost all parties do that. But, when Islam is used as a political tool, it loses its significance. When the organizations such as Deniz Feneri which are based on Islamic values do corruption it frustrates me. Recently we started to see the reality and realized that such parties and organizations are actually not that innocent.

Interviewer: What do you think about the people consider themselves as Muslims but do not practice religion?

Participant: If you would speak about this to a fanatic person, they would probably claim that you need to meet the obligations if you are Muslim. In my opinion this is all about the inner system of the individuals, you should live as you feel. Even if Islamic values are imposed by force, if forced person is not happy with practicing religion, then it

has no meaning. If the people want, they can adopt the religious way of life, but they should not force others. I am against the neighborhood pressure.

Interviewer: What do you think about committing sins? (i.e. consuming alcohol)

Participant: It is up to my decision; even if I drink alcohol I drink it for myself, this should not interest anyone.

Interviewer: Why do you think political Islam started to attract so much interest?

Participant: When the Republic of Turkey was formed, a more homogenous nationalist structure was desired. For this reason also Kurdish people felt the same pressure that Islamists felt; progress of an Islamist ideology was not desired. CHP ignored that the country has a Muslim majority and there is a group which consider Islamic values as important. Actually Islamist community felt excluded, because they felt their rights were neglected. The reason of their current organization is to reclaim their rights back.

Interviewer: What do you think about existence of Islamist parties in the political system?

Participant: I think there should be parties from all thoughts.

Interviewer: Do you think Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life?

Participant: Actually I think it does. I can feel there are the separatist acts, but I do not know how to explain it precisely.

Interviewer: Do you think the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts?

Participant: Yes, but we should also consider how independent the media is. I do not think media is independent in Turkey.

Interviewer: Do you think media is effective globally?

Participant: Yes, indeed it is.

Interviewer: What do you think about women's situation in Islam?

Participant: Actually now Islamic feminism has started, now we see that veiled women also have a voice, they run their own businesses and join political activities. Even though the importance of women is increasing, it is possible to say that women still lag behind especially in rural areas of Muslim countries while they have the same rights with men in urban life.

Interviewer: Which factors are influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle?

Participant: I think the people are influenced by the society and their family. If I should give an example from my family, I see my mother's side tends to Islamic values recently. For example while my mother was consuming alcohol in the past, she started to practice religion and stopped consuming alcohol. Besides, one of my friends from the university who was not using a headscarf suddenly decided to cover her head and completely changed her life style; another friend decided to veil after a traffic accident. Apart from that, of course family influences people's decisions. In my circle of acquaintances I see a tendency to the right wing, but I do not know what the exact reason is.

Interviewer: What do you think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards each other?

Participant: For example in Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı (Society Volunteers Foundation) liberal and conservative people are working together and give messages of unity, these people work side by side; but of course I do not know how integrated they are. It is about people's point of view, if they tolerate they can live together.

Interviewer: Do you feel any restraint from different political groups?

Participant: I felt my family pushed me to be Kemalist. For example, my family supports CHP and they still blench when their opinion about Kurds is asked; I also was grown up with this idea. Now I feel the pressure about Islamic values from the society. I think these constraints are an outcome of the political system.

SUBJECT 2

Interviewer: The topic of today's interview will be about political Islam for my master's thesis. First of all, can I learn your name?

Participant: Of course, it is T.

Interviewer: How old are you?

Participant: 27

Interviewer: What is your occupation?

Participant: I am a German teacher; I give lessons to the high school and secondary school students.

Interviewer: What education do you have?

Participant: I did not do an extra research following the university; I carry on my profession.

Interviewer: Which schools did you attend?

Participant: I completed my compulsory curriculum and graduated from Marmara University followingly.

Interviewer: Did you attend imam-hatip schools?

Participant: No.

Interviewer: Where do you live?

Participant: I live in Istanbul as a part of the crowded city life.

Interviewer: Where are your parents from?

Participant: My parents are also from Istanbul.

Interviewer: Do you perform political activities?

Participant: I think I have a lot to do in this area and therefore I perform political activities. I worked on several platforms.

Interviewer: Which political ideology do you support?

Participant: I define myself as a democrat indeed. My parents are a bit conservative in family life, but they are also democrats as a political ideology.

Interviewer: Where do you see yourself in the sense of religious belief, do you practice religion?

Participant: I try to meet religious requirements as much as I can, but of course I cannot claim that I do everything perfectly. It is a bit difficult for a person to say where they see themselves in terms of religion, I think only God can decide that. As currently we are in the month of Ramadan, fasting is required and I try to perform as much as my health allows me. I also try to meet the other requirements depending on my timetable, but we are not in this world only for religion; social life and business life are also important.

Interviewer: What do you think about political Islam; how would you define it?

Participant: I am against the statement of political Islam, because I do not believe the existence of such kind of a concept. This is a long subject that should be discussed; I think political Islam is a statement that was suggested by orientalist, people that does not want to see the success that conservative understanding sustains under democracy and people do not want to acknowledge this order to raise tension. I am against political Islam.

Interviewer: Do you think political Islam is a statement that some interest groups suggested to keep maintain their benefits?

Participant: It is not exactly what I wanted to say. This is an assertion that arose in the recent past when Turkey is taken into consideration. When we think of the political parties in power and the conditions of the period, I believe political Islam is a statement which was suggested by the circles that ignore the advance of conservatism to raise tension in the society.

Interviewer: Do you think political Islam is a threat for Turkey?

Participant: Right now it is not capable of generating a threat for Turkey. Such kind of statements were made in the past, as democracy culture advances and the system settles people see that Turkey will sustain a democratic system; so political Islam is far from being a threat.

Interviewer: Do you think that Turkey is imposed to be a model for the region by external powers?

Participant: I do not think that external powers has an influence on that, this situation is peculiar to Turkey. Turkey is an example country where the people following different faiths live together in a democratic and laic system. The messages, which our prime-minister gave in his visits to Middle East in the recent past, show that Turkey is ascending as an example country. The struggle of the people in other countries shows that. I absolutely do not think that the external powers have an influence on that, because Turkey is an independent country and it progresses in a good way. Therefore it does not need orientation.

Interviewer: Which party did you vote for in the last elections?

Participant: I think the people should express their political attitude freely. I voted for AKP in the last elections.

Interviewer: What do you think about the current AKP government?

Participant: I am very satisfied about its implementations; that is why I voted for it. I am especially satisfied with their positive attitude towards innovative ideas, efforts to solve problems and progress in domestic and international politics. Only the rapid transformations in Turkey's agenda and bad reactions against AKP for these implementations were challenging, it would be better if implementations were done gradually.

Interviewer: What do you think about the usage of religious items in the public space and do you think headscarf is also a religious item?

Participant: Turban or headscarf, you know there was a meaning conflict about that which was created by the groups whom suggested the political Islam definition; but for me it is absolutely not a political symbol. Prayer rug or bead can be religious materials but headscarf is a dressing style for the women to conceal their charm. I am not against headscarf, because in the end the public area is a civilian area, people should be more tolerant towards that. I do not feel uncomfortable about the symbols that individuals bear as long as they do not make others uncomfortable.

Interviewer: What do you think about the people that adjust Islamic values to their style? (i.e. the ladies cover their hair but wear revealing dresses)

Participant: I think dressing is also a preference; everyone has the right to dress according to their taste regardless being veiled or not. That is why; I tolerate and do not feel uncomfortable about it.

Interviewer: What do you think about Shari'a?

Participant: I do not envisage anything about an Islamic state; therefore I do not see the need of a state which is ruled through Shari'a. This is not an option in Turkey anymore; as we see the citizens of countries which are ruled by an Islamist order also want to live their faith in a democratic system. I think the epoch of such extreme thoughts has ended.

Interviewer: What do you think about secularism or laicism?

Participant: We always hear about laicism and secularism, the people are more conscious on that recently. Turkey is a laic state at present. When we investigate secularism seems to be a more flexible concept, eventually while laicism is a political concept, secularism is more sociological; that is why people might see secularism more suitable as it is flexible; but until the recent past, laicism was perceived differently, because of the suppression of laic system, they were standing against it. But during AKP term, laic system has settled better; because there is no intervention to the faith, they are more comfortable. Therefore, I do not see any issues about laicism and I hope the orientalist are also convinced about the new laicism perception.

Interviewer: What do you think about corruption in politics?

Participant: As any citizen I am also against corruption. It was a higher threat before AKP term and we lived the consequences of that all together. During the term of current government, there are implementations to prevent this. That is why I do not see corruption as a threat anymore. Eventually corruption is something I always stand against, no one should use their positions for interests. This is also something that is related to the personality of the people; it is something not related to the ideology but mentality. People should think about the consequences of their actions, this is a civic responsibility.

Interviewer: What do you think about the people consider themselves as Muslims but do not practice religion?

Participant: People's religious orientations should not interest anyone else as long as they do not interfere with the others' liberties. Personally I do not consider this while approaching people. I think meeting religious requirements is something between the person and their God, but people should not hurt each other's feelings. Recently there are not that much, but still there are people insulting veiled women or in the opposite, the women wear revealing dresses. I think those should not happen. The most important thing is to respect people because they are human.

Interviewer: Why do you think political Islam started to attract so much interest?

Participant: It would be more accurate to interpret this as conservative people, not as political Islam. First of all I do not think AKP is an Islamist party; it is a conservative democrat party which is also stated by the party organization. A trust was built between AKP and the people; therefore it was elected three terms in a row. Ten years ago everything was more complicated, more different; the economical situation was extremely challenging that Kemal Derviş was invited from USA and even he was not successful. AKP made a great progress concerning rights and freedom and implemented its election promises. That is why AKP attracts that much attention.

Interviewer: What do you think about existence of Islamist parties in the political system?

Participant: For example, SP promotes religious values but we still cannot claim that it is an Islamist party; I also do not think they have a different agenda about the political system. In other countries Islamist parties might have emerged because of the conditions in their society but they have nothing to compare with the parties in Turkey. As religious faith is an individual space, a person's religious belief only interests oneself. In an epoch that the states based on religion disappear one by one, I do not think that Islamist parties are necessary. Nevertheless, I believe that various parties to defend various opinions should take place in the political system. Besides, also the political and social environment of the country should also be evaluated. It is important to know how and what do the Christian parties represent in the countries they are located and what they promise to their supporters. That is why this should be evaluated more comprehensively.

Interviewer: Do you think Islam plays a disintegrating role in Turkish social life?

Participant: I believe both segments should not avoid speaking about the current situation of Turkish society. The reluctant individuals should probably be hesitating as a result of their lack of knowledge. However, now there is rather a relieved ambience in Turkey; that is why everyone is free to discuss their thoughts. Objective of the circles who introduced political Islam twenty years ago was to establish a ground for conflicts and distract the current harmony. Because conservative people were shown as religious extremists and this way impossibility of execution of a democratic system tried to be proven by some circles; this is a result of the struggle for political power. This is not the case at the present day, but this separatist perspective was attempted to be imposed in the past. Right now there are not separatist thoughts; everyone can discuss their opinions freely.

Interviewer: Do you think the media plays a role in spreading liberal thoughts?

Participant: Indeed. Now, door-to-door promotion is outdated, internet and the TV has replaced it; that is why media plays an important role on spreading liberal thoughts. Also social media encourages people to state their ideas freely. Media is also important in Turkey for the same reasons; we have seen that media caused great transformations on the opinions of people, but of course it should be used consciously. Because if media gets under influence of an authority

and tries to orient people in an obsessive manner, it becomes misleading. But media gets more liberal each day in Turkey which is pleasing.

Interviewer: What do you think about women's situation in Islam?

Participant: "Heaven is under mothers' feet." idiom means a lot. A politician, a beggar or a soldier are all begotten by a mother; that is why women are very important in Islam. It is also written in the Farewell Sermon of Mohammed that the women were entrusted to men by God; this is also very elucidative. Unfortunately there are still places where women are neglected because they are weaker, such as Afghanistan; it is not possible to speak about women rights there. This is because of the oppressive regimes but in Islam as a religion, it is not possible to say the women are ignored. I suspect the faith of those who mistreat women; because in our religion no one should limit the freedom of others and men should pay attention to women. Some men's desire about suppression of women is an issue related to lack of education. I think the men who mistreat women are either uneducated or mentally unbalanced. Nevertheless, place of women is very important in Turkish society; women have a voice in important platforms. For example while the number of women deputies was 48 in the past, this number increased to 78 at the present day in Turkish parliament; this is a very good progress. Moreover, the implementations on women rights are very successful; shelter is given to the women suffering from maltreatment, financial aid is given for the women that lost their husbands. Considering that women also take place in important tasks at the present day, we can say that importance given to the women is thriving. One of the other alluring sides of AKP is its respect to women and youth. I hope the number of maltreating people to women will decrease soon.

Interviewer: Which factors are influential on spreading Islamic lifestyle?

Participant: If we keep the people that do not let the women in their household to go out, as this is related to the mentality of people rather than religion itself, seeing more veiled women in the daily life could be considered as an outcome of abolishing the strict rules in public space against the conservative women. Those kinds of restrictions are vexatious as headscarf is not a style only Muslim women prefer. People that follow different faiths all around the world use it without encountering strict restrictions. I do not think the number of veiled women increased, but I think they are more visible in the social life after the abolishment of restrictions.

Interviewer: What do you think about the relation of people from different political or religious opinions towards each other?

Participant: I think the people shall approach each other humanly, differences are not important. If a person approaches impolitely to me because of my political view while I approach them humanly, I would get frustrated. I think the people should not be prejudiced. This is what I strive for, I have friends from different faiths around me, but I respect their choices. I think this should not affect interpersonal relationships.

Interviewer: Do you feel any restraint from different political groups?

Participant: There were some circles that strived for disintegrating the society and restrict the freedom of opinion in the past, but I believe these circles could not hang on during AKP term; now I do not feel any pressure.

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DECLARATION

Hereby I agree that the printed, visual and recorded materials collected during this interview are subject to educational purposes and I have no objections for usage and publication of those materials.

Name / Surname:

Signature: